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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores an important yet underexplored aspect of management studies, 
which is that some individuals and organisations in business gain a cultural 
significance and popularity in society, which goes beyond simply being known as 
being high quality.  Specifically, I explore how business actors garner celebrity value 
and explore consequences it can have for themselves and those around them. In paper 
1, co-authored with my thesis supervisors, I explore how the press construct 
entrepreneurs as celebrities and this study provides new knowledge about how certain 
individuals in business become celebrities and how the press create their personas. In 
the second paper, under the guidance of Michael Pfarrer and Daniel Gamache while 
a visiting scholar at the University of Georgia, I theorise the formation and 
consequences of hubris developing at a collective level in an organization.  In my 
third paper, I explore a celebrity spillover effect from a focal celebrity actor to those 
that they compete with.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The outcome of the 2016 American presidential election can serve as an 
example of the power that being well known in business can have in society.  
Scholars have described this concept of well-knowingness as “celebrity” which is a 
social approval asset that consists of broad attention and highly positive affect 
towards an actor (Rindova, Pollock & Hayward, 2006). It is different from other 
positive social approval assets such as high reputation and high status in that the 
media representations of actors and the emotive response this generates in an 
audience are key to their construction as celebrities (for a excellent summary see 
Rindova et al., 2006 p.54).  
The concept of celebrity has a long tradition in social studies and is seen as a 
reaction by society to the diminishing power of traditional institutions such as the 
church and state by relying on the charisma and personal attributes of unique 
individuals (Boorstin, 1962; Mills, 1957; Weber, 1948). According to Van Krieken 
(2012: 5) celebrity is “essentially about high public visibility and recognition”. Early 
empirical research on celebrity focused on the entertainment industries (Gamson, 
1994), and pointed out how Hollywood and other entertainment hubs engaged with 
the media to create a conveyor belt of new stars, from whom, both the press and the 
film studios could mutually profit. They did so as they believed that the increased 
interest in the personal life of entertainment stars as reported in the media would 
induce audiences to buy the cultural products they were associated with. 
This dissertation will add important contributions to the developing work in 
management studies regarding this construct. Studies have focused on two areas on 
the development of celebrity (cf Hayward, Rindova and Pollock, 2004; Rindova, 
Pollock & Hayward, 2006; Zavyalova, Pfarrer & Reger, 2017) and the effects of it for 
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the focal celebrity actor (Cho, Arthurs, Townsend, Miller & Barden, 2016; Hubbard, 
Pollock, Pfarrer, and Rindova, 2018; Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick & Pollock, 2017; 
Pfarrer, Rindova & Pollock, 2010; Kjaergaard, Morsing & Ravasi, 2011). This 
dissertation will extend both of these areas by adding important empirical insights to 
both the creation of celebrity in the press and two new areas related the 
effects/consequences of celebrity. Therefore this dissertation will answer the question 
what are the antecedents, consequences and effects of celebrity in an entrepreneurial 
organisational and competitive context? 
Celebrity has been conceptualized to develop in a business context through 
exciting press narratives and non-conforming action by the focal actor and has been 
theorized at the organizational level (Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova, Pfarrer and 
Reger, 2017) and for CEOs (Hayward, Rindova & Pollock, 2004) at the individual 
level.  In all conceptions the press are considered integral to the formation of celebrity 
for an actor. Recently scholars have argued that the process itself is likely to have 
subsequent effects on how the actor behaves (Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick & Pollock, 
2017) and how some  
Celebrity has been shown to affect a range of outcomes at both levels of 
analysis such as individual performance evaluations (Cho et al., 2016), leaders’ 
strategic behaviours (Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick & Pollock, 2017) stakeholders’ 
perceptions (Pfarrer, Rindova, and Pollock, 2010), employee engagement (Kjærgaard, 
Morsing and Ravasi, 2011), acquisition premiums (Cho et al., 2016), alliance 
formations (Hubbard, Pollock, Pfarrer, and Rindova, 2018), and shareholder value 
(Koh, 2011).   
 This dissertation aims to extend the developing work in this area of 
management research by providing more empirical work to the largely theoretical 
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extant arguments for the development of celebrity as well as providing insights into 
the effects and outcomes of celebrity. I also add to three levels of analysis: the 
individual, the organization and the industry as well as contributing to both 
entrepreneurship and strategy conversations.  
 In chapter 2, I explore the development of celebrity entrepreneurs in the press. 
Utilising a narrative based qualitative design, I analysed the press coverage of four 
entrepreneurs with high press coverage and signs of high visibility with four 
entrepreneurs with similar success but with low levels of media coverage and fewer 
signs of high visibility. In the resulting analysis, I describe how the press developed 
the higher coverage group in a similar manner and gradually imbued their names with 
a significance that transcended their entrepreneurial accomplishments, and constituted 
them as categorical prototypes and cultural symbols.  
In chapter 3, I conceptually argue how hubris can develop in positively 
attributed organizations. I outline a conceptual argument about highly positive 
external attributions can cause hubris to collectively develop in an organization and 
this can have two outcomes defined as latitude and insularity and for them in terms of 
subsequent actions. I then argue that hubris will influence organizational culture, thus 
making it a more enduring characteristic of the organization.  
In chapter 4, I quantitatively test and find support for a celebrity spill over 
effect from a focal celebrity actor to those they compete with, utilizing a novel data 
set from professional mixed martial arts. . My findings show that there is a 
longitudinal positive spill over effect from celebrity actors to those who compete 
against them and still exists even if the outcome is considered as negative. 
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 PAPER ONE:   
THE FACES OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: MEDIA NARRATIVES 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CELEBRITY ENTREPRENEURS 
 
 
 
In this paper, we examine how the popular press constructed four entrepreneurs – Bill 
Gates, Steve Jobs, Jeff Bezos, and Mark Zuckerberg – as societal-level celebrities. We 
compare their press coverage in prominent magazines and newspapers with the coverage 
of four highly successful, but less popular entrepreneurs in equivalent industries at about 
the same time. Our analysis reveals common patterns in the way the press developed the 
characters of these ‘celebrity entrepreneurs’ and embedded them into broader narratives 
making sense of changes in industry and society. By doing so, the press gradually imbued 
their names with a significance that transcended their entrepreneurial accomplishments, 
and constituted them as categorical prototypes and cultural symbols. 
 
Authors note: While the vast majority of the work is my own, Davide Ravasi and 
Vangelis Souitaris aided in the idea formation, editing and some writing of this paper 
in preparation for journal submission.   
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INTRODUCTION 
“Along the way, Jobs was widely hailed as the prototype of a new American hero--the 
irreverent and charismatic young entrepreneur.” (Time Magazine, 03-05-1985) 
In management studies, celebrity has been identified as an important social 
approval asset for organisations (Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006; Zavyalova, Reger 
and Pfarrer, 2017) and for individuals (Hayward, Rindova and Pollock, 2004). Celebrity 
has been defined as broad attention and high positive evaluations made to an actor 
(Rindova et al., 2006) and has been shown to affect stakeholders’ perceptions of and 
interactions with organisations both internally (Kjærgaard, Morsing and Ravasi, 2011) and 
externally (Pfarrer, Rindova and Pollock, 2010). Celebrity is also important for 
individuals, as it increases their access to opportunities (McCracken, 1989), affects their 
earnings (Wade et al., 2006; Cho et al., 2016), and raises their perceived market value 
(Koh, 2011).  
Many business leaders have become prominent figures in the press and popular 
culture, receiving levels of attention rarely seen before (Van Krieken, 2012). Interestingly, 
most if not all of these figures appear to be entrepreneurs. Taking the production of films 
for example, in the last ten years there have been three major-studio, fact-based films on 
businesspeople (Steve Jobs, The Social Network and The Founder) and all of them have 
focused on entrepreneurs or entrepreneurship. Despite this apparent increase in the 
celebritization of entrepreneurs by the modern media and the increased social and 
economic importance of the phenomenon (Hwang and Powell, 2005), it is not yet clear 
why some business founders become celebrities, while most others do not, and how this 
celebritization process happens. 
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The current theorization of individual-level celebrity in a business context seems ill 
fitting to entrepreneurs. It has focused on CEOs, and has described non-conforming 
actions and over-attribution of the behaviour of organizations to their leaders as an 
explanation for celebrity development. However, entrepreneurs are commonly considered 
non-conformist risk-takers (Hamilton, 2000; Kirzner, 1974; Schumpeter, 1934) and firms 
are often intrinsically linked to their founders (Fauchart and Gruber, 2011). Hence non-
conforming actions alone might not be sufficient to explain how some entrepreneurs 
become celebrities while most others do not.  
In all recent conceptions of  business celebrity, the narrative format of press 
reporting has been deemed key to the development  of celebrity figures (e.g. Hayward et 
al., 2004; Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick & Pollock, 2018; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et 
al., 2017). The consensus from these arguments is that the exciting nature of press 
reporting about business figures leads to a broad audience to increase in positive affect 
towards the actor and thus building celebrity for them.  What is missing from these 
arguments is any specifics about the types of narratives or narratological mechanisms that 
the press use to generate celebrity for particular actors. 
In this paper, we report from a comparative narrative analysis of the press coverage 
of eight entrepreneurs – four with high levels of news coverage and indications of celebrity 
(Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Jeff Bezos, and Mark Zuckerberg) and four entrepreneurs who 
founded similarly successful businesses in the same industries but received substantially 
less media coverage (Mitch Kapor, Michael Dell, Pierre Omidyar, and Jack Dorsey). Our 
findings reveal the differential treatment of the two subsamples. On the one hand, the press 
builds high-coverage entrepreneurs as distinctive characters by ascribing them 
extraordinary attributes and a nuanced personality, highlighting their unconventional 
appearance, and mythologizing the foundation of their companies. These entrepreneurs 
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become central to narratives aimed at making sense of broader socio-cultural changes, and 
gradually turn into cultural symbols. On the other hand, low-coverage entrepreneurs 
receive limited character development and remain peripheral to broader narratives. 
Firstly, we begin to explain how the press focuses on some entrepreneurs, and not 
equally successful others, and turns them into societal-level celebrities. This selective 
process is linked with the narrative function that celebrity entrepreneurs can play in 
describing and explaining broader societal changes. In other words, to become a celebrity, 
an entrepreneur should not only come with their own spectacular success-story, but it 
seems even more pertinent that they can be utilised in broader stories of technological and 
social change. This insight is important, because whereas past work has theorized that 
increased media attention is driven by the individual’s actions (Rindova et al., 2006), we 
know less about how the fit of the individual’s story with broader press narratives may also 
relate to the level of prominence. 
   Secondly, whereas current theories propose that business actors become celebrities 
by engaging in deviant, non-conforming actions, we show that in the case of entrepreneurs, 
conformity to archetypal representations of successful entrepreneurship seems central to 
their celebritization. While the celebrity entrepreneurs in our study deviate from certain 
established norms (for example dress differently and drop out of university), in general 
their celebrity seems to be developed by being described as highly prototypical of the 
category they belong to.  
 Thirdly, we detail the elements of press coverage that relate to how entrepreneurs 
appear to become cultural symbols. This explains how entrepreneurs break expected 
boundaries for “specialist celebrities” specified by previous research (Rojek, 2006; Van 
Krieken, 2012) and come to be perceived and narratively used as prototypical exemplars 
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(Cantor & Mischel, 1979) of entrepreneurs as a social category, and their names come to 
be generally accepted and used as signifiers of more abstract concepts commonly 
associated with entrepreneurship (wealth, genius, vision, etc.) in Western societies (e.g. 
Shane, 2008).  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The concept of celebrity has a long tradition in social studies and can be traced to 
Max Weber (1948), who argued that communities respond to the erosion of customs and 
institutions such as the church and state by relying on the charisma and personal attributes 
of unique individuals. According to Van Krieken (2012: 5) celebrity is “essentially about 
high public visibility and recognition”. Early empirical research on celebrity focused on 
the entertainment industries (Gamson, 1994), and pointed out how Hollywood and other 
entertainment hubs engaged with the media to create a conveyor belt of new stars, from 
whom, both the press and the film studios could mutually profit. They did so as they 
believed that the increased interest in the personal life of entertainment stars as reported in 
the media would induce audiences to buy the cultural products they were associated with. 
In almost all conceptualisations of celebrity development, the media are considered 
the main agents of this process (Gamson, 1994; McCracken, 1989; Rein et al., 1997). 
According to McCracken (1989), celebrity is created through the mass-communication of 
a carefully constructed persona in the media that is curated and carefully selected to give 
an impression of an individual’s personality, talent and style, which in turn creates a 
perception of the actor that triggers positive emotional responses. He argued that the 
information about the individual either can be a fabrication or grounded in fact.  
Reasons for this powerful role of the media in celebrity creation have been 
discussed in several fields of the social sciences. In media studies, McQuail (1985) 
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discussed how the media produce culture to order in a short timeframe, creating exciting 
narratives to capture their largely unknown audience’s attention. This is important for 
celebrity research as it is deemed that they are therefore more likely to positively attribute 
to particular characters who provide them with interesting things to talk about (Gamson, 
1994). Media narratives garner audience members’ attention and shape their perceptions 
about specific attributes and actions of actors receiving coverage (Kennedy, 2008).  
Research further recognized that celebrity can develop in different domains: not 
only entertainment, but also fashion, architecture, science and business (Rein et al., 1997; 
Rojek, 2006). It also suggests that there is a certain hierarchy across these domains. 
Individuals in the ‘top tier’ celebrity domains of sport, music and film attract considerably 
more attention even outside the restricted boundaries of their own domain (Rein et al., 
1997). In other domains, such as business or science, celebrity is usually contained within 
the boundaries of the domain (Rein et al., 1997; Rojek, 2006). Because of the specialist 
nature of the renown that, for example, business people or scientists receive it is deemed 
difficult for audience members who do not have knowledge of their domain to understand 
the reasons for caring about the celebrity. This makes it more difficult for them to evaluate 
them positively (Rojek, 2006).  
Celebrity creation in a business context 
In a business context, celebrity has been discussed at the individual (celebrity 
CEOs) and organizational level (celebrity firms). Rindova, Pollock and Hayward (2006) 
argued that celebrity firms are created by the media as they create a “dramatized reality” 
when reporting on organizational actions. The combination of a high volume of content 
and strong positive valence builds excitement and favourable perceptions of firms. Firms 
feed this process through nonconforming actions and managing their 
impressions (Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006). Rindova and colleagues used Heckert 
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and Heckert’s (2002) social deviation framework to underpin this theoretical assertion and 
stated that organizations can either under-conform to industry norms such as price points, 
strategies or over-conform to industry norms by being extremely good at some of the 
norms in the industry. They stated either of these positions will lead to increased news 
coverage and potential celebrity but an organisation must clearly occupy one of these 
positions in a visible way for the audience to notice.  
 CEO celebrity has been theorised to develop due to non-conforming strategic 
actions and over-attribution of firm actions to their leader by the media (Hayward, 
Rindova and Pollock, 2004). Hayward and colleagues argue that the press are incentivised 
to reduce a complicated task into simplistic narratives that will focus on leaders of firms 
despite the truth of the story being much more complicated. They argue that this leads to 
these prominent “celebrity” figures emerging.  Recent work has added to this argument by 
theorising that the press place celebrity CEOs in certain archetypes when developing their 
celebrity and this can lead to constraints on their decision-making (Lovelace et al., 2017). 
Two key elements of the celebrity CEOs’ behaviour is that is distinctive to others over 
time and there is a consistency in the message (Hayward et al., 2004).  
 Current theories of how CEOs become celebrities, however, do not seem to explain 
well the celebritization of entrepreneurs – certainly not the overwhelming popularity and 
recognition that some entrepreneurs have received in recent years at a global level. 
Entrepreneurs are non-conformists by definition, as breaking conventions and searching 
for  novelty is central to entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1934; Venkatraman and Shane, 
2000). Non-conforming action alone, therefore, does not seem to explain why some 
entrepreneurs are singled out from a broader group, to become celebrities.  
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Similarly, whereas over attribution of a firm’s success to its top manager can 
contribute to explain the celebritization of CEOs (Hayward, Rindova and Pollock, 2004), 
most entrepreneurs, as founders, are inherently and intimately connected with their 
business (Belenzon, Chatterji and Daley, 2017). Therefore, even over attribution of firm 
actions does not seem to explain why and how some entrepreneurs become celebrities 
while most others do not. This is the aim of our study.  
METHODS 
In order to investigate how the media construct some entrepreneurs as celebrities, 
we employed a multiple case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). We selected four 
“celebrity” entrepreneurs and four comparable entrepreneurs with similar backgrounds but 
with substantially lower media coverage. We carefully tracked and analysed articles in the 
popular press covering these eight entrepreneurs, searching for patterns of similarities and 
differences in the way they were portrayed over a period of time. We tracked their 
increasing visibility from early appearances in the popular press to the consolidation of the 
celebrity status (or lack thereof). 
Sampling and data collection 
We conducted our study in the United States of America, considered the birthplace 
of modern celebrity culture (Gamson, 1994). To identify suitable candidates for our study, 
we searched the covers of Time magazine and Newsweek, under the assumption that 
appearance on the cover of both the best-selling general culture magazines in the US was a 
reasonable indication that these individuals had reached a level of nationwide popularity 
that potentially qualified them as “societal celebrities”, with the caveat that the appearance 
was for something positive (For example Adolf Hitler appeared on the cover in 1938 and it 
was not framed positively). Our search involved over 3,000 covers in the period between 
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January 1980 and January 2015
1
, a period coinciding with the modern era of the popular 
culture industry discussed by Van Kreiken (2012) and Gamson (1994). 
For each individual appearing on these covers, we searched available online 
information (primarily Wikipedia pages) to identify those that were primarily known as 
entrepreneurs. We therefore excluded individuals who had first become celebrities in other 
fields and later in their career founded one or more companies
2
. We also excluded business 
leaders, such as Jack Welch
3
, whose notoriety was not related to companies they had 
founded. In the period covered by our search, 19 entrepreneurs appeared on the cover of 
Time magazine and 9 appeared on the cover of Newsweek. To select our sample, we 
adopted a conservative criterion and circumscribed our study to entrepreneurs that had 
appeared at least once on the cover of both magazines. Nine entrepreneurs conformed to 
our restrictive criterion: Jeff Bezos, Michael Bloomberg, Google co-founders Sergey Brin 
and Larry Page, Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Donald Trump, Ted Turner, and Mark Zuckerberg. 
We further streamlined our sample to eliminate cases with peculiar characteristics, 
which could have confounded our observations. We ruled out Michael Bloomberg as he 
had appeared on the covers of Time and Newsweek for his political career, rather than his 
entrepreneurial accomplishments. We looked closely at Donald Trump’s case and ruled 
him out as in a preliminary investigation of his early news coverage we noted that he was 
presented mainly as a real estate developer running his family’s business and not an 
entrepreneur. We ruled out Ted Turner, because while his appearance on the covers of 
                                                 
1
 Newsweek discontinued physical distribution from 31 December 2012 to 7 March 2014 but continued to 
publish digital versions with front covers. 
2
 For example, Oprah Winfrey and Jaime Oliver both became known for their business acumen after finding 
fame as a TV host and TV chef respectively.  
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Time and Newsweek was associated with the founding of CNN, at that time he had already 
enjoyed a massive coverage in the popular media as the owner of the Atlanta Braves 
baseball team. We finally dropped Sergey Brin and Larry Page, who appeared on both 
covers together, because the media would usually portray them as a pair, making their case 
not directly comparable with other entrepreneurs in the sample, such as Steve Jobs or Bill 
Gates, whose co-founders received far less coverage and did not appear with them on the 
covers.  
Having identified four entrepreneurs – Gates, Jobs, Bezos, and Zuckerberg – who 
could plausibly be considered as “celebrities”, we then searched for other successful 
entrepreneurs in similar industries at comparable times, who did not achieve such broad  
media coverage. To do so, we examined their most prominent competitors from available 
histories of the industry and the media coverage that they had received. This analysis led 
us to pair Jeff Bezos (founder of Amazon) with Pierre Omidyar (founder of eBay), Bill 
Gates (co-founder of Microsoft) with Mitch Kapor (founder of Lotus), Mark Zuckerberg 
(co-founder of Facebook) with Jack Dorsey (co-founder of Twitter), and Steve Jobs (co-
founder of Apple) with Michael Dell (founder of Dell).
4
 While these four additional 
entrepreneurs seemed to be well known, none of them had been brought to the attention of 
the public by the covers of Time or Newsweek, and the level of press coverage they 
received was considerably lower than the four “celebrities”. Table 1 describes some 
comparative data for the two groups.   
                                                 
4
 We acknowledge the gender bias in our sample but this is unfortunately representative of the bias against 
female businesspeople that is present in the media in general as discussed in previous research (Baker et al., 
1997) 
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Table 1: Comparative data for higher and lower coverage entrepreneurs 
Industry Computers Software E-commerce Social media 
Entrepreneur Jobs Dell Gates Kapor Bezos Omidyar Zuckerberg Dorsey 
Company Apple Dell Microsoft Lotus Amazon EBay Facebook Twitter 
Founded 1976 1984 1975 1977 1998 1995 2004 2006 
Net worth (up to 
2016) 
 
$11b* $18.4b 
$66b 
--** $46b $8.4b $35.7b $2.4b 
Total coverage (all  
global news 
outlets) 
164,354 14,045 194,434 
1,922 
49,045 5,434 78,783 13,628 
Average per year 4,565 413 4,834 54 2,336 286 7,162 1,363 
Total coverage 
(selected news 
outlets)  
5740 
1235 10,356 285 1721 269 3,051 541 
Average per year 129 
39 
296 8 81 14 254 49 
Total coverage 
(selected news 
outlets in the 
period of 
observation) 
277 83 320 62 395 60 582 
 
62 
Average per year 21 6 29 6 65 10 83 9 
Appearances on 
Time and 
Newsweek 
9 0 12 0 3 0 4 0 
 
 
 
Consistent with the idea that the media plays a major part in the construction of 
firms and business leaders as celebrities (Hayward et al, 2004; Rindova et al, 2006; 
Zavyalova, et al., 2017), we based our comparative analysis on articles published in the 
popular press covering the eight entrepreneurs. We chose the three newspapers that had the 
highest distribution figures in the US over the period 1980 to 2015 — namely The New 
*At time of death in 2011 
**Information not publicly available 
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York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post – and the two most 
widely-read general interest/news magazines — the afore mentioned Time and Newsweek. 
Data analysis 
In a preliminary step of our analysis, for each entrepreneur, we reconstructed an 
chronology of events from the foundation of the company associated with their popularity, 
to their first appearances on both Time and Newsweek
5
. To do that, we relied on a subset of 
5-6 articles per entrepreneur that we had identified in our preliminary reading as providing 
extended narratives of the history of these entrepreneurs, as well as other archival sources 
such as biographies and online biographies from Forbes.com, Biography.com and 
Wikipedia.org. This preliminary step was important for us to place our observations into a 
larger chronology of events.  
Consistent with the idea that the media selectively present and frame facts in a 
narrative format that shapes the way audiences make sense of people and events (McQuail, 
1985), we began to analyse the media coverage of the eight entrepreneurs from a narrative 
standpoint in the five news outlets we selected. Following Abbott (2008) we understood 
narratives as representations of an event or a series of events, arising from one or multiple 
interrelated texts (Boje, 2011).  
Step 1. Tracking narratives. We began our analysis by carefully reading each 
article to identify narratives produced and disseminated by the media about each of the 
eight entrepreneurs since the foundation of their companies. To do so, we first coded each 
article in our sample for any event its content related to. Next, we compared different 
articles to identify whether the events they reported were part of a narrative (Herman and 
Vervaeck, 2005) that comprised multiple articles over time and/or across multiple sources. 
                                                 
5
 In the case of low-coverage entrepreneurs, to ensure we would not miss important events, we followed their 
career until their press coverage began to decline; Jack Dorsey was the only one who experienced a moderate 
recovery of the attention of the press, as he returned to the board of Twitter. 
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Following Czarniawska (1997) we deemed an event not part of a narrative if the news 
story had no clear preceding event or development of action. Following several iterations 
of allocating articles to appropriate narratives and agreeing on narrative names, we 
produced a list of narratives and the chronology of how they developed (See table 2). 
This analysis revealed that not all the articles that mentioned these entrepreneurs 
were centred on the entrepreneurs themselves, or even their firms. Some of them linked 
them to broader narratives about industry dynamics, technological trends, or societal 
trends; others simply mentioned them in passing, and/or in content that was largely 
unrelated to their entrepreneurial experience (see Table 2). This observation was 
important, because it directed subsequent analyses examining more closely a) how the 
media constructed entrepreneurs as central characters of their own narratives, or used them 
as characters in broader narratives about cultural and societal changes and b) whether and 
how the media did so differed across the two groups of entrepreneurs.  
 
Step 2. Tracking character development. Consistent with the ideas that characters 
are central elements of narratives (Margolin, 2007; DiBattista, 2011), and that distinctive 
traits of individuals are central to their constitution as celebrities (McCracken, 1989), in a 
second round of coding, we searched all the articles again for text that contributed to the 
development of these entrepreneurs as characters. We first associated fragments of text to 
in vivo codes that tried to capture as closely as possible the attributions that the press made 
to these individuals (e.g. Bill Gates as a ‘wunderkid’, or Mark Zuckerberg wearing flip-
flops).  
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Table 2. Narrative events for higher coverage entrepreneurs 
 
Categorisation Steve Jobs Bill Gates Jeff Bezos Mark Zuckerberg 
Individual Job’s leadership at Apple 
Jobs starting a new venture 
Job as a computer pioneer 
 
Gate’s bullying of competitors 
Being super rich 
Bezos’s investments outside of Amazon 
Bezos’s sleeping patterns 
Zuckerberg being non-conformist 
business leader 
Being a young tech-entrepreneur 
Firm Apple in crisis 
Growth of Apple 
Corporate leadership at apple 
Apple’s history 
Apple’s performance under John Sculley 
Next becoming software only 
Next is a failure 
John Sculley’s departure from Apple 
 
Microsoft getting sued 
Failure of OS2 project with IBM 
Alleged unfair practices by Microsoft 
Microsoft’s domination of the market 
 
Amazon not making money 
Amazon growing its user base 
User-base growing into different 
countries 
Facebook taking on investment 
Facebook’s advertising strategy 
Facebook floating on the Stock Exchange 
 
Industry Silicon Valley growth 
Venture Capitalists’ tech funding 
Workspace desktops 
Deal with IBM 
 
Antitrust lawsuits 
Competition law in the USA 
Tech entrepreneurship in the mid 80s 
Rise of Lotus 
Demise of IBM 
 
 
The growing e-commerce industry 
Venture Capitalist venture practices 
Demise of traditional booksellers 
Online bookselling 
Change in practices in book publishing 
Dot com bubble bursting 
Behaviour of tech CEOs 
New online entrepreneurs 
New corporate leadership in the early 00s 
 
Myspace’s rise and fall 
Web 2.0 phenomenon 
Yahoo’s demise 
Goldman Sachs investment in social 
media 
Decline of Myspace 
Google dominating online market 
Societal Growth of computers 
Use of computers by universities and 
schools 
Increased use of the internet. 
New wealth in early 90s 
 
Hackers 
The new computer coding culture  
Growth of computers 
Usefulness of MBAs 
Successful college dropouts 
New wealth in the USA 
 
Change in consumer practices to online 
retailing 
Online purchases 
 
 
Rapid growth of social media use among 
college students 
Facebook use by high school kids 
Social media boom in society 
Protest from users about privacy changes 
 
Other  Increase of animation 
 
Growth in the Seattle area 
Opposition to NAFTA agreement 
Wealthy people in the Seattle area 
 
Education in New Jersey 
18 
 
The first author carried out the analysis on the whole data set and produced a first 
tentative set of codes. A second member of the team independently coded a subsample of 
the data set. The two then compared the outcome of their coding efforts. The comparison 
revealed a substantial agreement on in vivo codes (although labels varied for some first-
order and second-order codes). It led to revisit some labels and to reorganize some second-
order codes. The third member of the team reviewed the emerging coding structure, 
challenging the other members to refine labelling and definitions for increased clarity.
6
 
Step 3. Tracking the placement of entrepreneurs into broader narratives. We then 
focused on articles presenting entrepreneurs as characters of broader narratives (i.e 
narratives not about them or their company), to identify the way in which they related to 
the more general theme of the article. We followed similar coding procedures to those we 
used in the the previous step. This analysis revealed that the media used the eight 
entrepreneurs to narrate changes in their respective industry or – in the case of the four 
celebrities – in society more generally (see Table 6 ).  
Step 4. Tracking the constitution of entrepreneurs as celebrities and cultural 
symbols. In step 1, we identified articles that referenced the eight entrepreneurs in passing 
and/or placed them in content that had nothing to do with their firm, industry or career. In 
a further round of coding, we searched these articles for patterns in the way journalists 
referred to entrepreneurs outside the context of their own entrepreneurial activity. These 
articles were particularly important, because they showed how these entrepreneurs were 
gradually acknowledged as persons of wide renown, and constituted as cultural symbols, 
whose names were increasingly used to refer, for instance, to prototypical types of 
entrepreneurs or more general human attributes (e.g. wealth, vision, genius, etc.) (see 
Table 5 and table 7). 
                                                 
6
 We followed this pattern in following steps also. 
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We used the proportion of these articles on the total for the year as a criterion to 
establish the “celebritization” of entrepreneurs and to end our coding efforts. For each 
entrepreneur, we coded articles in yearly “batches” starting from the foundation of their 
business and/or their first appearance in the press, and proceeded until we found repeated 
evidence of their use as cultural symbols. Comparison across cases eventually led us to 
replace our intuitive assessment of theoretical saturation with a more precise and uniform 
criterion, ending the period of observation when the number of articles using entrepreneurs 
as cultural symbols reached 30% of the total for two consecutive years – which occurred 
sometime after the first appearance on Time. Figures 1 to 4 visually present the way codes 
evolved over times for each of the four celebrity-entrepreneurs, illustrating the observation 
period for each case.  
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Because the lower coverage entrepreneurs had less recurrent codes and overall coverage, 
we continued the analysis of their press coverage until we stopped the analysis of their 
higher coverage pair. In the case of Michael Dell, however, who started his company 7 
years after Steve Jobs, we continued for three years after Steve Jobs reached the 30% mark 
until we were confident we had theoretical saturation and no new codes were emerging.  
In all, we coded 1513 articles for the higher coverage group and 214 for the lower 
coverage across 41 cumulative years. 
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Step 5. Cross-case comparison. Comparison across cases led us to group in 
vivo codes associated to different terms that expressed the same meaning into more 
general first-order codes. Some of these first-order codes gathered in vivo codes from 
a single case (for instance, when the press used multiple similar terms to describe the 
personality or the appearance of a single entrepreneur); others from multiple cases 
Table 3. Information regarading stages of analysis 
 
Jobs 
Dell 
Gates Kapo
r 
Bezos Omidya
r 
Zuckerberg 
Dorse
y 
Total 
articles 
analysed 
 
277 83 320 62 395 60 582 
 
62 
Step 1 
        
Articles 
focused 
on the 
individua
l 
 14% 2% 14% 7% 6% 5% 
9% 
0% 
Articles 
focused 
on the 
firm 
24% 42
% 
11% 7% 48% 42% 
36% 
44% 
Articles 
focused 
on the 
industry 
40% 49
% 
54% 63% 35% 44% 
35% 
40% 
Articles 
on 
society 
22% 5% 17% 22% 11% 8% 
30% 
13% 
other 0% 2% 3% 2% 306 0% 
0% 
3% 
Step 2 & 
3 
        
Articles 
used in 
coding 
 
176 43 229 33 262 13 390 23 
Dropped 
because 
of 
absence 
of codes 
        
% of 
articles 
analysed 
used  
the 
coding  
63% 
52
% 
72% 53% 66% 21% 67% 37% 
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(for instance, when we noticed similar terms used to describe the personality of 
different entrepreneurs).  
Next, we grouped first-order codes into more analytical second-order codes 
capturing patterns that were common to the four high-coverage entrepreneurs, but less 
so in the four low-coverage ones. This criterion enabled us to focus our analysis 
gradually on narrative elements that differentiated one group of entrepreneurs from 
the other, and could possibly contribute to explain why the first group eventually 
became celebrities, while the second did not. In further rounds of abstraction, we 
grouped these second-order codes into aggregate themes pointing to fundamental 
elements of the narrative treatment of the eight entrepreneurs that contributed to 
develop them as character. 
We then grouped aggregate themes into overarching theoretical observations 
describing the way in which the press narratively constructed four entrepreneurs as 
societal-level celebrities (and roughly corresponding to the outcome of the three 
previous steps (see figure 5). We then compared our observations more closely across 
cases – both quantitatively (by comparing the frequency of our codes across cases) 
and qualitatively (by comparing the actual content of lower-order codes across cases). 
This analysis pointed to a common pattern in the type of characterisations and 
narrative roles played across the cases with some significant differences between the 
higher and lower coverage groups. (see Figure 5 for our coding structure).  
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Figure 5. Coding structure 
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Once we had identified similarities and differences amongst the different cases, we 
took into account the longitudinal nature of our data and looked at these patterns in relation 
to the time that was inherent in our coding (each article was labelled with a date and we 
started from the first mention of each entrepreneur). This allowed us to tentatively identify 
two phases to celebrity creation with different outcomes dependent on the role the 
entrepreneur plays in the press. 
Phase one utilised evidence from the codes associated with the overarching 
dimensions dramatization & character development and roles in emerging narratives in 
our coding structure. We identified that all the codes in the overarching dimension societal 
renown and recognition occurred on average 5.5 years (as evidenced by figure 1 to 4) after 
the beginning of phase one. We therefore deemed this a second phase. We refined the 
content of the two steps several times and used two as the basis of the analysis we will 
present in the following findings section. 
FINDINGS 
Our analysis shows that the ‘celebrity entrepreneurs’ in our sample were 
constructed as distinct and nuanced characters, not only used in narratives centered on 
their own careers, but also in narratives that covered broader changes in technology and 
society. This attention grew over the years, as the media increasingly used these 
individuals as prototypical entrepreneurs and symbols of more abstract qualities, and 
increasingly referred to them in non-business related articles. By doing so, the media 
implicitly recognized that the names of these entrepreneurs were widely known and 
meaningful to a broad audience well outside the boundaries of their business activities. 
Comparatively, while receiving some character development, their lower coverage pairing 
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had much meaning placed on them by the press. Table 4 illustrates the comparative 
evidence for each element of our coding structure.  
Dramatization & character development 
The introduction of the new characters in the press had similarities to traditional 
storytelling where the characters of the story are introduced. Like in a traditional story, 
some characters became more prominent than others. For the four higher coverage 
entrepreneurs the press provided a fully developed character that the audience could find 
appealing (selected evidence for our codes are presented in Table 5). For the lower 
coverage group, the coverage was less frequent and not as comprehensive (see table 4). 
We identified common patterns in description and character development for the two 
groups of entrepreneurs. We will now discuss each element of character development 
focusing on the higher coverage group and comparing, where relevant, to the lower 
coverage group.
7
 
Foundational entrepreneurial myth 
In each of the cases, media coverage started several years after the entrepreneur 
had founded their business. Each of the higher coverage entrepreneurs were attributed with 
a mythical story that preceded the current descriptions of their present day activities
8
. 
These myths seemed to provide a context for current events or actions and were commonly 
referred back to even as time progressed. We observed two dimensions to these mythical 
origins—a rebelliousness against the conventional career path and humble origins of their 
business.  
  
                                                 
7
 We will follow this pattern in subsequent sections. 
8
 While the press certainly report on factual events, media stories are not always ‘totally true’ (c.f. McQuail, 
2010); as such we will report characterisations, personalities etc. as attributions by the media rather than as 
factual attributes. 
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Table 4. Occurrence of codes (number of text fragments associated with each second order code) 
 
Overarching dimensions 
 
 Steve Jobs Bill Gates Jeff Bezos Mark Zuckerberg 
 
Michael Dell Mitch Kapor Pierre 
Omidyar 
Jack Dorsey 
Dramatization & 
character development 
 
 
Foundational myth 
          
Rebelliousness against 
conventional path  
18 (***) 23 (***) 11 (***) 23 (***) 
 
4 (*) 1 (*) -- 4 (*) 
Humble origins of 
business 
22 (***) 9 (**) 11 (***) 21 (***) 
 
6 (*) -- 4 (**) 2 (*) 
 
Extraordinary attributes 
of the character  
 
 
Extraordinary talent 
47 (***) 29 (***) 13 (***) 27 (***) 
 
3 (*) 7 (**) 1 (*) 10 (**) 
 
 
Extraordinary wealth 
28 (***) 58 (***) 38 (***) 55 (***) 
 
7 (*) 2 (*) 2(*) 3 (*) 
 
Extraordinary youth 14 (***) 27  (***) 7 (**) 27 (***) 
 
2 (*) 
-- 
-- 4 (*) 
 
Nuanced personal 
descriptions 
Contrasted personality 13 (**) 39 (***) 12 (***) 10 (***) 
 
2 (*) 2 (*) -- 2 (*) 
Unconventional 
appearance 
12 (**) 12 (**) 7 (**) 11 (***) 
 
-- 3 (*) -- -- 
Role in broader narratives 
 
Industry Impact 
 
 
          
Pioneering industry 
transformations 
80 (***) 49 (***) 76 (***) 37 (***) 
 
12 (***) 11 (**) -- -- 
 
Giving insights into 
current and future 
trends in industry 
21 (***) 40 (***) 22 (***) 17 (***) 
 
5 (**) 8 (**) 6(**) 9 (**) 
Societal relevance 
Products changing 
people’s lives 
26 (***) 20 (***) 13 (***) 15 (***) 
 
-- -- -- -- 
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Numbers represent total amount of pieces of text coded for that particular dimension  
*** frequently recurring longitudinal evidence of code (Every year, often more than once a year with some periods of regular recurrence) 
** moderately recurring evidence with some extended absence of code (less than once a year) 
* some evidence of code but infrequent and not extended over time (occasional appearance across years) 
-- no evidence of code 
  
Vision for the future of 
society 
31 (***) 12 (***) 9 (***) 21 (***) 
 
-- 3 (*) -- 3 (*) 
Societal renown and 
recognition 
     
    
Recognition of 
entrepreneur as cultural 
symbol 
Prototype of an 
entrepreneur 
18 (***) 25 (***) 20 (***) 10 (***) 
 
-- 2 (*) -- -- 
personal quality 
11 (**) 18 (***) 13 (***) 14(**) 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Role Model 11 (**) 8 (***) 8 (***) 6(**) 
 
-- 1 (*) -- 1 (*) 
General references 10 (***) 18 (***) 13 (***) 25 (***) 
 
-- 2 (*) -- -- 
Recognition of 
entrepreneur as popular 
figure 
 
Focus on individual 6 (**) 
13 (***) 
7 (**) 13(***) 
 
-- -- 
-- 
2 (*) 
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Each entrepreneur was described as being on a route to attainting a conventional 
successful career (i.e. attending college and gaining a job). However, the press describe 
that a great interest in invention led them away from that path and pursued 
entrepreneurship instead. Bill Gates was described as being obsessed with computer 
coding, Steve Jobs with building computers, Jeff Bezos with internet commerce and Mark 
Zuckerberg with website development. As the below quote illustrates, the change in path 
for these individuals was directly linked to entrepreneurship-- “…Chairman William 
Gates, 30, the boy wonder who dropped his undergraduate studies at Harvard in 1975 to 
help start Microsoft (Time, 17-02-1986)”.  
 We also observed that the press commonly referenced these entrepreneurs as 
having founded their business in humble origins. The press described how Apple was 
founded in a garage, Microsoft began as an obsession by two hackers in a small bedroom, 
Amazon developed from a car ride across America and Facebook began as internet servers 
in a college dorm-room. The below quotes illustrate: 
[Jobs and Wozniak] set up shop in their garage and spent six months designing the 
prototype for Apple I, the first line of personal computers (New York Times, 28-
09-1980) 
Jeff Bezos's e-commerce vision materialized during a cross-country ride in a hand-
me-down Chevy Blazer. (Newsweek, 28-09-1999) 
The founding in each case was different but they all shared the common theme of humble 
origins, which was in a sharp contrast to the major corporations these start-ups evolved to 
be.  
We note that the types of mythical foundations we observed in the press coverage 
are common in traditional storytelling to create depth to the main characters (DiBattista, 
2011). The practice dates back to Greek mythology where every hero had a distinct origin 
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that influenced their present; for example, Achilles was dipped into the river Styx to 
become immortal, but his mother failed to dip his heel (Burkert, 1982).  
Extraordinary attributes  
Along with a foundational myth, the press emphasized particular extraordinary 
personal attributes of the entrepreneurs from the beginning of their coverage and continued 
throughout the timeline we analysed. Firstly, through different narratives that related to 
their business and the broader industry, the press repeatedly emphasized that these 
entrepreneurs were geniuses with extraordinary talents. “Genius” and “wunderkind” were 
labels used for each entrepreneur, whilst labels such as “visionary” and “pioneer” were 
also used regularly across the cases. Such attributions were not just general declarations of 
intelligence or common descriptors of leaders but were almost always directly linked to 
entrepreneurial accomplishments. The following quotes illustrate: 
Steven Jobs, one of the founding geniuses of Apple… (The Washington Post, 01-
10-1985) 
They range from Microsoft's computer genius Bill Gates, (personal stock holdings: 
$ 350 million… (Newsweek, 17-11-1987) 
In other words, the press created a link between an ‘extraordinary individual’ and the 
founding of a business and/or the creation of a revolutionary product. These types of 
descriptions were recurrent in our high coverage cases (see the corresponding section of 
table 4). 
We also observed that the press regularly commented upon how quickly these 
entrepreneurs made their money and how vast their fortunes were. The common recurrence 
of this code (on average one in five articles for the higher coverage group had some 
reference to the entrepreneurs’ wealth) infers that the press found the surprising speed of 
large wealth-accumulation a major point of interest, as evidenced by the below quote.-- “It 
took Andrew Carnegie three decades to become a centimillionaire by making steel. It 
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took Jeff Bezos three years by starting Amazon.com.” (The Washington Post, 29-07-
1997). The quote also illustrates the common occurrence of making comparisons against 
other famous entrepreneurs. Again, the positive attributions in relation to wealth were 
directly related to the individual’s entrepreneurial accomplishments; namely the focal 
actors were not just rich, but were rich because of being successful entrepreneurs.   
 Another point that emphasised the specialness of these entrepreneurs was that they 
were in positions of power, which one would generally not expect at their age. Although, 
they varied in their age, this common pattern was present across the cases. 
At 26, he [Jeff Bezos] was a wizard among whiz kids at one of Wall Street's most 
exclusive hedge funds. He was 30 when he founded what would become the 
dominant force in online retailing. (The Washington Post, 03-09-2000) 
Peach-fuzzed entrepreneurs like Mark Zuckerberg, who founded Facebook at age 
19, and Larry Page and Sergey Brin, both 23 when they developed Google, have 
created a collective image of the successful innovator as youthful, brash, and 
brilliant. (Newsweek, 06-09-2010) 
Once again, the remarkableness of their youth was in reference to their entrepreneurial 
endeavours and it was emphasising the apparent exceptionalness of these entrepreneurial 
figures versus traditional corporate figures.  
  
Nuanced personal descriptions 
As well as providing a myth and extraordinary attributes, we identified that the 
press gave detailed insight into the personality of each entrepreneur. Each entrepreneur 
was presented as having various positive traits, which were  conflicted with a dark side of 
their personality. For example, Steve Jobs was desbribed as visionary but difficult to work 
with as illustrated in the following quote: ‘Steve Jobs, lone-wolf computer visionary, now 
needs a little help from his friends’ (Wall Street Journal, 18-11-1990).  In a similar vein, 
Bill Gates was commended for being very creative but criticised for being overly political 
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and cutthroat; Jeff Bezos was described as extremely driven but overly hyperactive and 
goofy; and Mark Zuckerberg was described as brilliant but also arrogant (see the 
corresponding section in table 5). 
Additional to their quirky, nuanced personality, the portrayal of the entrepreneurs’ 
personal appearance reinforced the image created by their foundational myths, that they 
were different to traditional corporate figures. The entrepreneurs wore casual clothing, as 
opposed to business suits, and, in general, had extravagant features in their appearance, 
which embodied their stated differences with traditional corporate expectations. The 
following quotes illustrate: 
And then there was Mark Zuckerberg, the 22-year-old … wearing Adidas flip-flops 
-- sans socks -- with a blazer and jeans.’ (New York Times, 10-11-2006) 
It is important to note that these nuanced personal characterisations of 
entrepreneurs drove various narratives that were developing in the press in relation to 
them, their company or their industry.  For example, Jeff Bezos’s characterization as 
“…the company's impish founder…” (The Washington Post, 14-03-1998)—was used in a 
narrative about the exponential growth of Amazon. And Bill Gates’s characterisations as 
ruthlessly competitive helped drive a narrative about competition in the computer industry 
(and Microsoft’s alleged anticompetitive practices). The following quote illustrates: 
With that strong-arm tactic, Mr. Gates had won yet another near-monopoly for his 
company’ (Wall Street Journal, 23-09-1987) 
Overall, the foundational myths, the extraordinary attributes and the quirky 
character and appearance of these individuals were used as tools to drive coverage. We, 
therefore, interpret these attributions as being related to the constitution of entrepreneurs as 
celebrities. The press sets out these characters as worthy of paying attention to, and 
attention is a key function of celebrity creation (Rindova et al., 2006). Moreover, nuanced 
characterisations (e.g., Bill Gates’s stand-offs with competitors, Jeff Bezos’s problems 
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with Wall Street investors and Steve Job’s issues with the management of Apple) seem to 
build drama and intrigue and also introduce conflict between the entrepreneurs, the 
protagonists, and other characters in their story. Table 5 provides further evidence of the 
different elements of dramatization and character development across the four cases.  
Lower-coverage entrepreneurs received some sparing character development but 
not to the same extent as their higher-coverage counterparts (see table 3). References to 
mythical origins, wealth and extraordinary genius of the lower coverage group were either 
rare (i.e. less than once a year) or non-existent. As an illustration, the proportion of articles 
with any reference to dramatization or character development for Mitch Kapor was 19% of 
the total, and that was the highest amongst the lower coverage group; the same proportion 
for Bill Gates was 42% of total articles. Therefore, there was a difference in the intensity 
of dramatization and character development across the two groups. While the higher 
coverage group received intense and consistent description of their character and 
background story, the coverage in the lower coverage group was sparing and the portrayal 
of the entrepreneurs was  often mixed. For example, in the below example the press refers 
to the quirky personality traits of Mitch Kapor, but at the same time portray him as a 
quitter.  
With his quick debating style, biting wit and an easy going manner that masks deep 
intensity, he is also something of an enigma; two years ago, as chairman of Lotus 
Development Corporation, one of the computer world's greatest success stories, he 
walked away from it all.’ (11-09-1988, New York Times, Mitch Kapor) 
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Table 5. Dramatization & character development: Higher-coverage entrepreneurs 
 
Overarching 
dimensions 
Second order codes Steve Jobs Bill Gates Jeff Bezos Mark Zuckerberg 
Foundational 
entrepreneurial myth 
 
Rebelliousness against the 
conventional career path. 
Each celebrity entrepreneurs were 
following a conventional path of high 
achievement—attending a prestigious 
university or in a high status job, until 
they had their ‘big idea’ and left the 
path to pursue it.  
 
Hippie College drop out  
Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak, 
the founders of Apple Computer 
Co., were …Both were college 
dropouts who taught themselves 
to be computer wizards (The 
Washington Post, 28-09-1985) 
Hacker college dropout 
Mr. Gates, who as a teen-ager 
had developed a previous 
computer programming business, 
dropped out of Harvard and 
wrote a version of the Basic 
computer language for one of the 
first personal computers (New 
York Times, 24-07-1984) 
 
Disillusioned Wall Street banker  
Four years ago, Jeff Bezos quit 
his Wall Street job and headed 
across the country. (New York 
Times, 23-04-1998) 
Teenage Harvard student  
Mark Zuckerberg, the 23-year-
old Facebook founder who 
followed the path of Bill Gates 
by dropping out of Harvard to 
build a company (New York 
Times25-10-2007) 
 
Humble origins of business 
The audience are reminded of the 
humble origins of their businesses that 
turned into a fortune. Each of the 
entrepreneurs had to ‘struggle’ to 
chase their dream. 
 
Started company in a garage 
Steve Jobs co-founded Apple 
Computer in a California garage 
nine years ago and helped build it 
into a billion-dollar business that 
gave rise to the personal-
computer industry. (Time, 03-09-
1985) 
Started company in bedroom 
… it began in Seattle toward the 
end of the 1960's, when Paul 
Allen, then 15 years old, and Bill 
Gates, 13, who were to found 
Microsoft a decade later, started 
hanging around the Computer 
Center Corporation at night 
finding software bugs. (New 
York Times 24-07-1984) 
 
Quit his job and wrote the 
business plan driving from New 
York to Seattle 
In the shorthand mythology of 
cyberspace, Bezos invented 
Amazon.com while he and his 
wife were driving cross-country 
in a used Chevy Blazer’ (New 
York Times, 03-09-2000) 
Started in a college dorm room.  
Mark Zuckerberg, began 
obsessively writing software for a 
new Internet site in the common 
room of their Kirkland House 
dorm suite. (Newsweek, 26-05-
2007) 
Extraordinary 
attributes  
 
Extraordinary talent 
Terms like “wunderkind” and 
“genius” are used to describe their 
extraordinary abilities. 
High intelligence 
Mr. Jobs's flair for marketing and 
to his genius for conceiving 
innovative personal-computer 
technologies.’ (Wall Street 
Journal, 18-09-1985) 
 
Technical genius 
Then a brilliant young capitalist 
named Bill Gates wrote an 
excellent program – (The 
Washington Post, 08-10-1984) 
Young wonder 
At 26, he was a wizard among 
whiz kids…. (The Washington 
Post, 03-09-2000) 
 
Young wonder 
“We are not a media company,” 
Mark Zuckerberg, the 
wunderkind behind Facebook, 
(Newsweek, 01-11-2007) 
Extraordinary wealth  Rapid accumulation  of wealth Billionaire Rapid accumulation of wealth Billionaire 
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It is regularly reinforced that the 
entrepreneurs have made exceptional 
amounts of money quickly. 
 
Mr. Jobs, at 30 years old a 
millionaire many times over (19-
09-1985, New York Times) 
 
Microsoft Wunderkind Bill 
Gates is called the United States' 
richest individual, worth $7.5 
billion. (21-06-1993, The 
Washington Post) 
 
The first billion is always the 
hardest. It took Jeff Bezos four 
years. He made his second over 
the last six weeks. Even by the 
overheated standards of the late 
'90s, this is quick.’ (Wall Street 
Journal, 04-03-1998) 
 
Their project fizzled, while 
Facebook made Mr. Zuckerberg a 
billionaire -- at least on paper -- 
at the age of 23 (New York 
Times, 03-12-2007) 
Extraordinary youth 
Each entrepreneur is hailed as special 
for being in a position of power in the 
corporate world one would not expect 
for their age. 
Surprising power for young age/ 
founding business at a young age 
For some of these teen tycoons, 
whiz-kid CEOs such as Steve 
Jobs, who founded Apple 
Computer at age 24…(Wall 
Street Journal, 09-06-1989) 
 
Surprising wealth for young age 
The "boy billionaire," Bill 
Gates… (New York Times, 25-
03-1987) 
Surprising power for young age 
He was 30 when he founded what 
would become the dominant 
force in online retailing. (The 
Washington Post, 03-09-2000) 
Founding business at a young 
age 
The Oct. 1 movie premiere of 
The Social Network, which 
recounts how Mark Zuckerberg 
launched Facebook at the peach-
fuzzed age of 19…(Newsweek, 
06-09-2010) 
Nuanced personal 
description 
 
Unconventional appearance / style 
Related to their unusual personality, 
their remarkable appearance gives 
further depth to their unconventional 
behaviour, personality and dress 
Unusual clothing for corporate 
position 
…co-founded as a scruffy 21-
year-old… (New York Times, 
08-11-1987) 
 
 
Distinct physical attributes 
… it is now considered 
fashionable to maintain a pasty 
pallor and to wear socks with 
sandals… Bill Blass is out, Bill 
Gates is in. (New York Times, 
02-08-1992) 
 
 Distinct physical attributes 
…Jeff Bezos, the company's 
impish founder… (Wall Street 
Journal, 25-03-1999) 
 
 
Unusual clothing for corporate 
position 
He [Mark Zuckerberg] was 
famously photographed at a big 
media powwow wearing Adidas 
flip-flops. (The Wall Street 
Journal, 24-03-2007) 
 
 Contrasted personality  
Each of the entrepreneurs also have a 
nuanced personality. Like any central 
character, they have traits that 
influence their brilliance but also 
cause conflicts. 
Stubborn visionary 
He was the brash, brilliant and 
sometimes bumptious brat of 
Silicon Valley, a symbol of its 
high-tech genius and fabulous 
sudden wealth (Time, 03-09-
1985) 
 
Highly energised and over-
focused 
With that strong-arm tactic, Mr. 
Gates had won yet another near-
monopoly for his company. 
These traits stand in sharp 
contrast to his unassuming public 
image as the industry's 
consummate computer nerd. 
(Wall Street Journal, 23-09-1987) 
 
Highly energised and over-
focused 
Speculation? Perhaps. 
Founder Jeff Bezos--he of the 
disarming charm and maniacal 
laugh, the darling of the digerati 
and the most recent Time 
magazine Person of the Year--is 
still the emperor of e-tailing (The 
Washington Post, 29-06-2000) 
Cocky 
The former computer-science and 
psychology major quickly set a 
brash tone, joking with 
colleagues about Facebook's goal 
of "world domination" and once 
distributed business cards that 
read, "I'm CEO . . . bitch." (The 
Wall Street Journal., 21-09-2006) 
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Central and peripheral roles in broader narratives  
In the previous sub-section, we described how the press developed distinct and 
nuanced characters of entrepreneurs for their audience. In this section, we examine the 
common roles these entrepreneurs play in broader narratives and explore how these roles 
attract news coverage. We observe that celebrity entrepreneurs play an important 
explanatory role in terms of a novel industry and also in terms of the societal and cultural 
changes that this industry is causing; thus they are important tools for the press to explain 
new phenomena.  
Industry impact 
In each case, the press recurrently described these entrepreneurs as central to the 
birth of their associated industry and a major thinker in transforming this industry. Each 
industry that they are associated with (computers, software, e-commerce and social media) 
is considered new and economically important. The below quotes illustrate that the higher 
coverage entrepreneurs are considered pioneers in their industries.  
Amid the chorus of praise that greeted Steve Jobs' unveiling of the new computer 
developed by his firm, Next Inc., there was but one sour note. It came from Bill 
Gates, the billionaire chairman of software giant Microsoft. Behind it lies the 
rivalry between two brilliant, phenomenally successful, almost unbelievably rich 
young men. At 33, they have been central figures in the development of the 
personal computer industry. (The Washington Post, 31-10-1988) 
Quickly, Jeff Bezos turned those big bookstore powerhouse assets into anchors of 
lead and dross. Or so argued the stock market last week when it bid up Mr. Bezos's 
version of a bookseller.’ (New York Times, 14-07-1998) 
Coinciding with the recurrence of these “pioneer” narratives, these entrepreneurs 
are also central figures in narratives that predict future trends in their industry. These 
narratives are business orientated and offer clear insights into future competitive dynamics 
of the industry.   
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The forefront for the next few years is knowledge-based software,' said Bill 
Gates… (New York Times, 28-12-1984) 
When he introduced the plan last month, Zuckerberg claimed that it was a once-in-
a-century kind of media transformation. (Newsweek, 10-12-2007) 
These two roles of industry pioneer and of commentator of the industry’s future relate to 
each other, as being a pioneer justifies the expertise offered by the entrepreneur.  
Lower-coverage entrepreneurs also participated in industry narratives, by 
explaining future trends in their associated industries. The following quote illustrates: 
Most software companies also will face a difficult choice. The biggest companies 
can simply write programs that work both with the existing standard and with the 
new IBM hardware, but the thousands of other companies have too few resources 
for that.’ (12-03-1987, Wall Street Journal, Mitch Kapor) 
Despite that, the press did not give focus on them as visionaries in any systematic way. . 
We coded 99 times for the higher-coverage group providing visions of the future, whereas 
we only observed 11 such instances for the lower-coverage group. 
The lower-coverage entrepreneurs were also used in industry stories, and were 
positively attributed by the press for their success in their industry. To demonstrate: 
The five-year-old company has been lauded because of the sophisticated direct-
mail sales operation built by its 24-year-old chairman, Michael Dell. (Wall Street 
Journal, 17-06-2002) 
However, the low-coverage entrepreneurs were not used by the press as protagonists in 
their industry stories, but as secondary characters. 
The announcement of Austin, Texas-based Dell's PS/2 clones is the first of a wave 
of similar announcements expected over the next several weeks. Fort Worth, 
Texas-based Tandy Corp. is expected to announce a PS/2 copy on Thursday, and 
several companies may unveil their copies at the big Comdex computer trade show 
next month in Atlanta. Dell, a closely held company founded in 1984 by its 
chairman and chief executive officer, Michael Dell, 23 years old, said it will offer 
copies of IBM's models 60 and 80. Prices haven't been set, but Mr. Dell said they 
would probably be 20% to 30% below prices for the comparable IBM products. 
(Wall Street Journal, 19-04-1988) 
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For example, in the above quote, Michael Dell is not the main character in this narrative 
about the development of the PC industry but helping explain a narrative where IBM is the 
dominant character.  
  It seems that the lower coverage entrepreneurs are credited as innovators who have 
created an interesting product that is changing practices in their associated industry, but 
they fall short from being pioneers and visionaries, namely the protagonists in the 
unfolding industry-stories. This difference in narrative roles are important for the 
constitution of the higher coverage characters as celebrities as it has implications for 
drawing the attention of audience members. Research on attention points out that people 
have limited attention and will allocate attention to the issues most relevant to them 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Ocasio, 1997). Therefore, celebrity entrepreneurs, as the 
protagonists in industry stories, are likely to receive more attention than secondary 
characters. This role difference is common in traditional storytelling, where more 
importance is placed on some characters than others. The more central characters (the 
protagonists) play a more important role in moving the action along.  
Societal relevance  
We identified that the higher coverage entrepreneurs played an important 
additional narrative role in explaining changes at a societal level and not just changes 
within a business or an industry context. We observed recurrent evidence in each case that 
the press credit these entrepreneurs with creating products or services that are changing the 
way people behave or changing how they think about a certain activity. For example, 
Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg are credited with altering social interactions. Therefore, 
the press place in readers’ minds that these entrepreneurs are shaping the way the world 
works.  
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HOW MAC CHANGED THE WORLD. It was a vision [of Steve Jobs] and a 
technology that created Apple Computer Inc., producing products that changed 
America (New York Times, 26-06-1989) 
The latest sign of the times was Time magazine's selection last week of Jeff 
Bezos of Amazon.com, the big online retailer of everything from books to toys, as 
its ''Person of the Year.'' Time's cover headline declares, ''E-commerce Is Changing 
the Way the World Shops.''’ (New York Times, 26-12-1999) 
...tech entrepreneurs like Facebook wunderkind, 23-year-old Mark Zuckerberg, 
whose company is redefining what global community means. (Newsweek, 14-04-
2008)  
Leading on from being described as having an effect on society, each entrepreneur 
prophesizes about the future of our lifestyles (as opposed to the future of the industry). 
They give insights into how societal practices and behaviours will change as an effect of 
their ‘magical’ new products or services. Thus they enable readers to understand what 
awaits them in the future. 
The primary sponsor and designer of the proposal is Apple Computer Corporation, 
whose chairman, Steve Jobs, has repeated a vow to make a computer available to 
every school in America. (09-01-1983, New York Times) 
Mr. Gates had his own vision, dubbed "information at your fingertips," in which 
each desktop computer would be seamlessly woven into a vast tapestry of data. 
(The Washington Post, 20-09-1989) 
 
The above quotes illustrate how each entrepreneur has a vision of the future that will 
involve a change in the way we (broader society) do things, always in relation to his 
innovative products and/or services. These entrepreneurs appear to be simplifying the 
press’s task in telling interesting society-level stories and explaining emerging and 
important lifestyle changes.  
On the contrary, when the lower celebrity group are asked for opinions, it is about 
matters pertinent to their industry. They do not regularly envisage the future of general 
lifestyles, because of their novel products and services, like the higher coverage sample
9
. 
We interpret this fact as evidence that the ‘explanatory role’ of low coverage entrepreneurs 
                                                 
9
 with the only possible exception of Mitch Kapor who provided visions of the future for society much later 
on in his coverage as the head of a lobby group concerned with the regulation of the internet 
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is narrower (industry bound) than that of their higher coverage counterparts (broader 
lifestyle issues).  
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Table 6. Role in broader narratives: higher coverage 
 
Overarching 
dimension 
Second order code Steve Jobs Bill Gates Jeff Bezos Mark Zuckerberg 
Industry impact 
 
Leading industry 
transformations. 
Each entrepreneur is 
deemed integral to 
shaping the new 
important industry they 
are associated with. 
Industry founder 
OSC hopes that the Pegasus will help to 
usher in the microspace era, in much the 
way Steve Jobs and Apple II ushered in the 
era of the microcomputer. (The Washington 
Post, 23-10-1989) 
 
Industry founder 
Thus was born Gates' personal software 
firm -- a modest little outfit called Microsoft 
-- and the whole multibillion-dollar PC 
software industry.’ (The Washington Post, 
01-09-1986) 
 
Industry pioneer 
A pioneer, royalty and a revolutionary--
noble company for the man who is, 
unquestionably, king of cybercommerce. 
(Time, 27-12-1999) 
 
Industry spokesman 
announced the start of a movement. "Social 
networks are closed platforms," Zuckerberg 
told a gathering of about 800 developers in 
San Francisco. "Today we're going to 
change all that."(Time, 16-06-2008) 
 
 Giving insights into 
current and future 
trends in industry 
With giving their 
opinions, they are 
explaining important 
changes currently 
happening and likely to 
happen in the future in 
the industry. 
 
Commenting on rivals performance 
"IBM is a great company," said Steve Jobs, 
co-founder of Apple Computer Inc. 
…"They need someone with a software 
background because that is where value is 
being added today."’, (The Washington 
Post, 27-01-1993) 
 
Explaining industry dynamics 
In the lower end of the market, the flood of 
IBM PC clones will continue -- intensifying 
the ongoing price war. The forecast is for 
continued mayhem in the market. Says 
Gates: "Next year will be very messy." 
(Newsweek, 22-09-1986,) 
 
 
Explaining important industry dynamics 
“The thing a lot of people don't understand 
about e-commerce is the degree to which it 
is a scale business," says Jeff Bezos, chief 
executive officer of Amazon. (Wall Street 
Journal, 22-05-2000) 
Commenting on new innovations 
Zuckerberg told an audience of more than 
250 marketing and advertising executives in 
New York. "For the last hundred years 
media has been pushed out to people, but 
now marketers are going to be a part of the 
conversation."’ (Wall Street Journal, 07-11-
2007) 
 
Societal 
relevance 
 
Products changing 
people’s lives 
The products that they 
are deemed responsible 
for creating are 
changing people’s 
every day behaviours. 
New ‘revolutionary’ user trends described 
Perhaps no one understands this better than 
Steven Jobs, co-founder of Apple Computer 
and the man who made the personal 
computer a household term. (Time, 24-10-
1988) 
 
 
New ‘revolutionary’ user trends described 
. "Without tools he is nothing, with tools 
[man] is all." Computer software is only the 
latest of those tools, and programmers are 
only beginning to understand the true 
potential of software. (Time, 16-04-1984) 
 
New ‘revolutionary’ user trends described 
If it is a sign of an e-world yet to come, a 
place in which technology allows all of us 
to shop, communicate and live closer 
together, then Jeff Bezos has done more 
than construct an online mall. He's helped 
build the foundation of our future. (The 
Washington Post, 27-12-1999) 
Users discuss use of new products services 
I can't go to a sorority formal or football 
game without photos from the event 
winding up on Facebook, uploaded by me 
or a friend… now my friends and I are 
building each other's collective stories one 
photo, caption and poke at a time. 
(Newsweek, 20-08-2007) 
 Vision of societal 
transformation 
The entrepreneurs can 
articulate a future for 
society that will be 
changed by their 
inventions. 
 
Forecasting changes in society 
… the dreamer behind the Apple II and the 
Macintosh has been trying to do it again -- 
to create out of silicon his vision of what it 
is that makes people feel a bond with their 
machines. (Time, 24-10-1988) 
 
Explaining new technologies to consumers 
"The TV screen is going to become the 
general-purpose entertainment and 
information device. " [says Bill Gates] (The 
Washington Post, 14-04-1993) 
Explaining new technologies to consumers 
Jeff Bezos believes the Internet store of the 
future should be able to guess what he 
wants to buy before he knows himself. (The 
Washington Post, 08-11-1998) 
Forecasting changes in society 
In fact, the success of Facebook may well 
underscore a major shift in the way we 
gather information, a trend that Mr. 
Zuckerberg picked up early on. (Wall Street 
Journal, (24-03-2007) 
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Table 7. Character and Narrative summary: High-coverage entrepreneurs vs. low coverage 
2nd order codes Steve Jobs 
Michael Dell 
Bill Gates Mitch Kapor Jeff Bezos Pierre Omidyar Mark Zuckerberg Jack Dorsey 
Rebelliousness 
against 
conventional path 
Described as having 
dropped out of Reed 
College to start his 
business. 
Described as having 
dropped out of 
college in Texas. 
Described as having 
dropped out of 
Harvard to found 
Microsoft two years 
later. 
 
Described  as a 
former successful 
Wall Street banker 
who left to pursue 
his idea. 
Described sparingly 
as someone who quit 
his high paying IT 
job to start eBay. 
Described  as having 
attended Harvard but 
founded Facebook 
and then dropped 
out. 
Described sparingly 
as a college dropout. 
Humble origins of 
business 
Described as having 
co-founded Apple in 
his garage with a 
loan from his 
parents. 
Described as having 
started his business 
in his college dorm 
room. 
Described as having 
learnt programming 
skills at night as a 
hacker and 
developed BASIC in 
his room. 
Described as  a 
former disc-jockey 
turned software 
developer. 
Described as having 
moved all his 
belongings by car to 
Seattle from New 
York and began his 
business in a garage. 
Described as having  
started his business 
at  home as a hobby. 
Described as having 
started  Facebook as 
a sophomore student 
from his dorm room. 
 
Extraordinary 
talent 
 
Described as being 
an extraordinarily 
talented visionary. 
Described as a high-
achieving business 
man 
Described as having 
exceptional 
programming skills 
and business 
acumen. 
 
Described as a 
brilliant coder. 
Described has 
having extreme 
determination and 
ability to come up 
with new ideas. 
 
Described  as a 
creative genius with 
exceptional 
computer coding 
abilities. 
Described as a 
silicon valley star. 
Extraordinary 
wealth 
Described 
recurrently as having 
profited from his 
vision. He is also 
heralded for making 
billions from Pixar. 
Described  as being 
relatively wealthy. 
Described with great 
frequency as 
extraordinarily 
wealthy.  
Described  
intermittently 
referred to as being 
wealthy. 
Described as 
extremely wealthy 
with the quickness 
of his wealth 
accumulation noted 
often. 
Described as a 
billionaire. 
Described as a boy 
billionaire and the 
stock price of 
Facebook becomes 
of particular interest. 
Described as 
wealthy. 
Extraordinary 
youth 
Described regularly 
as having  founded 
Apple at 21 and 
throughout the 
proceeding 
coverage, his youth 
is referenced. 
Described as having 
founded his business 
at 19. 
Described initially 
as being a teenage 
founder. His young 
age, often in 
particular reference 
to his wealth is 
regularly mentioned.  
 
Described as being 
very successful for a 
young age. 
 
Described regularly 
as youthful and a 
student . 
Described as being 
young.  
Unconventional 
appearance 
Described as looking 
like a hippy and 
wearing chains and 
 Described as having 
a bespectacled 
appearance and bowl 
Described as 
wearing bright 
Described regularly 
as being impish and 
 
Described as 
wearing flip-flops 
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having an unkempt 
appearance. 
haircut are regularly 
mentioned. 
Hawaiian shirts. small in stature. and hoodies to 
meetings.  
Contrasted 
personality 
Described as being a 
perfectionist 
visionary but single 
minded and not 
willing to listen to 
others. 
Described rarely as 
being self-assured.  
Described as an 
introverted “nerd” 
but also very 
cutthroat and 
ruthless.  
Described as intense 
but with a quick wit 
and easy going 
manner. 
Described as being 
goofy with an 
exaggerated laugh 
but also driven to the 
point of a fault. 
 
Described as 
prodigious but also 
petulant.  
Described rarely as 
being fastidious.  
Leading industry 
transformations 
Credited with 
starting the personal 
computer industry. 
Dell Computers are 
described as a 
successful IBM 
clone manufacturer. 
Credited with 
pioneering the 
software industry. 
Described as 
producing a useful 
software package. 
Credited with 
pioneering e-
commerce. 
 
Credited with 
pioneering social 
media.  
Described positively 
for the payment 
software company—
Square that he 
founded after 
Twitter. 
Insight into 
industry trends 
Gives insights into 
the changing future 
of the computer 
industry. He 
prophesizes about 
the internet and use 
of computers in 
education . 
Gives opinion on 
changes in the 
industry. 
Gives opinions on 
the importance of 
software to the 
development of the 
computer industry. 
Gives opinions on 
the PC industry and 
particularly later on, 
about the effect of 
the internet on the 
industry. 
Gives insight into 
what is needed for e-
commerce to be 
successful, often in 
contrast to making 
money for 
shareholders. 
Omidyar 
intermittently gives 
his opinions on e-
commerce. 
Gives insight on 
topics such as social 
media advertising 
and the effects of 
privacy on the 
industry. 
Gives insight into 
changing digital 
trends, particularly 
mobile payment 
systems. 
Products changing 
people’s lives 
The Personal 
Computer is 
described as 
revolutionising 
ordinary behaviours. 
Jobs is strongly 
linked to the product 
and to this change. 
 
Microsoft and 
software are credited 
with bringing 
forward the 
computer revolution. 
Gates is strongly 
linked with this 
change. 
Lotus’ software is 
described as useful 
but not ground-
breaking.. 
E-commerce is 
described as 
changing the way we 
shop and Bezos is 
strongly linked to it. 
 
Social media and 
Facebook are 
described as 
changing the way 
people communicate 
and Zuckerberg is 
described as integral 
to this. 
Described in relation 
to his new company 
making an exciting 
product. 
Vision for the 
future of society 
Predicts the 
dissemination of the 
personal computer. 
 
Predicts the 
importance of 
technology in our 
lives. 
 
Predicts the 
increasing 
importance of the 
internet in retailing. 
 
Predicts how people 
will interact online 
in the future. 
 
Spaces indicate no presence of that element in the news coverage  
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Societal Renown and Recognition 
After, on average, 5.4 years of increasing media coverage for the higher coverage 
entrepreneurs, when their character is developed and they are placed in industry and 
societal narrative roles, we identified another emergent pattern— they develop an even 
broader level of renown and seem to break beyond their particular domain.  
The entrepreneur as a cultural symbol  
From our analysis, we identified that these entrepreneurs become prototypes of 
entrepreneurship. There was recurring justifications that they were now symbolic of the 
broader act of entrepreneurship and abstracted away from their company’s actions or 
events in their associated industries. For example, in the below quote Steve Jobs is 
described as an example of a classic entrepreneur. 
… so long as Wilbur and Orville Wright can tinker in their bicycle shop and Steve 
Jobs can fool around in his garage, anything is possible. We have reached the 
starting point -where every Wright, Jobs and Gallileo in the world can start to 
ponder the inner recesses of his or her own mind without fear of offending those in 
power, and with the promise of great wealth if he or she succeeds.’ (New York 
Times, 10-09-1989) 
 In a similar usage beyond their original context, there was evidence of analogous 
use of the entrepreneurs’ names like in the below examples— 
But now the 36-year-old entrepreneur, often called the Steve Jobs of Japan in 
reference to the Apple Computer co-founder, is in the midst of a fight to save his 
company from bankruptcy. (New York Times, 24-08-1992) 
While market forces have yet to spawn the Bill Gates of biotech….’ (The 
Washington Post, 18-09-1992) 
The analogous use of these names appears to have the intention of giving meaning to an 
unknown individual but also is based on the premise that the newspapers’ audience knows 
what using the name Bill Gates or Mark Zuckerberg stands for. In the above and the 
associated quotes in table 7, no context is needed to explain the type of person the 
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entrepreneur is. This provides evidence that the use of their name alone now infers 
meaning related to the act of entrepreneurship in general. 
Another recurring pattern we identified was that the names of these entrepreneurs 
are used to represent certain personal characteristics, for example, in the below quote Bill 
Gates and Steve Jobs are symbolic of vision and success without these traits being 
mentioned in the article: 
Another is when he asserts that "anyone with a little money, some free time, and a 
willingness to learn marketing can make money." That very same paragraph contains this 
assertion: "If there were five Steve Jobs or one Bill Gates in Harlem, the entire nature of 
the community would change." Yes, it would have moved to Jersey.,( The Washington 
Post, 06-07-1995) 
While in the below quote, “the next Mark Zuckerberg” represents a reference to youthful 
technology geniuses: 
Unless you're the next Mark Zuckerberg, the high-tech campuses that dot the 
valley are off-limits. But there are ways to sneak a look. (New York Times, 05-09-
2010) 
 
Once again, the use of these names by the press infers that the level of meaning that is 
associated with them has changed and is at a broader level than before. What is important 
to note is that this is still directly related to the act of entrepreneurship but in terms that are 
more general. As the above suggests, the entrepreneur is not simply adhering to 
expectations of entrepreneurs as described in the last section, they actually embody the 
expectations of entrepreneurship. 
Additionally, a new narrative developed presenting these entrepreneurs as role 
models to the public, as people try to emulate them in order to achieve similar level of 
phenomenal success.  
At a cluttered workbench in an Arlington high-rise, Jason Yoon is trying to do 
what Steve Wozniak, Steve Jobs and other great innovators of the computer 
industry have done before him. With a minimum of money, equipment and people, 
he is trying to build a machine that will take the computer market by surprise and 
change the course of an industry.’ (The Washington Post, 25-04-1988) 
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The new movie "Social Network" may inspire some college students to attempt to 
emulate the film's hero, Facebook Inc. founder Mark Zuckerberg.’ (The Wall Street 
Journal, 09-09-2010)  
Although the original site was merely an Internet-based version of his small-town 
shop, Mr. Harte had the Jeff Bezos-like ambition of eventually going national. (The 
Wall Street Journal, 03-03-1994) 
As the above quotes illustrate, these entrepreneurs attract imitators but this is not for the 
specifics of what they did; more generally, people see them as successful role modes. They 
are again seen as an ideal type of entrepreneur that provides a guideline for others who 
would like to achieve similar impact and success.  
 Overall, these new characterisations and narrative roles occur, in each case, several 
years after the development of the initial character development and the participation in 
industry and societal narratives; they infer that these entrepreneurs now have a level of 
meaning and influence that is beyond their current endeavours but at a more general level.  
The entrepreneur as a popular figure  
Another indication of societal level renown we observed was that these 
entrepreneurs began to be referred to in general news articles in casual references. These 
occurred across two dimensions, one was a focus on their personal lives, abstracted from 
their professional persona and the second was general references. 
Firstly, we observed that the press become interested in the person and this was 
observed in different ways. In the case of Steve Jobs, the press became interested in what 
he was doing after leaving Apple. These recurrent articles were less focused on the 
company but on him and his individual success or failure as the below example shows-- 
He has named this computer NeXT. ''What we want,'' he tells the audience, ''is to 
create the next computing revolution. We want to push the envelope.'' The name 
NeXT stakes his claim to the newest standard in the industry -a PC with 
unprecedented power and versatility and an innovative programming system - but it 
is also an undisguised reference to curiosity about the next chapter in the story 
of Steve Jobs. (New York Times, 06-08-1989) 
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In the other cases, where the entrepreneurs stayed with their initial organisation, we 
noticed a developed interest in what they did outside of the organisation, as the below 
example shows-- 
Gates will marry Melinda French tomorrow morning on the secluded Hawaiian 
island of Lanai, according to the Seattle Times. Roughly 130 guests are expected to 
attend, including former Washington governor Dan Evans, billionaire Warren 
Buffett and Washington Post Chairman of the Executive Committee Katharine 
Graham. Guests were sworn to secrecy in an attempt to keep the wedding details 
private. (The Washington Post, 31-12-1993) 
 
In further evidence of their development as a popular figure, they are referenced in 
remarks, where it is expected the audience will know who the person is and what the use 
of their name means. In the below examples, a Steve Jobs’s phrase is used to rate a 
videogame, Bill Gates is referenced in an article discussing identifying opportunities, Jeff 
Bezos is referenced in an article about meat consumption and Zuckerberg about a speech 
in Harvard.  
This game, to twist Steve Jobs's phrase, is insanely great -- play it for too long and 
you'll probably go insane (The Washington Post, 25-01-1995) 
Still, not more than a couple of hours from here a fortune may be waiting for the 
person clever enough to break the Beale codes. Can someone get me Bill Gates on 
the phone? Have I got a deal for him. (The Washington Post, 14-02-1993) 
But why should that stop anyone? Entertainment rules, and a beef scare, valid or 
not, could be even more riveting than the mauling of Jeff Bezos by the bears.’ 
(New York Times, 31-03-2001, Bezos) 
Fifty years before Mark Zuckerberg arrived at Harvard—back when facebooks 
were actually books, back when poking a friend had a whole different set of 
connotations—Thornton Wilder came to campus to deliver the Charles Eliot 
Norton Lectures. (Newsweek, 27-09-2010) 
The inference in the above quotes is that these entrepreneurs are now so widely known, 
that the author references them in an article not related to them or their business interests 
assuming the audience will know them. In the same way, someone could reference the 
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Queen of England or Elvis Presley and not have to worry about giving some backstory as 
to who they are.  
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Table 8. Societal renown and recognition : Higher-coverage entrepreneurs 
Overarching dimension Second order code Steve Jobs Bill Gates Jeff Bezos 
Mark Zuckerberg 
Recognition of entrepreneur 
as cultural symbol 
Prototypical of entreprenuer 
They are now used as a generic 
term to represent a certain type 
of entrepreneur and the category 
they are associated with. 
Analogies such as the Steve 
Jobs of X begin to be used and 
the audience are expected to kn 
ow what that means. 
Archetype of a type of 
entreprenenuership 
Although old-fashioned class-
warfare rhetoric still finds its 
way into the political debate, it 
is not easy to stir up much 
public sentiment against 
America's modern 
tycoons. Steve Jobs, Sam 
Walton, Ross Perot and Michael 
Jackson, to name a few, seem to 
be widely admired. (Wall Street 
Journal, 01-11-1988) 
 
Analagous use of name 
While market forces have yet to 
spawn the Bill Gates of 
biotech... (The Washington Post, 
18-09-1992) 
 
Epitome of entreprenuerial type 
The image is fixed in popular 
culture: that of the 20-something 
Internet entrepreneur. It seems 
as if Marc Andreesen of 
Netscape Communications,Jeff 
Bezos of Amazon.com and 
assorted other online heroes 
were barely old enough to drive 
when they reinvented business 
as we know it. (Wall Street 
Journal, 06-10-2001) 
 
Epiotme of entreprenuerial type 
But to me, the really interesting 
thing about this movie is that 
while much of the tale is 
invented, the story tells a larger 
truth about Silicon Valley’s get-
rich-quick culture and the kind 
of people—like Facebook’s 26-
year-old founder and CEO, 
Mark Zuckerberg—who thrive 
in this environment. 
(Newsweek, 04-10-2010).  
 
 
Symbols of personal qualities 
The entreprenuers are used to 
symbolise a particluar trait that 
they are associated with. 
Symobol of  vision 
We don't think opportunity 
should be available only to big 
business: Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, 
etc., didn't start big. (Wall Street 
Journal, (05-10-1995) 
 
Symbol of wealth  
Instead, it sold for a record-
smashing $11.8 million. The 
price floored experts in the art 
world. Said Sam Pennington, 
editor of the Maine Antique 
Digest, "11 million! Was Bill 
Gates in it?"’ (Wall Street 
Journal, 24-05-1993)  
Symbol of  determination 
The railroad boys could learn 
something from Jeff Bezos: Get 
where you're going, fast. (Wall 
Street Journal, 14-03-200) 
 
Symbol of youthful genius 
Part of the reason could be 
pinned on the investing and tech 
world's raging case of Next 
Zuckerberg Syndrome -- the 
urge to find another Mark 
Zuckerberg before he starts 
another Facebook.’ (New York 
Times, 19-09-2010) 
 
 
Role Model 
They are a role model for 
society in general and for 
aspiring entreprenuers. 
Described as an aspirational 
figure  
 
Hidden inside every company 
with a successful IPO is another 
budding Steve Jobs, newly 
endowed with a bulging bank 
account. "In their own mind, 
they will say, `I'm going to do a 
Described as an aspirational 
figure  
 
Think about it: when mothers 
used to tell their children that 
they could grow up to be 
anything they wanted, they 
usually cited the Presidency as 
the greatest possible aspiration. 
Prospective entrepreneurs 
describe the entrepreneur as a 
role model 
 
Even with his banking jargon, 
he often sounds like a college 
kid, as when talking about 
Prospective entrepreneurs 
describe the entrepreneur as a 
role model 
 
The success of start-ups 
like Facebook and Google Inc. 
… has planted the idea of 
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start-up. I know I'm good,' " said 
Roger Smith, president of 
Silicon Valley Bank. "It's part of 
the valley fever, if you will." 
(The Washington Post, 29-07-
1990) 
Now mothers are more likely to 
tell their kids that they can grow 
up to be the next Bill Gates. 
(The New York Times, 15-12-
1998) 
 
meeting Jeff Bezos, head of 
Amazon. ''I said, 'Jeff, you are, 
like, my mentor. I like look up 
to you because you've inspired 
me to build this company,' and I 
mean I was just so excited.''’ 
(Newsweek, 11-02-2000) 
entrepreneurship in more 
students' brains. Some 40% of 
youths between the ages of eight 
and 21 say they'd like to start 
their own business in the 
future,… (The Washington Post, 
09-09-2010) 
Recognition of entrepreneur 
as popular figure 
 
 
 
General cultural reference 
Due to their promenence, they 
receive coverage in other realms 
of society such as politics, 
education and pop culture. 
These include casual mentions 
in a general fashion due to their 
well-knowingness. 
 
Politics 
Like Mr. Buchanan, List valued 
protectionism, arguing that 
government should help what he 
called "infant industries": "The 
reason for this is the same as 
that why a child or boy in 
wrestling with a strong man can 
scarcely be victorious or even 
offer steady resistance." By this 
logic, the U.S. has been starving 
"infants" like Steve Jobs. (29-
02-1996, Wall Street Journal) 
Popular culture 
Sure, the Boeing plant and the 
Pike Place Market appear on the 
Monks' cartoon map of Seattle, 
but so does the former home of 
executed serial killer Ted 
Bundy, the current residence of 
famed nerd billionaire Bill 
Gates, the graves of Jimi 
Hendrix and Bruce Lee, and the 
rough location of a building 
decorated with many jello 
molds. (06-06-1993, The 
Washington Post) 
Education 
The strong economy has left 
many potential students satisfied 
with their current jobs -- or 
eager to join start-ups. If Bill 
Gates or Jeff Bezos didn't need 
an M.B.A., some people wonder 
why they do, either. (The New 
York Times, 01-10-2000) 
Popular culture 
How's this for a high-profile 
team: Rap artist Snoop Dogg, 
real name Calvin Broadus, 
recently tweeted he'd like to 
combine 
with Facebook founder Mark 
Zuckerberg to "go buy a pro 
sports team together."…(05-10-
2010, The Wall Street Journal) 
 
Focus on individual 
There is a new focus on the 
individual, separate from the 
firm they founded and gained 
initial recognition for. 
Insight into hobbies 
In the '70s, important figures in 
the future of computing tried 
psychedelics. Apple Computer 
co-founder Steve Jobs called his 
first LSD trip "wonderful." Bob 
Wallace, one of the founding 
programmers at Microsoft, says 
today: "I consider the insights 
from LSD to be very useful, 
both professionally and 
personally." (The Washington 
Post, 10-03-1996) 
Insight into relationships 
And speaking of romantic New 
Year's ideas ... Microsoft Corp. 
Chairman Bill Gates will marry 
Melinda French tomorrow 
morning on the secluded 
Hawaiian island of Lanai, 
according to the Seattle Times. 
(The Washington Post, 31-12-
1993) 
 
Insight into hobbies 
SLEEP, while never exactly out 
of style, seems really in vogue 
now. The Wall Street Journal 
this year proclaimed it ''the new 
status symbol.'' Business 
superstars like Jeff Bezos of 
Amazon.com and Marc 
Andreesen, a founder of …brag 
about getting eight luxuriant 
hours regularly, to the doubtless 
envy of legions of sleep-
deprived stiffs. (The New York 
Times, 12-09-1999) 
Inisght into relationships 
Under the headline ''Facebook 
Mastermind Is ... Cheating?,'' the 
26-second video clip showed 
Mr. Zuckerberg and a woman 
being confronted by a TMZ 
cameraman as they left a 
restaurant. ''Facebook 
creator Mark Zuckerberg was 
caught off guard last night when 
he was spotted with a lady 
friend at Mr. Chow,'' (The  New 
York Times, 11-02-2008) 
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DISCUSSION  
The preceding analysis section has described how higher-coverage entrepreneurs in 
our study become main characters of a story of a new industry and technology and 
eventually become symbolic of the act of entrepreneurship. We illustrate how some 
entrepreneurs become societal level celebrities and describe how others are treated 
differently, and do not achieve this status. Specifically, we show that similar descriptions 
and references are recurrent and common across the four higher coverage cases. For the 
lower coverage group, these types of characterisations are limited or sparingly present in 
some cases.  
In the following sections, we outline the theoretical implications of this process. 
Firstly, we detail how being a prominent character in explaining technological, cultural 
and industrial changes is likely influential on the level of press attention that individual 
will receive by the press. Secondly, we show that prototypically and conforming to a 
perceived category is important to how the press emphasize these figures as special. 
Finally, we argue that because entrepreneurs appear key to explanations in how the world 
is changing they can achieve a cultural significance once reserved for movie stars and 
sports people.  
Generating press attention 
An important question in research on the development of celebrities is how do 
individual’s garner audience attention (Rindova et al., 2006; Hayward et al., 2004; 
Zavyalova et al., 2017). This paper reveals that the higher coverage entrepreneurs in our 
study play a central role in broader narratives in relation to social, cultural and 
technological changes whereas the lower coverage do not. We argue that this is influential 
on the level of attention both groups achieve in the media. We elaborate on this point 
below.  
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 In explicating the dimensions of character development for the high coverage 
group, we found empirical evidence for what Rindova and colleagues (2006) theorised in 
terms of non-conforming actions; entrepreneurs were deviating from norms, for example, 
regarding appearance and career codes. However, as well as this, we found that 
entrepreneurs in the higher coverage group were linked to a very specific type of broader 
stories of social and technological changes, while the entrepreneurs in the lower coverage 
sample were not.  
Our data suggest that the press make a judgement early on about who to focus their 
attention on. That is because their broad, general audience has limited attention span 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1977; McQuail, 2010), and they can only remember a few 
‘figureheads’. From our comparative cases, the evidence suggests that the press focuses on 
entrepreneurs who they think are suitable in casting as the main character of developing 
narratives related to socio-cultural and technological change. This finding therefore 
suggests that there is an important relationship between an entrepreneur’s (or an actor’s 
more generally) suitability to featuring in more general narratives and the level of attention 
they will receive by the media.  
This observation regarding storytelling suitability also suggests that celebrity 
entrepreneurs may be more likely to arise in certain industries than others. Each of our four 
celebrity entrepreneurs acted in a different industry, but all four industries were novel, 
consumer facing, and had big impact on lifestyle and social norms. Based on the evidence 
of how these four celebrity entrepreneurs developed, we can speculate that industries that 
are culturally salient to the general public might be more likely to generate celebrity actors, 
as the press will look for a personality to explain complicated current events and predict 
the future. Conversely, industries with perceived limited socio-cultural or techno-cultural 
importance will be less likely to foster celebrity figures. 
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Why the press focuses on certain actors has been discussed in several fields of 
social science. Communication theorists have argued that the content the media produces 
reflects these pressures and is affected by organizational and individual level actions 
(Janowitz, 1968; McQuail, 2010) and by broader social forces as the media try to reflect 
social reality (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991). Research on the development of celebrity has 
focused on the premise that individuals can allow the media to do their job and tell 
interesting stories (Gamson, 1994; Rindova et al., 2006). One key element of this is the 
personality of the individual. For example, Van Krieken (2012) discussed Princess Diana’s 
personality, which did not conform to normal expectations of the monarchy, which, at her 
time, were dominated by aloof non-relatable personalities. In contrast, Diana was 
personable and open to courting the media and thus allowed the media to tell an interesting 
story. However, non-conforming actions and interesting personality are not deemed to be 
the only reason for celebritization. In Diana’s case, she also represented and revived the 
archetype of the “Queen of Hearts”, pioneered by Queen Victoria in the 19th century, 
which was important to people, because it represented Englishness (Ward, 2001).  
Therefore, in this work, we extend and combine the above perspectives by detailing 
how personalities are linked explicitly to broader stories by the press. Specifically, we 
show that more attention is a garnered in terms of news coverage by those who seem to be 
recurrently used to tell broader stories of technological and societal change. This provides 
an additional understanding of why some actors may become celebrities in a business 
context, taking the discussion away from a focus on the behaviour of the actor themselves 
(e.g. Hayward et al., 2004; Lovelace et al., 2018; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 
2017), which has been key to previous theorising in the management literature about 
celebrity development.  
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Creating an interesting character 
Being a character in the press that is deemed interesting by a broad audience is 
considered paramount to celebrity development in a business context (Hayward et al., 
2004; Lovelace et al., 2018; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2017).  Current theories 
for the development of celebrity in business assume that non-conforming action relative to 
industry norms (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006) is paramount to be constructed 
by the media as a celebrity. In the case of celebrity entrepreneurs, non-conforming 
business action is necessary, but not sufficient. In contrast, our observations indicate that 
entrepreneurs become celebrities by simultaneously non-conforming to societal 
conventions and established business norms in their industries, and highly conforming to 
common representations of entrepreneurship.  
Our data suggests that the non-conforming behaviours and distinctive actions of the 
celebrities in our study are framed by the press within expectations of the category the 
actor belongs to, in this case entrepreneurship. For example, having extreme amounts of 
money is distinctive but relates the ideas of sole residual claimant (Knight, 1957). Leaving 
the conventional path to start a business is non-conforming but again it is framed by the 
press within the context of entrepreneurship. Based on this finding, we believe that high 
category conformity is important to celebrity development in a business context. The low 
coverage entrepreneurs seem to deviate from norms within their respective industries such 
as Michael Dell being a young leader of an organization or Mitch Kapor wearing Hawaiian 
shirts to meetings but as their narrative summaries suggest, they are described not as 
highly prototypical to the category of entrepreneurs as the higher coverage entrepreneurs.  
This finding is substantiated by how there is such commonality in the way the high 
coverage entrepreneurs are described in terms of their background, personal characteristics 
and attributes. What is interesting is that eventually the press begin to use statements that 
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actively describe these the higher coverage entrepreneurs as prototypes of the entrepreneur 
in the second phase of character development, when they move to being societally known.  
Prototyping is deemed an important element of the socio-cognitive view of categories (E.g. 
Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Rosch, 1978; Tversky, 1977). According to Cantor and Mischel 
(1979: 30), “the most prototypic members of a category are those members who share 
many features in common with other members of their own category and few features in 
common with members of other closely related categories”.  
 Extant theories of celebrity development (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 
2006; Zavyalova et al., 2017) rely on research in social psychology on social deviance to 
determine what type of individuals are likely to be noticed by others. This behaviour can 
be deviant because it over conforms to perceived norms of the group such as having 
multiple wives in western society (Tittle & Patermoster, 2000) or it can under conform to 
norms such as not paying taxes. Simultaneously, the audience will be placing them in a 
particular social category to frame the deviance, as the deviance from cultural norms is 
framed within which category a person fits in to. For example, if an individual is 
categorised as a particular religion or ethnicity, these will affect the norms others will 
expect them to follow (Cantor and Mischel, 1979).   
 We therefore argue that extant views of celebrity development ignore the 
categorical element to social norms and our findings support the idea that as well as being 
positioned as breaking certain norms of behaviour it is equally important to conform to 
perceived norms of the category the actor belongs to, in this case Entrepreneurship. We 
therefore provide another important criterion for how the press generate interest in a 
character. These findings also extend recent work by Lovelace et al. (2017) who in 
reference to CEOs argued that ideal types of celebrity exist and celebrity actors conform 
and are constrained by the archetype they belong to. Evidence of the archetype of the 
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creator is present in our data. However, in our cases, being a CEO and a leader seems very 
much second to being categorised as an entrepreneur. Lovelace and colleagues (2017) 
focused on established celebrities. We extend this line of reasoning by showing that over 
adhering to a category can be important to the formation of an individual as a celebrity in 
the first instance. 
Entrepreneurs achieving societal level celebrity 
As discussed earlier, celebrities can be divided into sectors. Van Krieken (2012) 
argued that some sectors are dominant and used the Forbes celebrity list as an illustration; 
in 2011 it consisted of 73 celebrities in film, television and radio, ten in sport, ten in music, 
four in literature and three in modelling. A reason for the domination of these sectors is the 
generalist narratives that these celebrity actors can tell (Van Krieken, 2012). Similarly, 
Rein et al. (1997) argued that only three “superstar” sectors, namely sport, movies and 
music, could generate broad-level celebrities, as they are the only sectors that narrate 
stories that almost anyone can relate to—loss, love, passion. According to Rojek (2006) 
these sectors allow people to interact with the expression and manifestation of powerful 
emotions which have no other outlet, adding drama to everyday life. Conversely, other 
‘second tier’ sectors that require specialist knowledge do not generally have that same pull 
on the average person.  
Despite this previous theorisation about the limits of the second tier sectors to 
generate broad-level celebrities, our findings show that entrepreneurs can eventually reach 
broad recognition by the general public, representing abstract concepts like wealth, 
determination and creativity. We argue that the reason for this is that entrepreneurs are 
now key to our understanding of how the world is changing. For example, Muhammad 
Yunus and Elon Musk are different personalities but they are linked by their value in 
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explaining social changes, one in terms of international development and the other in terms 
of technological advancements; thus, they both garner a lot of press attention.   
Interestingly, we observed a lag in the appearance of codes associated with the 
placement of entrepreneurs in broader contexts until several years after their initial 
character development and placement in narratives. Relatedly, research in social 
psychology has shown that simple repetition of information will increase an audience’s 
familiarity with someone (Hawkins and Hoch, 1992). We therefore argue that the initial 
build-up of entrepreneurial characters and the early narratives enable the subsequent 
positioning of entrepreneurs as cultural symbols, because the audience becomes familiar 
with the entrepreneur; afterwards, it seems that the press will start associating the 
entrepreneur with broader themes. This in interesting for entrepreneurship scholars as it 
empirically shows the specific qualities entrepreneurs are linked to; vision, wealth, 
determination are the key entrepreneurial roles that are emphasized by the press.  
This finding links current theory on how celebrity works in society (Rojek, 2006; 
Van Krieken, 2012) and the importance of entrepreneurship as a cultural phenomenon (e.g. 
Shane, 2008). It firstly shows how entrepreneurs can become societally relevant through 
coverage in the press. Secondly, this finding also extends the scope of the effect of 
celebritization, which to date has focused on the focal actor or their associated firm and 
show how those who garner broad attention and positive affect can become symbolic of 
the activity they are associated with and in turn help shape the understanding of what that 
activity is.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 Besides describing the clear dimensions of how certain figures develop as celebrity 
entrepreneurs, this study provides impetus for research to focus on an area largely ignored 
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by entrepreneurship scholars: which is the cultural salience of celebrity as an intangible 
asset to be a) used by entrepreneurs themselves to garner resources and improve their 
positions and b) encourage entrepreneurship in society. Furthermore, we show that 
entrepreneurship as a topic is very culturally salient because the treatment of the celebrity 
entrepreneurs in this study is similar to Gamson’s (1994) descriptions of entertainment 
celebrities who garner interest in their personal lives. Inherent in previous exploration of 
celebrity for CEOs (E.g. Cho et al., 2015; Hayward et al., 2004) is that it is a more 
localised phenomenon to business environments. This study shows that some 
entrepreneurs command significant societal level attention, to the point of being 
constructed as societal level celebrities and becoming cultural symbols who are described 
as archetypes of entrepreneurship and role models for others. 
Thus, it is important for entrepreneur research to know from this study that it seems 
the most dominant type of entrepreneur broadcast to the public is that of the idealist genius 
who strikes it rich. We demonstrate that these characters are normalised to the point that 
they are used out of context as popular characters and are discussed as representing the act 
of entrepreneurship in general. 
LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Firstly, a main limitation of this study is that it only presents the outcomes of a 
celebritization process in the press.  A future avenue of research could be the behind the 
scenes negotiation between the press, PR agents and entrepreneurs in being selected as a 
main character in the story of a new industry. Future studies may want to look at the 
behind the scenes negotiations between the press and communication professionals at 
those early stages when coverage begins to develop on a new topic.  
Secondly, we chose a medium (printed press) and selected outlets (five most 
published news publications in the USA) to make the qualitative research design feasible. 
59 
 
The logic was that it would give a reasonable representation of the broader media coverage 
on these entrepreneurs and their activities. Future studies could focus on social media in 
particular and how this shapes the public identities of entrepreneurs. 
 In terms of future studies, the development of the clear dimensions that the press 
focus on will allow scholars to explore the effects of celebrity in an entrepreneurial context 
as well as contribute to its testing in other contexts. For example, scholars could test if a 
variance in narratives affects a difference in terms of stakeholder evaluations. Secondly, 
we believe scholars could test the implications of the types of entrepreneurs that develop 
as celebrities on entrepreneurial behaviour. Previous research has shown some evidence 
that media coverage of entrepreneurship influences entrepreneurial intentions (CITE).  
Thirdly, the clear dimensions of celebrity entrepreneurs can allow for the fine-
grained testing of the effect of the construct on outcomes for celebrity entrepreneurs 
themselves. For example, the press’ emphasis on wealth creation or foundational myths 
could be explored in relation to acquiring resources. This is important as stakeholder 
evaluations and access to resources are key to the success of entrepreneurs (Hsu, 2004; 
Shane and Cable, 2002) and celebrity has been shown to have effects on these in more 
general organisational contexts (Wade et al., 2008; Pfarrer et al., 2010).  
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Table 3. Information regarading stages of analysis 
 
Jobs 
Dell 
Gates Kapor Bezos Omidyar 
Zuckerberg 
Dorsey 
Total 
articles 
analysed 
 
277 83 320 62 395 60 582 
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Step 1 
        
Articles 
focused on 
the 
individual 
 14% 2% 14% 7% 6% 5% 
9% 
0% 
Articles 
focused on 
the firm 
24% 42% 11% 7% 48% 42% 
36% 
44% 
Articles 
focused on 
the 
industry 
40% 49% 54% 63% 35% 44% 
35% 
40% 
Articles on 
society 
22% 5% 17% 22% 11% 8% 
30% 
13% 
other 0% 2% 3% 2% 306 0% 
0% 
3% 
Step 2 & 3 
        
Articles 
used in 
coding 
 
176 43 229 33 262 13 390 23 
Dropped 
because of 
absence of 
codes 
        
% of 
articles 
analysed 
used  
the coding  
63% 
52% 72% 53% 66% 21% 67% 37% 
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Numbers represent total amount of pieces of text coded for that particular dimension  
Table 4. Occurrence of codes (number of text fragments associated with each second order code) 
 
Overarching dimensions 
 
 Steve Jobs Bill Gates Jeff Bezos Mark Zuckerberg 
 
Michael Dell Mitch Kapor Pierre 
Omidyar 
Jack Dorsey 
Dramatization & 
character development 
 
 
Foundational myth 
          
Rebelliousness against 
conventional path  
18 (***) 23 (***) 11 (***) 23 (***) 
 
4 (*) 1 (*) -- 4 (*) 
Humble origins of 
business 
22 (***) 9 (**) 11 (***) 21 (***) 
 
6 (*) -- 4 (**) 2 (*) 
 
Extraordinary attributes 
of the character  
 
 
Extraordinary talent 
47 (***) 29 (***) 13 (***) 27 (***) 
 
3 (*) 7 (**) 1 (*) 10 (**) 
 
 
Extraordinary wealth 
28 (***) 58 (***) 38 (***) 55 (***) 
 
7 (*) 2 (*) 2(*) 3 (*) 
 
Extraordinary youth 14 (***) 27  (***) 7 (**) 27 (***) 
 
2 (*) 
-- 
-- 4 (*) 
 
Nuanced personal 
descriptions 
Contrasted personality 13 (**) 39 (***) 12 (***) 10 (***) 
 
2 (*) 2 (*) -- 2 (*) 
Unconventional 
appearance 
12 (**) 12 (**) 7 (**) 11 (***) 
 
-- 3 (*) -- -- 
Role in broader narratives 
 
Industry Impact 
 
 
          
Pioneering industry 
transformations 
80 (***) 49 (***) 76 (***) 37 (***) 
 
12 (***) 11 (**) -- -- 
 
Giving insights into 
current and future 
trends in industry 
21 (***) 40 (***) 22 (***) 17 (***) 
 
5 (**) 8 (**) 6(**) 9 (**) 
Societal relevance 
Products changing 
people’s lives 
26 (***) 20 (***) 13 (***) 15 (***) 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Vision for the future of 
society 
31 (***) 12 (***) 9 (***) 21 (***) 
 
-- 3 (*) -- 3 (*) 
Societal renown and 
recognition 
     
    
Recognition of 
entrepreneur as cultural 
symbol 
Prototype of an 
entrepreneur 
18 (***) 25 (***) 20 (***) 10 (***) 
 
-- 2 (*) -- -- 
personal quality 
11 (**) 18 (***) 13 (***) 14(**) 
 
-- -- -- -- 
Role Model 11 (**) 8 (***) 8 (***) 6(**) 
 
-- 1 (*) -- 1 (*) 
General references 10 (***) 18 (***) 13 (***) 25 (***) 
 
-- 2 (*) -- -- 
Recognition of 
entrepreneur as popular 
figure 
 
Focus on individual 6 (**) 
13 (***) 
7 (**) 13(***) 
 
-- -- 
-- 
2 (*) 
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*** frequently recurring longitudinal evidence of code (Every year, often more than once a year with some periods of regular recurrence) 
** moderately recurring evidence with some extended absence of code (less than once a year) 
* some evidence of code but infrequent and not extended over time (occasional appearance across years) 
-- no evidence of code 
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PAPER TWO:  
SIMPLY THE BEST: ORGANIZATIONAL HUBRIS AND DECISION MAKING 
BIASES 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we conceptualize the development and consequences of organizational hubris, 
which we define as an attitude marked by an extreme and inflated sense of pride, certainty, and 
confidence in the organization that becomes a characteristic of a bulk of organizational 
members. We propose that it develops in organizational members through positive external 
attributions and eventually influences the development of a hubristic culture which makes it 
more sustaining than individual level hubris. Additionally, we argue that once developed, 
organizational hubris leads to two defining outcomes: latitude and insularity, which can have 
both positive and negative outcomes for firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authors note: this project was started while I was in the University of Georgia as a visiting 
scholar with two faculty members there: Michael Pfarrer and Daniel Gamache. They 
helped with the idea formation and framing and have provided feedback and edits on the 
below draft. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We were acquiring a million subscribers a month. We were rolling in dough. We were 
like, we - I'm amazing, and you know what? So are you. Wait - so are you. We're 
amazing. What can we do? Anything we want. And everything was golden. There's no 
way we were going to fail.” (Patty McCord, Netflix) 
 
In the world of business, one often sees firms displaying brazen decision-making that has 
been described in common parlance as hubristic. On one hand, these description are often related 
to negative events such as the manipulations of energy markets at Enron (Swartz & Watkins, 
2003) and secretive risk-taking at Barings Bank (Leeson, 2015), to Goldman Sachs’ and Lehman 
Brothers’ rampant use of subprime mortgages and credit default swaps that preceded the 2008 
financial crisis (Lewis, 2011, Cohan, 2010) Conversely, they can be associated with rapid growth 
and high performance such as in the growth of Netflix or Uber. What links these examples that in 
each case, the attitude at these firms was one of invincibility—that success was inevitable and 
failure impossible (e.g., Swartz & Watkins, 2003; Lewis, 2011). In short, these firms were 
exhibiting organizational hubris. 
Hubris is an exaggerated sense of pride and self-confidence (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Li and Tang, 2010). At the executive level, management and finance literature treat hubris 
as synonymous with overconfidence—an excessive certainty about one's decisions (Brown & 
Sarma, 2007; Simon & Houghton, 2003; Malmendier & Tate, 2005, 2008; Malmendier Tate & 
Yan., 2011). Hubris can have both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, hubris 
can increase determination, boldness, and persistence (Johnson & Fowler, 2011). Indeed, 
research demonstrates that CEO hubris is associated with increased firm innovativeness (Tang, 
Li, & Yang, 2015) and an entrepreneurial orientation (Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010). On the 
other hand, hubris can lead to “faulty assessments, unrealistic expectations, and hazardous 
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decisions” (Johnson & Fowler, 2011: 317). Consistent with this, CEO hubris is associated with 
rash decisions such as value-destroying acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier 
& Tate, 2007) and reduced corporate social responsibility (Tang, Qian, Chen, & Shen, 2015).  
It is not only top executives, however, who can be hubristic. Employees at all levels of 
the organization can display this form of pride and overconfidence (Anderson, Ames, & Gosling, 
2008; Ford, 2006). As a result, decisions made at the middle- and lower- levels of an 
organization can also be shaped by hubris. Like other collective beliefs, emotions, and 
behaviours—such as organizational empathy or organizational corruption (den Niewenboer, da 
Cunha, & Trevino, 2017; Muller, Pfarrer, & Little, 2014; Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008)—hubris can 
spread throughout an organization. In turn, as hubris becomes more prevalent among 
organizational members, it can infuse the organization at a collective level and has the potential 
to shape the very nature of the company.  
In this paper, we introduce the construct of organizational hubris and explicate its 
development and consequences. We define organizational hubris as a collective attitude marked 
by an inflated sense of pride and confidence in the organization that becomes a pervasive 
characteristic of the organization and its members. We conceptualize the development and 
consequences of organizational hubris in three steps. Firstly, we argue that organizational hubris 
is formed following positive external attributions about the firm that serves to create a sense of 
pride in the organization and confidence embodied in organizational members. As such, hubris 
becomes a collective, organizational level attitude. Secondly, as a result of this organizational 
wide attitude, we conceptualize a model for how organizational hubris becomes embedded 
within organizations. We theorize that this process is propagated through organizational culture 
as it develops through the interactions of the collective of hubristic individuals. As organizational 
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hubris becomes embedded in the organization, it becomes a persistent attribute of that 
organization and endures beyond the tenure of any one leader or any specific employee and thus 
differs from CEO or executive-level hubris. Thirdly, we argue that once developed, 
organizational hubris leads to two defining outcomes: latitude and insularity. Latitude reflects a 
freedom of action and the ability of organizational members to take bold steps and be free from 
restrictive monitoring. Insularity reflects an internal focus that isolates organizational members 
from the opinions or concerns of outsiders. We theorize that latitude and insularity can have both 
positive and negative organizational consequences. For example, latitude can lead to both 
innovative and unethical behaviours, while insularity can lead to both persistence and neglecting 
stakeholder relationships. 
Our paper makes three primary contributions to management research. Firstly, we 
develop the construct of organizational hubris to account for the collective inflated pride and 
overconfidence that organizational members can have within their organization. Doing so adds to 
the theoretical conversation that has focused almost exclusively on hubris of individual 
executives (e.g., Li & Tang; 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sadler-Smith et al., 2016). 
Secondly, we explain how organizational hubris leads organizational members to both latitude 
and insularity, and we discuss the positive and negative implications these outcomes have for the 
organization. As such, our theory can enhance our understanding of why “good” firms do bad 
things (Mishina et al., 2010). Thirdly, we explain how organizational hubris can become 
embedded in the culture making it a persistent attribute of the organization. Thus, we challenge 
the convention that replacing a hubristic CEO can solve concerns of hubris in organizations (e.g. 
Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 2010). The fact that organizational hubris can endure 
for an extended period of time, shaping organizational actions for successive generations of 
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leaders, makes understanding how and when organizational hubris is likely to develop and its 
implications for the organization very important.  
INDIVIDUAL VS. ORGANIZATIONAL HUBRIS 
The concept of hubris is rooted in Greek mythology. The common theme from this 
literature depicts the rise and fall of various heroes with an extreme level of self-belief 
(Woodruff, 2005). Hubris is often conceptualized as a potentially dangerous combination of 
over-confidence, over-ambition, arrogance, and pride (Sadler-Smith, Akstinaite, Robinson, & 
Wray, 2016). The story of Icarus is a classic example of mythological hubris. Icarus’ father 
created a pair of wings for his son that enabled him to escape their island prison. His father 
cautioned Icarus not to fly too close to the sun. However, because of his hubristic belief in his 
newfound abilities, Icarus ignored the advice and fell to his death (Petit and Bollaert, 2012).  
Organizational scholars’ conceptualization of hubris builds directly on the construct’s 
mythological roots, and it has focused primarily on hubristic CEOs (Conroy & Brennan, 2013; Li 
& Tang; 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sadler-Smith et al., 2016). Early work investigated 
why CEOs persistently pay high premiums for acquisitions and argued that hubristic CEOs 
overestimate their ability to extract value from an acquisition and thus overpay for it. The 
market, in response, sees the premium as being excessive and responds negatively (Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997; Roll, 1986). Ensuing research suggested that CEO hubris grows over time as 
the result of successful experiences and the tendency to attribute such successes to their own 
abilities (Billett & Qian, 2008). More recently, management scholars have expanded our 
understanding of the role of CEO hubris, moving beyond the acquisition context and showing a 
positive relationship between CEO hubris with both organizational risk-taking (Li & Tang, 
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2010), and firm innovation (Tang, Li & Yang, 2012), but a negative relationship between CEO 
hubris and corporate social responsibility (Tang et al., 2015). 
Concurrently, scholars in finance have studied overconfidence—a term synonymous with 
hubris (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Hirshleifer, Low & Teoh, 2012).
10
 Similar to 
management scholarship, work in finance has explored the role of CEO overconfidence in 
influencing firm investment decisions and acquisition activity. In particular, this work has 
demonstrated that CEO overconfidence is positively related to the number of acquisitions and 
negatively related to market reactions to acquisitions. Further, Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
found that overconfident CEOs tend to over-invest when they have abundant cash flow but 
under-invest when they need to rely on external sources of funding. A subsequent study 
confirmed that “overconfident CEOs overestimate future cash flows and therefore perceive 
external finance—and particularly equity—to be unduly costly” (Malmendier et al., 2011: 1729). 
Additionally, researchers have explored the influence of overconfidence in entrepreneurs. This 
work suggests that entrepreneurs are more overconfident than professional managers and that 
this is particularly prevalent for younger entrepreneurs and those in smaller and newer ventures 
(Forbes, 2005; Koellinger, Minniti, & Schade, 2007; Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006).  
Whereas hubris and overconfidence are treated synonymously, hubris should not be 
confused with narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Haynes, Hitt & Campbell, 2016; Tang 
et al., 2015). Narcissism is associated with self-love and perceived superiority (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007; 2011). Narcissists crave public attention, are motivated and emboldened by 
praise and adulation (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011), and have “an intense need to have one’s 
superiority reaffirmed” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007: 354). In contrast, hubris is not associated 
                                                 
10
 Although research in psychology notes that all people tend to display overconfidence in their decision making 
(Debondt & Thaler, 1995), studies of hubris and executive overconfidence tend to focus on very high levels of 
overconfidence beyond that typical of individuals (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 
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with the need for external recognition (Tang et al., 2015). Further, while the sense of superiority 
associated with narcissism includes a strong belief in one’s ability, it also emphasizes self-love 
and egotism, two characteristics not associated with hubris (Haynes et al., 2016; Tang et al., 
2015). In short, hubris lacks elements central to narcissism, “most notably, a sense of 
entitlement, preoccupation with self and continuous need for affirmation and applause” 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007: 357). 
Research on hubris has established that hubristic individuals have great effects on their 
organizations. However, to date, research has almost exclusively focused on the CEO and other 
top executives while ignoring the rest of the organization. Of course, if executives can become 
hubristic then it is possible that others within the organization can become hubristic too 
suggesting that the effects of hubris within an organization may be more widespread than 
previously theorized. Building on this notion, we theorize that the hubris can become a 
collective, organizational-level attitude, which can guide organizational culture and as such, the 
organization itself can become hubristic.  
 
 Executive Hubris Organizational Hubris 
Definition Exaggerated sense of pride or self-
confidence  
A collective attitude marked by an 
inflated sense of pride, certainty, and 
confidence in the organization that 
becomes a pervasive characteristic of the 
organization and its members. 
 
Target of pride, certainty, 
and confidence 
Self Organization 
Level of influence Confined to hubristic individuals 
 
Collectively held--pervasive through 
organizational members—not restricted 
to any one person 
 
Table 1: Executive-level versus organizational-level hubris 
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DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL HUBRIS 
Organizational-level Attitudes 
An attitude is “a relatively enduring organization of beliefs, feelings, and behavioural 
tendencies towards socially significant objects, groups, events or symbols” (Hogg, & Vaughan 
2005, 150). Hubris is an attitude as it contains a belief (self-confidence), an emotion (pride), and 
ultimately shapes behaviour (e.g. Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Early management scholarship 
argued that collective beliefs and emotions can disseminate throughout an organization 
(Selznick, 1949). Since then research has explored how beliefs, feelings, and behavioural 
tendencies can be conceived as collective. For example, research investigating cognition (Kaplan 
& Tripsas, 2008) sense making (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005), efficacy (Bandura, 1997) 
and intuition (Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2009)all argue that collective beliefs and emotions 
can have important outcomes for organizations. 
Within organizations, collective attitudes are important for two reasons. Firstly, they can 
develop outside of the control and influence of top management, and thus, are not part of the 
rational and intentional strategic vision that executives may have for the organization (den 
Persistence of construct Until the departure of the hubristic 
individual 
 
Becomes ingrained in the processes, 
routines and actions of the organization 
 
Outcomes Strategic-level actions – Primarily  
influences behavior, decisions and 
actions initiated by the hubristic 
executive  
 
The organization through its processes 
exhibits hubristic behavior, decisions, and 
actions at all organizational levels 
 
Limiting factors Influence can be limited by the 
presence of checks and balances 
(governance etc..) 
 
Influence is persistent and subject to 
decreased checks and balances over time 
 
Antecedents Natural tendencies such as perceived 
self-importance and situational factors 
such as recent performance and media 
praise 
 
Positive attributions from external 
sources—not necessarily based on actual 
performance or sense of self-importance 
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Niewenboer et al., 2017; Muller, Pfarrer, & Little, 2014). Secondly, because individuals 
throughout the group hold similar understandings, collective attitudes are reinforced and breed 
confidence in the veracity of those beliefs (Bar-Tel, 1998) leading to stronger action tendencies 
than for individual beliefs (Barsade & Gibson, 2012; Muller et al., 2014). Thus, at the 
organizational level, collective attitudes can provide a powerful explanation of behaviours and 
decision making processes throughout the organization (Dean JR, Brandes & Dharwadkar, 1998; 
Muller et al., 2014; Pinto, Leana, and Pil, 2008).  
Collective attitudes can have either positive or negative implications for the organization. 
On the one hand, positive collective attitudes can develop into organizational empathy which can 
affect decision-making processes throughout the organization, resulting is a higher engagement 
in corporate philanthropy (Muller et al., 2014). On the other hand, negative collective attitudes 
can develop such as organizational corruption (e.g., Pinto, Leanna, & Pil, 2008) and 
organizational-level cynicism (e.g. Dean, Brandes & Dharwadkar, 1998). These collective 
attitudes can be particularly harmful to organizations resulting in employee disengagement, 
resistance to organizational change, and legal and regulatory problems (Avey, Wernsing & 
Luthans, 2008;Dean et al., 1998; Pinto et al., 2008).  
Consistent with this research, and as we explicate below, we believe that hubristic 
attitudes can grow systematically among organizational members, become an attribute of the 
organization, and have important implications for how organizations operate.
11
 Further, we argue 
that organizational hubris can become embedded within the organization, thus, lasting beyond 
the influence or tenure of any particular organizational member. Thus, unlike executive hubris 
which has little influence on the organization beyond the tenure of the hubristic executive, 
                                                 
11
 We use the term “organizational members” to refer to all employees throughout the organization ranging from 
entry-level employees through mid-level managers and including top executives. The term refers to the group as a 
collective and not any one individual employee. 
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organizational hubris can have a long-lasting influence that may shape the organization for an 
extended period of time. 
Positive External Attributions and the Development of Organizational Hubris 
As noted earlier, organizational hubris is a collective attitude characterized by an extreme 
and inflated sense of pride, certainty, and confidence in the organization. Prior work on 
organizational characteristics notes that an individual characteristic becomes an organizational-
level phenomenon when it becomes a “palpable attribute” of the group (Muller et al., 2014: 9) 
and is “sufficiently widespread to characterize the organization as a whole” (Pinto et al., 2008: 
688). Consistent with this, hubris among individuals becomes organizational hubris when it 
becomes a pervasive characteristic of the organization.
12
 Further, organizational hubris reflects 
that the organization itself is the target of the inflated pride and confidence. While hubristic 
individuals display extreme pride and self-confidence (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Li & Tang, 
2010), members of companies with high organizational hubris display extreme pride, certainty, 
and confidence in the organization. Thus, the organizational members do not necessarily act 
hubristically in other spheres of their lives.  
We argue that the primary antecedent of organizational hubris is positive attributions 
made about the firm. These positive attributions can come from a variety of external sources. 
Media coverage, due to its pervasive role in society, is likely to be a particularly important 
source of external attributions (Bednar, 2012; Bednar, Boivie, & Prince, 2013). Additionally, 
positive attributions can come from industry analysts, stock analyst recommendations, company 
                                                 
12
 Consistent with other work on organizational characteristics (e.g., Muller et al., 2014) we do not argue that a 
specific number or proportion of employees must be hubristic. The actual number or proportion of organizational 
members who must be hubristic before hubris becomes a pervasive characteristic of the organization may differ 
from one organization to another. 
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awards, and other forms of public recognition (e.g., Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006; 
Wiersema & Zhang, 2011; Westphal & Graebner, 2010).  
Positive attributions can have both a direct and an indirect influence on employees within 
the organization. Direct influences occur through the exposure of employees to positive 
attributions about the organization. When people hear news that directly affects them, they pay 
particular attention to that message even to the point of seeking out additional coverage 
(Kepplinger, 2007). Indirect influence occurs when friends and family mention the positive 
attributes to employees further amplifying the effect of the news (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). As 
a result of this effect, employees grow to assume that public opinions of the firm match those 
portrayed in the media (Dutton & Duckerich, 1991; Morsing, 1999). 
Whereas at a high level of abstraction, it appears that both executive and organizational 
hubris are precipitated by the same thing (positive attributions), in reality, organizational hubris 
relies on different mechanisms. Executive hubris is thought to be driven by three factors: recent 
performance, media praise, and self-importance (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Unlike research 
on executive hubris, however, we do not contend that actual high performance is a necessary 
antecedent to organizational hubris, nor is the self-importance of any individual. Therefore, 
organizational hubris is distinct from CEO hubris and is not simply CEO hubris at a collective 
level. Indeed, the actions of employees within an organization are more distanced from firm-
level performance outcomes than are top executives (den Niewenboer et al., 2017; Corley and 
Gioia, 2004). As a result, employees lower in an organization are less likely to focus on 
organizational performance metrics than top executives. The accuracy of the positive 
attributions, therefore, are less important for these employees than they would be for top 
executives who are better able to identify the accuracy of the attributions. Further, because 
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organizational hubris is not focused on the superiority of the self, but rather on the superiority of 
the organization, self-importance of organizational members is not necessary for the 
development of organizational hubris. Thus, it is the positive attributions themselves, and not the 
actual performance of the organization, nor the perceived self-importance of organizational 
members, that lead to the development of organizational hubris. 
Positive attributions about the organization are likely to lead to organizational hubris for 
three primary reasons: heightened positive affect, increased organizational identification, and 
elevated confidence in the firm. Firstly, positive attributions about the firm are likely to increase 
positive affect of organizational members. This positive affect often comes in the form of 
increased pride in their company. For example, positive media coverage evokes “strong positive 
emotions” in employees (Kepplinger, 2007: 13), creates enthusiasm and pride in the company 
(Kepplinger, 2007; Kjaergaard, Morsing, & Ravasi, 2011), and can have an important effect on 
morale and job satisfaction (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Korn & Einwiller, 2013). Other research 
suggests that external recognition, such as the company being listed on “Fortune’s Most 
Admired” company list, leads to pride and job satisfaction among employees (Helm, 2011). 
While positive attributions are likely to influence individual employees, evidence suggests that 
emotional arousal following positive external attributes can have a stronger effect when the 
influence is on a group rather than an individual (Muller et al., 2014; Perse, 2001). In short, 
positive attributions about the firm lead to positive attitudes in the organizational members, 
particularly, pride in the organization itself. 
This strong sense of pride is likely the spread quickly throughout the organization 
through the process of emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is “a process in which a person 
or group influences the emotions or behaviour of another person or group through the conscious 
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or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral attitudes” (Schoenewolf, 1990: 50). 
Emotional contagion builds when organizational members perceive emotions being expressed by 
other members (Barsade, 2002, Healey and Hodgkinson, 2017). Consistent with this, displays of 
pride affect interpersonal relationships and how employees communicate with one another 
(Sharrif & Tracey, 2009; Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010). These expressions are transferred 
through both subconscious contagion (Hatfield , Cacioppo, and Rapson, 1993) and more 
conscious emotional comparison processes (e.g., Gump & Kulik, 1997; Sullins, 1991). In the 
case of pride, this process would include the reading of prideful expressions and more explicit 
statements in formal communications about pride in the organization. 
Secondly, positive attributions are likely to increase employee identification with the 
firm. Organizational identification is the extent to which organizational members feel like they 
belong to the organization, share success or failure with the organization, and identify 
themselves in terms of membership in the organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992). As 
organizational members increase in the degree to which they identify with the organization, they 
are more likely to bond with one another (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991) and, in doing so, develop 
collective attitudes (Muller et al., 2014). Positive attributions are important factors in motivating 
organizational members to link their self-concept with the organization (Dutton et al., 1994). 
Indeed, the more attractive the organization, the more likely an organizational member will 
identify with that organization (Dutton et al., 1994). Images created by external attributions are 
embodied by the company’s organizational members and shape their understanding of the 
organization (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Morsing, 1999). For example, in their study of a 
Danish hearing aid manufacturer, Kjaergaard and colleagues (2011) noted that positive media 
coverage increased employee identification with the organization’s vision. Positive attributions 
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of the firm, therefore, allows the collective of organizational members to “bask in the reflected 
glory” of their organization’s successes independent of being responsible for it, leading them to 
identify more strongly with the organization (Cialdini et al., 1976: 367).  
Finally, positive attributions increase the confidence that organizational members have in 
their organization. Indeed, the natural response to external praise is that people will make 
internal attributions about the sources of their success, discounting external factors such as luck 
(Kjaergaard et al., 2011). Thus, positive attributions from the media and other sources lead 
organizational members to attribute their success to internal organizational factors, thus elevating 
their confidence in the firm (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004). In short, organizational 
members start to believe their own press, growing in their confidence for the ability of the 
organization to succeed in whatever they do (Kjaergaard et al., 2011). This belief in the abilities 
of the organization is likely to spread rapidly throughout the organization through the process of 
shared cognition. Indeed, shared cognition allows beliefs to be transferred even without being 
overtly communicated (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001). Therefore, individuals in an 
organization receiving positive attributions are likely to develop overconfident beliefs in the 
organization, and these beliefs are likely to spread to a collective level through shared thought in 
the organization (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Cooke , Salas, Cannon-Bowers & Stout, 2000; 
Elsbach, Barr & Hargadon, 2005; Hodgkinson & Healy, 2008; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994).  
We further note that one positive attribution of an organization is not sufficient to lead to 
organizational hubris. If organization hubris developed through singular positive attributions we 
would be unlikely to have any organizations that were not hubristic. Instead, we argue that 
positive attributions will lead to organizational hubris in one of two situations: 1) where positive 
attributions about the organization persist over an extended period of time, or 2) when an 
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organization experiences a period of intense positive attributions. The more intense the positive 
attributions, or the more persistent the positive attributions, the more likely that organizational 
hubris will develop. Intense or persistent positive attributions are needed to spark emotional 
contagion, employee identification, and shared cognition—the mechanisms that lead to 
organizational hubris.
13
 
In summary, positive attributions lead organizational members at all levels to a 
heightened confidence in the organization, a sense of pride of the role they play and in the 
organization itself, and an increased level of commitment and loyalty stemming from their 
identification with the company. This attitude becomes collectivized through the processes of 
emotional contagion (e.g. Barsade, 2002), shared identity (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1976), and shared 
cognition (e.g. Hodgkinson & Healy, 2008). More formally, we propose:  
Proposition 1: The greater the external attributions, the greater the likelihood that a 
collective hubristic attitude will develop in an organization 
 
Hubristic attitudes guiding organizational culture 
An important assumption, implicit in existing conceptualizations of hubris at the CEO 
level is that when the hubristic CEO leaves the firm, their influence ends and the firm no longer 
makes hubristic decisions. This is because hubris is considered a trait of the individual (e.g 
Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Thus, the influence of a hubristic CEO is somewhat isolated in 
that only the CEO is thought to exhibit hubristic behaviours and, as such, the effect is isolated 
during their particular tenure. Further, by restricting the influence of hubris to the individual 
CEO, this work also suggests that external sources—such as the board of directors—can restrain 
the hubristic influences of a hubristic leader (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997, Li & Tang, 2010). 
                                                 
13
 Importantly, we recognize that emotional contagion and shared cognition, (and to a lesser extent employee 
identification), require that employees have frequent contact with each other. As such, we believe that organizational 
hubris is most likely to develop when a sufficient group of organizational members work in close proximity to one 
another and that our theory may not apply to highly dispersed organizations. 
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One differentiating factor that makes organizational hubris potentially more potent than CEO 
hubris is that over time, a culture will develop guided by a collective hubristic attitude.  
Development of a hubristic culture 
Organizational culture has been defined as a set of shared mental assumptions that guide 
interpretation and action in organizations that defines appropriate behaviours for different 
situations (Fiol, 1991; Martin, 2001; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Schein, 1990, 2010). Canato, 
Ravasi and Phillips (2013) note that 3M is classically described as an organization where being 
innovative is guided by both formal (for example, allowances for scientists to work on personal 
projects on company time) and informal behaviours in the organization (for example, the famed 
story of how interacting in the organization’s choir inspired two employees to invent the post-it 
note).  
Schein (1990: 111) described the formation of organizational culture as “what a group 
learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems of survival in an external 
environment and its problems of internal integration.” Schein described specific goals and the 
means to accomplish them as an example of external adaption tasks. He described agreement on 
the attainment of status and power in the group as an example of internal integration tasks.  
We propose that because of extreme confidence and pride amongst a group of hubristic 
organizational members as they balance their internal and external environments due to the 
positive attributions they are receiving, a culture will develop embodying this gross sense of 
overconfidence in their own and their firm’s abilities.  
Many other adjectives are commonly used to describe culture in order to explain and 
categorize the shared mental assumptions of organizational members that develop (for example 
the familial culture Martin (1992) described in her case study of a fortune 500 company). The 
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reason a familial culture developed in the organization in Martin’s study or an innovative culture 
in 3M in Canato and colleagues (2013) study is that these underlying principles guided learning 
that the group made over time as the internally integrated external problems.  
We propose that because of the extreme confidence and pride pervasive among hubristic 
organizational members, a hubristic culture will develop (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2015)Martin 
1992; Schein, 1990) embodying this sense of overconfidence in their own and their firm’s 
abilities. With every learning opportunity made and external problems adapted to internally that 
is guided by the pervasive hubristic attitude in the organization, the culture will become 
increasingly reflective of this.  
Presence of hubris in three levels of culture. 
  Schein (1985) described three levels of culture: 1) artefacts, 2) espoused beliefs and 
values, and 3) underlying basic assumptions. Artefacts are the visible and felt structures and 
processes that develop as a result of organizational culture (Alvesson & Sveningsson 
, 2015; Martin, 1992; Schein, 1985; 1990). In spite of natural differences in culture based on 
organizational type and industry, there will be some commonalities in cultural artefacts across 
hubristic organizations. Due to the particular nature of hubristic attitudes, hubristic firm’s 
cultural artefacts would likely reflect a high degree of employee identification and emotional 
involvement, such as staying late and overworking. Processes reflecting a high emphasis on 
results, be they financial or quality and a high focus on the brilliance of the organization and its 
staff are likely to develop. There are also likely to be mottos or charters relating the 
organizations continued excellence and their belief in this excellence. This would be consistent 
with our definition of hubris applied to traditional conceptions of cultural artefacts and rituals 
(Martin, 1992; Schein, 1990) 
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 The espoused beliefs and values whether they be personal goals for individuals or their 
aspirations for the organization will again reflect this collective sense of hubris that has 
developed. Scholars have discussed how these shared underlying values are not readily seen at a 
superficial level (Barley, 1983; Rohlen, 1974; Van Maanen, 1973, 1975) but even so they are 
likely to reflect strong pride in the organization and extreme confidence in the abilities of the 
firm and their members. In sum, the espoused beliefs and values in a hubristic organization will 
likely be performance orientated and describe strong belief in the direction of the organization. 
 Similarly, the underlying basic assumptions in a hubristic organization will reflect the 
taken for granted belief that their organization’s behaviour is excellent and better than other 
organizations in their industry and that employees and organizations performance is and should 
be excellent. These types of assumptions will underpin the culture and often create battles of the 
new guard versus the old guard in any cultural adaption (Rosen, 1985) 
Deepening of a hubristic culture through recruitment and employee turnover 
 This development of a high-performance and a high-talent driven culture amongst a 
group of hubristic individuals will establish the expectations for current members but also it sets 
the expectations for new members as they will be educated explicitly and implicitly about how 
the organization operates (Martin, 1992).  
The organization will likely attract new members who seem to adhere to the kinds of 
assumptions that they as a group make (Schein, 1990; Judge & Cable, 1997). Thus, in a hubristic 
firm new and existing members will have to accept this hubristic culture or reject it and leave the 
firm (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; Martin, 2001; O’Reilly et al., 1991; Schein, 1994). This 
concept is described as cultural fit, which is the likelihood that an organizational member will be 
able to adapt to the core beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours that exist in an organization (Kristof, 
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1996). Kristof-Brown et al. (2005) found that employees who fit well with the existing culture of 
an organization had greater job satisfaction, were more likely to remain with their organization, 
and showed superior job performance. Hence in a hubristic firm, it is likely that as a result of 
organizational fit, members who don’t like the hubristic culture developing will eventually leave 
and new hires will increasingly reflect the hubristic attitudes prevalent in the organization.  
For example, Swartz & Watkins (2003) described how the culture in Enron became 
increasingly “frat-boyish” as more people who seemed egotistical and cocky continued to join 
the organization. This continued to the point that this became the norm and she felt like an 
outsider. In this case and many others, hubris is now beyond a shared attitude but is a cultural 
norm. Once the hubristic attitudes and subsequent behaviours becomes the way “things are done” 
throughout the organization in terms of culture, and more new employees are socialized into 
these norms, organizational hubris will be a persistent attribute of an organization at a shared 
level and thus more enduring than individual level hubris so much so the organization may be 
referred to by observers as being hubristic or having a hubristic culture.  
To summarize, because hubris is a prominent attitude in these organizations and the 
positive external attributions provide a problem for the group to internally adapt to, a culture is 
likely to reflect the hubristic principles guiding the group. Over time, this will result in key 
features of hubris present in the organization’s culture. This, in turn, will strengthen the presence 
of hubris as similar individuals will begin to join replacing members who don’t reflect the new 
norms. The presence of hubristic culture makes the construct more enduring.  
Proposition 2: Over time the presence of hubris as a dominant attitude in an organization 
will result in key features of it such as pride in the company and confidence of action 
becoming evident in organization’s culture. 
 
HUBRISTIC ACTIONS 
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Integral to research on hubris is the premise that hubris shapes behaviour, decisions, and 
actions. Executive hubris, for example, has been shown to affect decision-making in relation to 
acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), innovativeness (Tang, Li, & Yang, 2015) and CSR 
activities (Tang, Qian, Chen, & Shen, 2015). Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the primary 
focus of research on executive hubris has been strategic-level outcomes. In contrast, 
organizational hubris shapes behaviour, decisions, and actions, throughout all levels of the 
organization. The pervasiveness of these behaviours, however, means that organizational hubris 
is also likely to have important strategic implications for the organization. Our focus, therefore, 
is the orientation of behaviour, decisions, and actions that result from organizational hubris.  
Organizational hubris is likely to lead to behaviour, decisions, and actions marked by 
high levels of insularity and latitude. Insularity reflects an internal focus that isolates 
organizational members from the opinions or concerns of outsiders. Latitude reflects a freedom 
of action and the ability of organizational members to take bold steps and be free from restrictive 
monitoring.  
Insularity 
We argue that hubristic organizations will reflect an internal focus that isolates the firms 
from the opinions or concerns of outsiders. What we are suggesting here is somewhat ironic. 
While positive attributions from external sources are likely to lead to organizational hubris, once 
established, hubristic organizations turn away from the external influences that lead to their 
hubris. The central driver here is the fact that, by definition, members of hubristic organizations 
have an inflated sense of pride and confidence, in the organization. As such, members of 
hubristic organizations will naturally look inwards at the source of their pride and confidence. At 
the same time, they are less likely to care about the concerns from external sources. After all, if 
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their organization is great, they are likely to discount the potential that anyone outside the 
organization could help it improve. Insularity in behaviour, decisions, and actions, are likely to 
be expressed in three key forms: reduced scanning of the environment, resistance to external 
feedback, and a belief of infallibility of their core products/ philosophy.      
Reduced scanning of the environment. Firstly, we believe that the confidence and 
certainty of organizational members will lead them to become less concerned with scanning the 
environment. This has been described in innovation studies in relation to prominent and 
renowned incumbents becoming complacent and becoming less concerned with new innovations 
and failing to adapt to new technologies (e.g. Danneels, 2002; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). For 
hubristic firms, we believe that overconfidence in their abilities will lead them to similar types of 
reasoning as firms who are complacent due to their confidence in their own technological 
performance. This will lead hubristic firms to act like the firms studied by Henderson and Clark 
(1990) where confidence in the technology they use led them to not look or even be cognitively 
blinded to improvements externally. Henderson and Clark argued that organizations much like 
individuals will cling to old knowledge about the existing technology they use in the face of 
change and be slow to adapt. This is due to the tendency of established firms to overestimate the 
merits of the old technology they use. Because of the elements of pride and self-confidence in a 
hubristic organization, we deem that this type of behaviour is likely to happen. 
 There is a large stream of research in innovation about why highly reputed firms fail to 
adapt (Christensen, 1997; Danneels, 2002; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000, 
Wu, Wan & Levinthal, 2015) and we believe implicit in some of this research is an element of 
hubris on the part of incumbents. Common across this research stream is that incumbents have 
strong belief that the success they had in the past will continue and there is no need to look 
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forward to new technologies. We believe that hubristic firms are likely to fall into this trap due to 
their strong sense of pride and confidence in their abilities. Although, this research also notes 
that this belief in an existing technology will only cause a problem if a new technology iteration 
does not take place (Christensen, 1997). For example, the process of brewing has remained the 
essentially the same for hundreds of years. Therefore, a hubristic organization’s is likely to be 
highly effective due to their focus internally if an external change does not happen.   
Resistance to external feedback. A second feature of the insularity that will develop in a 
hubristic firm is that they will be so confident in their abilities that will believe that with their 
abundant talents they can solve any problems and not take the advice of outsiders seriously. 
Griffin and Tversky (1992) found that people’s confidence in making a decision is determined by 
the balance of arguments for and against any competing hypotheses, with insufficient regard for 
the weight of the evidence. In a hubristic firm, the balance of argument will likely always be 
towards that of the firm and not any critical external voices. This relates to CEO hubris, where 
hubristic CEOs believe that they can do anything with their abundant talents (e.g. Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2008). As we discussed, identity congruence is likely to be 
high (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Kjaergaard et al., 2011) and thus consensus’s within the 
organization against outside advice may quickly form.  
Belief of infallibility of core products/philosophies. Thirdly, we believe that hubristic 
organizations will believe the core products/philosophies of the organization are infallible. The 
increase in identification that causes hubris to collectivize will cause a high level of attachment 
to products and activities that garnered them their inflated pride and confidence. The members’ 
of a hubristic organization’s organizational identity will be wrapped up in the activities that 
garnered those positive attributions related to performance (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; 
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Kjaergaard et al., 2011). For example, in Cialdini and colleagues’ (1976) study, it was the 
college football team that increased organizational member’s pride in their organization and the 
members reflected this pride externally. In hubristic organizations, employees will take pride in 
their organization's attributions and thus gain an inflated sense of their firm’s abilities. For 
example, in the following quote, David Beckham is part of a Manchester United team that has 
been highly successful and has led to him believing that the team could win every game and 
every competition they entered:  
"To win every trophy we play in would be a fitting last season, wouldn't it? The 
Premiership, the European Cup, the FA Cup, the Worthington Cup. And to not lose a 
game all season. Every year, the manager always says: 'We want to go through the whole 
season without losing a game.' That would be great this year." - David Beckham, August 
8, 2001. (The Guardian, 2002) 
 
This can have both positive and negative consequences for a hubristic organization. In 
terms of positives, it will mean that the organization will present a very strong sense of self and 
unity in identity to stakeholders. These firms are likely to have a highly committed workforce 
who have intense pride in their organization. Based on the high levels of identification in the 
organization combined with the collective sense of self-confidence in the organizational 
members, they will likely demonstrate high levels of commitment and loyalty to the 
organization. Secondly, we believe hubristic firms are likely to garner loyalty from consumers 
due to a social categorization effect. Social categorization is where people see themselves and 
others as a group (e.g. Tajfel, 1970).  Zavyalova, Pfarrer and Reger (2017) noted that firms who 
garnered positive attention from the press can cause stakeholders who identify with their 
projected identities categorize themselves with them. In a similar way, we believe hubristic firms 
are likely to garner loyalty from stakeholders due to this social categorization effect (e.g. 
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Ashford & Mael, 1989; Hogg, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1970) as a result of the 
strong values they project. 
A negative consequence of this resistance to external advice can be illustrated by what 
happened to Beckham and his teammates in the 2001/02 season. After having won the Premier 
League in the previous four years and a record-making treble including the FA Cup and 
European Cup in 1999, they had several key injuries and retirements, and competitors had 
invested heavily. However, they as a team made very little changes and the remaining players 
could not perform as well as they had in the past and had a disastrous season where they lost a 
record amount of games, did not win a trophy or get to a cup final. What this illustrates is that in 
a hubristic organization, strong pride and belief in abilities can lead organizational members to 
not make adequate changes that others are making in a dynamic market and thus suffer poor 
performance.  
This lack of change will be likely caused by an escalation of commitment that hubristic 
organizational members will likely display. Escalation of commitment can be defined as the 
proclivity of decision-makers to maintain a losing course of action even in the face of quite 
negative news (Brockner, 1992; Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara and Miles, 2012; Staw, 1997). 
Previous theorizing of social identity and self-categorization has argued that individuals 
identifying strongly with a group are likely to experience conformity of perception and judgment 
(Hogg & Terry, 2000). In a hubristic organization, where high performance is strongly valued, 
failure is less likely to be tolerated and thus the organization is more likely to try to avoid failure 
and reinforce members’ over-estimations and refusal to see warning signs from outsides. Thus, 
in instances where hubristic firms where they require major adaption to external environments, 
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they are less likely to do so and, like Beckham and his colleagues in 2001, continue committing 
to a failing strategy.  
Table 2: Insularity of thought in a hubristic organization 
Element of insularity Potential negative outcomes Potential positive outcomes 
Belief of infallibility 
Not making adequate changes 
throughout organization 
 
Making clear decisive decisions 
Reduced scanning of the 
environment. Missing new trends/ new 
competitors 
 
Focusing on their key offerings 
and products 
Ignorance of outside advice 
Encountering problems with 
regulators 
 
Sticking to their core beliefs 
 
 
To summarize, as a result of the pride displayed by organizational members and their 
confidence in the organizations’ ability, hubristic organizations are likely to become insular in 
their actions, decisions, and behaviour by 1) reduced scanning of the environment, 2) resistance 
to external comments and 3) belief that the core products/philosophies of the organization are 
infallible. More formally we propose: 
Proposition 3: Hubristic organizations will exhibit insularity in the form of a) reduced 
scanning of the environment, b) resistance to external feedback and c)belief in their own 
infallibility. 
 
Latitude 
 A second characteristic of actions, decisions, and behaviour in hubristic organizations is 
latitude. Here we suggest that organizational members will have a freedom to act including the 
ability and willingness to take bold steps. Because of the multifaceted nature of hubris where 
actors are likely to have a strong sense of pride in the organization, they will be also be 
emboldened by their confidence in the organization and will, therefore, display extreme certainty 
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when engaging in existing activities and exploring new opportunities. We, therefore, argue that a 
hubristic organization’s decision making routines will display a freedom of action and the ability 
of organizational members to take bold steps and be free from restrictive monitoring. 
 Decentralized decision making. The latitude characteristic of a hubristic firm is likely to 
manifest itself in terms of power being decentralized in the organization. This is likely to happen 
in a hubristic firm because of the nature of hubris causing organizational members to project 
extreme confidence and certainty in the behaviour combined with positive performance 
attributions about firm performance.  
Firstly, because of confidence and pride exhibited by both supervisors and employees, 
managers will likely delegate a greater level of task freedom to their employees. Research has 
found that delegation in an organization is more likely to happen when subordinates demonstrate 
competence and a sharing of the managers’ objectives (Yukl, 1999). Due to a shared sense of 
confidence and belief in the excellence of the firm, both of these factors will be likely 
demonstrated heavily by subordinates in a hubristic firm and thus over time decision-making is 
likely to be more decentralized.  
 Secondly, because of the self-confidence and certainty displayed by employees in a 
hubristic firm, they will likely seek out more responsibility and avenues to display their talent 
and become a good follower (e.g. Baker,2007, Bligh, 2011, Carsten et al., 2010, Kelley, 2008 
and Sy, 2010) of leaders in their organization. The traits of a good follower are 1) managing 
oneself confidently, 2) being committed to the organization and to a purpose, principle, 3) 
building ones competence and focusing their efforts for maximum impact, and 4) appearing 
courageous, honest, and credible (Kelley, 1988). Hubristic employees are likely to fit the 
qualities of a good follower due to their high levels of pride in the organization and displays of 
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confidence in their abilities as an employee of the firm. Thus, over time it is likely they will 
garner increased responsibility and decision-making will become more decentralized.  
 This type of decentralization in a hubristic firm can be positive in the sense that it can 
incentivize individual employees to be more proactive and innovative. Work in innovation has 
shown that giving space to R&D scientists can be more beneficial to innovation (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) and hubris has been linked to innovation at the executive level (Tang et al., 
2012). However, it has potential to be negative if power is too decentralized and employees have 
the ability to make large bad decisions like in the case of Baring’s bank where Nick Leeson was 
able to conceal billions of pounds of losses.  
Pluralistic ignorance and a decrease in checks and balances. A second manifestation of 
latitude in a hubristic firm is that they are likely to have fewer mechanisms of control or 
dissenting voices in relation to organizational action. We believe this is due to the phenomenon 
of pluralistic ignorance which will likely develop in a hubristic firm. Pluralistic ignorance is a 
decision making bias that occurs when the private opinions of individuals are contrary to group 
norms and, as such, they do not voice their concerns and assume no one else holds their view 
(Katz & Allport, 1931; Miller & McFarland, 1987, 1991; Miller & Nelson, 2002; Miller, Monin, 
& Prentice, 2000; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). Pluralistic ignorance has been shown to develop in 
various situations amongst formal groups, informal groups and organizations (Miller, Monin & 
Prentice, 2000). It can also be responsible for the perceived acceptance of negative group 
behaviour such as racial discrimination (Fields & Schuman, 1976), food prohibitions (Kitts, 
2003) and anti-social behaviour (Matza, 1964). 
In management, pluralistic ignorance has been shown to systematically affect outside 
directors of boards during conditions of low performance, where directors underestimate the 
  
 
91 
 
extent to which fellow directors share their concerns about the direction of the firm’s strategy 
and, as a result, fail to voice their concerns to the group (Westphal & Bednar, 2005). Westphal 
and Bednar posited that due to this underestimation, failing strategic direction often continues 
beyond when it should at the corporate board level.  
 We believe that organizational hubris acts as an underlying mechanism for this decision-
making bias across the organization also. Miller and Nelson (2002) suggest that an important 
element of pluralistic ignorance is the hesitancy of group members to voice minority opinions in 
group decision making. In hubristic organizations, employees will take pride in their own and 
their organizations attributed good performance and thus gain an inflated sense of their own and 
their firm’s abilities.  
 In a situation where an individual sees something going wrong in their department or the 
broader firm activities, in a hubristic organization, they are unlikely to see any potential allies to 
confide in or support them because of the projections of high confidence and certainty in the 
performance of the firm. This is consistent with broader conceptualizations of pluralistic 
ignorance where group members will not speak up due to conflict with group norms (E.G. Miller 
and Nelson, 2002). Using the Enron example again, Sherron Watkins was deeply worried about 
escalating wrongdoing in Enron, which had been happening for many years, but didn’t officially 
report her concerns to the CEO until 2001 until after a lawsuit had been filed against the 
company by shareholders in 2000 (Swartz & Watkins, 2003). In her book on the scandal, she 
cites the high-performance culture that had developed where she saw no allies as a reason for this 
failure to act.  
  The result of pluralistic ignorance is to reduce checks and balances in hubristic 
organizations. In one way this can be good for a hubristic firm in the short run because it can 
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reduce the barriers placed on employees to perform to their best potential, like the traders at 
Enron. However, like the traders at Enron, this is likely to cause problems for a hubristic firm in 
the long run as if member’s start being excessive or risky in their behaviour due to 
overconfidence (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005), due to the presence of pluralistic ignorance, 
there is unlikely to be are large amount of resistance to it.    
Over-optimism in future planning. One psychological bias which is deemed close to 
hubris is that of over-optimism (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Over-optimism can be defined as the 
tendency or inclination to perceive an event or action as more likely to result in a favourable 
outcome in the future, irrespective of the objective probability of that outcome actually occurring 
as opposed to hubris which is concerned with current behaviour (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) 
and not expectations for the future. For example, an individual could be low in confidence about 
their current actions but overoptimistic about their future.  
The consensus in management and finance literature is that the two are distinct 
(Bazerman, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; Simon, Houghton & Aquino,1999). But, because 
both constructs rely on high levels of confidence and certainty, they often co-occur (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). Therefore, in a hubristic organization, there is likely going to be over-optimism 
towards the future. This will likely result in hubristic organizations having little planning for 
contingencies as they both believe they are the best now and have an unrealistic view of their 
performance in the future.  
Thus, we believe hubristic firms will likely have structures geared towards high growth 
with limited reserves. This again can have both positive and negative outcomes for a hubristic 
organization. In terms of positive effects, hubristic organizations will likely be seen by 
competitors as strong and fast movers. While this is positive, it runs the risk of any 
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overoptimistic behaviour that it can backfire if external circumstances change, much like the 
behaviour of some investment banks and their employees in relation to sub-prime mortgages 
documented by Lewis (2010).  
 Grand statements. At the individual level, a marker of hubristic behaviour is increasingly 
outlandish behaviour such as major acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier & 
Tate, 2008) or in the classic story of Icarus, flying too close to the sun (Petit & Bollaert, 2012). 
We believe that this behaviour will likely be exhibited by hubristic firms also. Because members 
will be high in confidence, projects that will be undertaken will likely be grand in nature. 
Therefore, much like the choice to make bold actions that have been especially described at the 
individual level, across an organization, it will mean that there will be an orientation over time 
towards grand projects as opposed to adhering towards the status quo in the industry. 
Proposition 4: Decision-making routines in a hubristic firm will reflect a latitude of 
action where decision-making will be more decentralised, checks and balances will be 
lowered and there will be over-optimism and a lack restraint in future planning. 
 
Table 3: Latitude of action in a hubristic organization 
Element of latitude Potential negative outcomes Potential positive outcomes 
Decentralized decision making 
Rogue traders 
 
Getting the most out of 
employees 
 
Pluralistic ignorance and a 
decrease in checks and balances 
 
Problems will be identified too 
late 
 
Streamlined decisive decision 
making 
Over optimism in future planning 
Not planning for contingencies 
 
Quick growth orientation 
Grand Statements 
Overcommitting resources Large wins 
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We believe both insularity and latitude  will develop simultaneously due to the nature of 
key elements of the construct: pride and self-confidence. Previous studies have shown that 
groups high in pride will likely have a strong attachment to what they have done in the past 
(Basch & Fisher, 2000). While a group high in self-confidence will likely be both confident their 
actions in the past were correct (e.g. Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Hayward, Forster, Sarasvathy, 
& Fredrickson, 2010) and have high levels of optimism that they will be successful in the future 
(e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005).  
All the positive outcomes above are linked by the fact that they allow the hubristic firm to 
focus their attention on what they are good at and be decisive in their actions. Previous research 
has deemed attention being important to decision-making (e.g. Ocasio, 1997) and the inability to 
focus on a task can lead to sub-optimal decision-making (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963). A belief of 
infallibility, reduced scanning of the environment and ignorance of outside advice all allow for 
focus on what the organization does well without getting distracted as it makes decision making 
much less complicated. Similarly, the elements of latitude are linked by the fact that they all 
encourage extreme levels of decisiveness in actions relating to big decisions. Decentralized 
decision making, pluralistic ignorance and a decrease in checks and balances, over-optimism in 
future planning and grand statements all refer to bold decision-making that is made decisively. In 
contrast, large organizations often suffer from a decoupling of the leadership and the operational 
core (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1978) and develop a bureaucratic orientation. 
Much like several individual-level studies of hubris (Li and Tang, 2010; Tang et al., 
2015), we believe that the external environment will likely dictate the outcomes of hubris. If the 
insularity and latitude of action displayed by the organization aligns with the external 
environment, then there are likely to be positive outcomes whereas if it doesn’t align with the 
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environment (i.e. the firm fails to innovate correctly due to low scanning of the environment, pay 
attention to regulators’ concerns or changing financial trends) then there are likely to be bad 
outcomes.  
The behaviour of Uber can serve as an example of both insularity and latitude and has 
resulted in both positive and negative outcomes. They have displayed latitude in their rapid 
growth of their service and their bold moves into new territories. In Uber’s case, the latitude that 
comes with hubris has been beneficial. However, insularity has caused them major problems in 
terms of not listening to stakeholders concerns. The most marked example of this was a highly 
publicized dispute with regulators in London, one of their biggest markets (Cox, 2017). It seems 
throughout the organization, members took actions that contradicted advice and suggestions by 
regulators to the point that the company had their license revoked in the city pending an appeal 
(Reuters, 2017). Uber serves as a good example of how depending on the reactions of the 
external environment to their hubristic behaviour, the consequences can be either good or bad. 
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Figure 1. Process of organizational hubris 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this manuscript, we have proposed the concept of organizational hubris as a collective 
attitude marked by an inflated sense of pride and confidence in the organization that becomes a 
pervasive characteristic of the organization and its members. Over time it can become a guiding 
feature of an organizations culture. We have also noted how organizational hubris affects 
organizational action in terms of creating an insularity in the organization where they become 
resistant to external criticism and latitude, where organizational members will have a freedom to 
act including the ability and willingness to take bold steps. 
The core focus of this discussion is on creating a distinct construct that accounts for 
behaviour, organizational action, and decision-making orientations that extend beyond the C 
suite or the influence of one executive. In doing so, we argue that organizational hubris is a 
persistent and enduring characteristic that can cause both positive and negative outcomes. We 
argue that this is a phenomenon worthy of attention in its own right and examining these types of 
organizations can aid our understanding of the strategic behaviour of positively attributed firms 
more generally.  
Theoretical contributions 
Firstly, our theoretical framework expands our knowledge of the effects of hubris in an 
organizational context. This includes a perspective that hubris can occur as a collective 
organizational construct that extends the individualistic view focused on executives that 
dominates extant research. Our theory extends research on individual-level hubris (Billett & 
Qian, 2008; Li and Tang; 2011; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Roll, 1986; Sadler-Smith et al., 
2016) by showing the mechanisms by which hubris collectivizes in an organization. We show 
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that due to the nature of organizational hubris as a collective attitude it can become engrained in 
organizational culture. Instead of being limited to one person who can be replaced or limited by 
structural factors at the board level (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Li and Tang, 2010) 
organizational-level hubris can become engrained in an organization and thus be more enduring. 
Secondly, we extend work on the strategic benefits of hubris for organizations. While 
most previous studies have described negative consequences for organizations (E.g. Billett & 
Qian, 2008; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Roll, 1986) some studies have posited that there may 
be positive effects of individual-level hubris on outcomes. These include firm innovation (Tang 
et al., 2015) and persisting in entrepreneurial behaviour (Hayward et al., 2009). We extend this 
line of reasoning by arguing that organizational level hubris can have beneficial outcomes for 
firms where it allows them to avoid external distractions and focus on what they are good at and 
secondly where it allows them to maximize their growth and performance. In line with previous 
research, we provide a caveat that it is environmental factors (Li and Tang, 2010; Tang et al., 
2015) that will more likely lead to hubris being harnessed beneficially.  
Thirdly, we contribute to a growing literature on explaining the phenomenon of 
positively attributed firms making major errors of judgment or engaging in wrongdoing. We 
build on work done by Mishina and colleagues (2010) who posited that a link between hubristic 
managers and the propensity to increase risky behaviour by firms by explicitly linking  hubris 
with decision-making orientations in an organization (notably insularity and latitude) and how 
this can lead to negative outcomes. Here, we posit that environmental factors (Li and Tang, 
2010; Tang et al., 2015) and internal factors (Westphal & Bednar, 2005) are key to these factors 
turning negative. Taking the classic example of hubris of Icarus, if the day that he and his 
brothers flew too close to the sun was cloudy he may have survived flying too close to the sun 
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and it would be observed as excellent performance. Conversely, if the weather was extremely 
humid, they may have fell to the death even sooner.  
Practical contributions 
Our theoretical framework has several implications for practitioners. Firstly, it provides 
managers with increased information about how positive attributions can lead to unexpected 
outcomes. It, therefore, gives managers the impetus to mediate or challenge the message of 
positive attributions reaching organizational members. This is important because as we theorize, 
once it collectivizes it may be difficult to disrupt.  
Secondly, if managers can identify highly attributed competitors as displaying hubris 
then, based on our discussion regarding organizational hubris’ effect on actions, they can have 
insight into the type of actions these competitors may make. Similarly, if a manager identifies 
their own firm as behaving hubristically, instead of the long process of cultural change, they can 
attempt to steer the organization into areas where they will benefit from being hubristic and not 
receive negative outcomes.  
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PAPER THREE: A RISING TIDE LIFTS ALL BOATS? EXAMINING THE 
CELEBRITY SPILLOVER EFFECT  
 
ABSTRACT 
Social approval assets have a variety of effects on relationships and behaviors in a business 
context for a focal actor, yet past research is unclear on whether mere competition with an 
actor high in a particular social approval asset can have benefits for others. In this paper, I 
theorize a positive spillover effect from focal celebrity actors to competitors occurs as a by-
product of the attention the focal actor receives. I test my hypotheses using a novel data set 
from professional mixed martial arts (MMA) between 2009 and 2017. My  findings generally 
support my  theoretical arguments, providing evidence about how celebrity spills over to 
provide financial and social benefits to non-celebrity rivals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The effect of social approval assets on competitive outcomes is key to several 
important conversations in management research. For example, firms with a high reputation 
can charge premium prices (Rindova et al., 2005; Shapiro, 1982, 1983), gain better access to 
needed resources (Fombrun, 1996), achieve better financial performance (Deephouse & 
Carter, 2005), and increase their chances of survival in a competitive environment compared 
to low reputation competitors (Rao, 1994). Similarly, a firm’s high status can influence its 
positioning in a market (Podolny, 1993) and the likelihood of being offered opportunities 
(Washington & Zajac, 2005).  
Further, management scholars have begun to investigate the effects of celebrity on 
business outcomes,  such as individual performance evaluations (Cho et al., 2016), leaders’ 
strategic behaviors (Lovelace, Bundy, Hambrick & Pollock, 2017) stakeholders’ perceptions 
(Pfarrer, Rindova, and Pollock, 2010), employee engagement (Kjærgaard, Morsing and 
Ravasi, 2011), acquisition premiums (Cho et al., 2016), alliance formations (Hubbard, 
Pollock, Pfarrer, and Rindova, 2018), and shareholder value (Koh, 2011).  
Taken together, past management research on reputation, status, and celebrity has 
theorized and shown how each of these social approval assets affects competitive outcomes, 
with its focus being predominantly on the focal firm. More recently, some research has begun 
to investigate how the focal firm’s reputation or status affects competitors, most typically in a 
negative way. This type of effect, where the behavior or attributes of a primary actor alters 
the standing of a cognitively related actor or actors, is commonly called a spillover effect 
(Zavyalova et al., 2016). For example, scholars have demonstrated that merely competing in 
the same industry can lead to negative reputation and status spillovers (Boutinot et al., 2015; 
Graffin et al., 2013; Jonsson et al., 2009; Kang, 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2016). Scholars have 
also shown that low reputation (Hsu, 2004; Petkova, 2014; Petkova, Rindova & Gupta, 2008) 
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and low status (Podolny, 2005; Shane and Cable, 2002; Washington and Zajac, 2005) actors 
can gain benefits by engaging in co-operative behavior with actors high in the asset. The 
nature of gaining benefits through a positive association with high-reputation or high-status 
actors is based on the zero-sum assumption that an actor low in the asset show through the 
association that they are better or more connected than their peers who are in a similar 
position to gain a boost.What has not been investigated, however, is whether the positive 
effects spillover effects from social approval assets can accrue through competition and non 
co-operative behavior. 
In this paper, I focus on how celebrity alters the outcomes of competitive interactions 
for non-celebrity competitors in terms of subsequent performance and social standing. 
Celebrity refers to an actor that attracts broad audience attention and highly positive 
evaluations (Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006). Specifically, I theorize celebrity is non-
rivalrous: As such, the asset can be shared in a non-zero-sum manner between celebrity 
actors and competitors. I build on theory of celebrity formation (e.g., Lovelace et al., 2017; 
Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2017) and narrative analysis (Margolin, 2007) to argue 
that a celebrity actor assumes the role of a protagonist and its competitors become secondary 
characters in positive press narratives. In turn, I theorize that the construction of these 
narratives has positive effects on rivals’ performance and social standing. Further, I theorize 
that the spillover effect between celebrity and non-celebrity competitors is durable, even if 
the competitive interaction had a negative outcome for the non-celebrity.  
I test my hypotheses on a sample of competitive interactions in professional Mixed 
Martial Arts (MMA), the fastest growing sporting industry in the world (Adams, 2017). 
Through inspecting fan-voted awards and industry magazine covers, in the Ultimate Fighting 
Championship (The largest MMA league in the world), I identified celebrity competitors and 
focused on the effects of their engaging in a bout with non-celebrity competitors. Consistent 
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with my hypotheses, my results indicate that a competitive interaction with a celebrity has a 
substantial effect on both earnings and status ranking of non-celebrity competitors. I also find 
an effect on earnings and rankings in the periods after the interaction regardless of the 
outcome of the fight. The UFC is a suitable context to study the effects of celebrity because 
of the clear competitive interactions (i.e., scheduled bouts) that take place and the level of 
information available on other confounding factors. 
I contribute to the social evaluations and strategy literatures in several ways. First, I 
show how a focal actor’s celebrity, unlike other social approval assets, can benefit 
competitors (cf. Cho et al., 2016; Koh et al., 2011). Celebrity’s non-rival and positive 
spillover effects extend our understanding of an industry’s competitive dynamics in ways that 
previous research would not predict. Second, I add to our understanding of the relationship 
between celebrity and status by highlighting that associating with celebrities can improve 
non-celebrities perceived status in terms of their positioning in the industries visible status 
hierarchy.  
CELEBRITY, SPILLOVERS, AND COMPETITION 
Celebrity refers to an actor that attracts broad audience attention and highly positive 
evaluations from observers (Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006). The media play an 
integral role in celebrity creation by serving as a conduit between the celebrity actor and the 
audience, many of who have little direct contact with celebrities (Puglisi & Snyder, 2011; 
Zavyalova et al., 2017). A reason for the powerful role of the media in celebrity creation has 
been discussed in several fields of the social sciences. In media studies, McQuail (1985) 
discussed how the media produce culture to order in a short timeframe, creating exciting 
narratives to capture their largely unknown audience’s attention. This is important for 
celebrity research as it is deemed that they are therefore more likely to positively attribute to 
particular characters who provide them with interesting things to talk about (Gamson, 1994). 
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Media narratives garner audience members’ attention and shape their perceptions about 
specific attributes and actions of actors receiving coverage (Kennedy, 2008).  
The media craft a celebrity persona by creating exciting narratives to capture the 
audience’s attention and shape their perceptions about specific attributes and actions of actors 
receiving coverage (Deephouse, 2000; Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Kennedy, 2008; 
Rindova et al., 2005; Westphal & Deephouse, 2011). These narratives give an impression of 
an actor’s personality, talent, and style (McCracken, 1989). For example, for an individual 
celebrity, the media will create fully developed character (Hayward et al., 2004)/ 
 In a business context, celebrity creation has been discussed at the individual and 
organizational levels. Individual, or CEO, celebrity develops due to the CEO’s 
nonconforming actions and the media’s over-attribution of firm actions to the CEO (Hayward 
et al., 2004). Similarly, the media help create organizational celebrity by creating a 
“dramatized reality” when reporting on firm actions (Rindova et al., 2006: 50). Firms 
facilitate this process through nonconforming actions, including those that are salient and 
socially significant Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2017). What is important to note 
here as that extant work dictates that it is the narrative format of press reporting and 
interesting and exciting characters that develop celebrities and what one does not need to 
show to become a celebrity is relative dominance compared to others.  
Spillover effects 
 A “spillover” occurs when the behavior or attributes of a primary actor alters the 
standing of a cognitively related actor or actors (Haack et al., 2014) In this way, spillovers 
tend to occur in industries or groups of individuals or organizations that observers consider 
similar, and have usually focused on negative reactions to one actor affecting other similar 
actors around them. Negative spillovers have been theorized and shown to affect firms’ 
legitimacy (Jonsson et al., 2009), reputation (Boutinot et al., 2015; Kang, 2008), social 
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approval (Zavyalova et al., 2012), and status (Graffin et al., 2013) in various settings, 
including financial services, transnational governance, architecture, the chemical industry, 
and politics.   
 Positive spillovers have been shown in studies of high reputation (Hsu, 2004; 
Petkova, 2014; Petkova, Rindova and Gupta, 2008; Rindova, Petkova and Gupta, 2007) and 
of high status (Podolny, 2005; Shane and Cable, 2002; Washington and Zajac, 2005) where 
the spilloverspillover occurs through friendly affiliation. Low-reputation firms borrow 
reputation from high-reputation others to improve their standing in their industry (Hsu, 2004; 
Petkova, 2014; Petkova, Rindova, and Gupta, 2008; Rindova, Petkova and Gupta, 2007). For 
example, new ventures will sacrifice around a 10% premium in the cost of an offer to affiliate 
with high-reputation Venture Capitalists  (VCs) in order to signal their own high quality 
(Hsu, 2004), while high reputation VCs are more likely to invest in risky new emerging 
sectors than low reputation VCs (Petkova, Wadhwa, Yao, & Jain, 2014). Status is gained 
through association and the increased affiliations (Washington and Zajac, 2005). Similarly, 
actors with low status use higher status affiliations to gain advantage (e.g. Podolny, 2005; 
Shane and Cable, 2002) and improve their network position (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Pollock 
et al., 2010). This area of study has exclusively focused on alliances where an actor low in a 
social approval asset formally associates themselves with another actor high in that asset, and 
then others will think better of them due to this affiliation. 
 It seems from extant research that the only way to gain a positive spillover effect from 
high reputation and high status is through non-competitive means (Hsu, 2004; Petkova, 2014; 
Petkova, Rindova and Gupta, 2008; Podolny, 2005; Rindova, Petkova and Gupta, 2007; 
Shane and Cable, 2002; Washington and Zajac, 2005). This again speaks to the rivalrous 
nature of these assets where you show you are better or more connected than your peers who 
are in a similar low possession of the asset to gain a boost. High status and reputation actors 
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show they are better than competitors who have lower levels of the asset through 
competition. This suggests that a competitive interaction between an actor low in status or 
reputation is unlikely to result in any positive spillover effects due to this rivalrous nature of 
these assets. Currently we don’t know anything about how celebrity can be shared or passed 
between competitors, but because of its non-rivalrous nature that I will explain in my 
hypotheses, it should work differently. Little social evaluations research has focused on the 
potential effects of competitive interactions between competitors with differing amounts of a 
social approval asset (cf. Washington and Zajac, 2005). Extending current research on social 
evaluations, spillovers, and competition, I develop theory to argue that a focal actor’s 
celebrity serves as a non-rivalrous social approval asset that can transfer positive economic 
and social benefits to competitors.  
HYPOTHESES 
The celebrity business actor is a character used by the media to tell exciting stories 
(Lovelace et al., 2017; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2017). Looking more closely at 
extant arguments regarding celebrity development and their grounding in narrative theory, I 
theorize that the media will also develop secondary characters in their narratives.  
Furthermore, these secondary characters will benefit from the attention and positive affect 
being directed towards the focal, celebrity actor. In the following hypotheses I will theorize 
that this increase in attention will lead to performance benefits in terms of increased income 
and social benefits in terms of increased visibility in the industry’s status hierarchy. 
Media narratives, secondary characters, and the celebrity spillover effect 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2003: 1169) defines a narrative as a “spoken or 
written account of connected events; a story.” Narratives are used to provide explanations 
and sense making by journalists (Hayward et al., 2004), managers (Sonnenshein, 2010) and 
organizations (Weick, 1988). People and organizations have a natural tendency to convey 
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information in a narrative format (Vaara, Sonnenshein & Boje, 2016). For something to be 
considered a narrative, it must have developing action (often described as a plot) and 
characters who the action situates around (Czarniawska, 1997). The two main types of 
characters are primary and secondary characters (Duncan, 2006).   
Primary characters or protagonists are the chief actors in a story who propel the action 
forward (Duncan, 2006). While a protagonist is a term from fiction, its use is also common in 
descriptions of how the media works (McQuail, 1985). For example, Apple is a protagonist in 
the story of the emergence of PC. Secondary characters are recurring characters who are of 
lesser importance (DiBattista, 2011), who in the story of the PC could be Compaq, Lotus and 
later on Dell. According to Abbott (2007) it is the relationship between peripheral and main 
characters that drive narrative and without a multitude of characters, a cohesive story cannot 
exist. For example, in the mid-1980s newspaper coverage focused on the conflict between 
Apple and various competitors, made Apple’s behavior distinctive but at the same time 
brought these companies as secondary characters in narratives concerning Apple. This 
reflects the commonly held belief in narrative and literary studies that it is a complex 
interweaving of different characters, motivations and actions generally focused around a 
central narrative that tells an interesting story (DiBattista, 2011; Wood, 2008).  
The media are incentivized to distill, simplify, and dramatize complex information 
about actors to keep constituents’ attention (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1997). Much like 
characters in a novel (Forster, 1927), the media will provide emotions and motivations to the 
individuals and organizations they cover and regularly develop primary and secondary 
characters. In modern literature there are almost no examples of purely single-character 
stories as writers use interactions with other characters to develop the main character and 
develop the narrative (DiBattista, 2011). This logic also applies to the media who try to 
capture the reader’s attention with developed characters (McQuail, 1985).  If as Zavyalova et 
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al. (2017) and Lovelace et al. (2017) theorize, celebrity actors are cast as main characters in 
media narratives, then there will inevitably be more characters than just the protagonist. 
Much like characters in a novel (Forster, 1927), the media will provide emotions and 
motivations to the individuals and organizations they cover and regularly develop primary 
and secondary characters.  
Extant research has placed the celebrity actor as the primary character in media 
narratives but has not discussed who the secondary characters are. In an industry context, 
competitors are likely to be prominent secondary characters as they offer chances for conflict 
and character development which is deemed the main purpose of a secondary character.
14
 
Using the Apple example again, the conflict with competitors gave the press the opportunity 
to explain the motivations and character of Apple and Steve Jobs to their audience. 
Therefore, as the press develops interesting narratives about focal celebrity actors, 
competitors will emerge as secondary characters as these narratives develop and media 
coverage increases.  
This role as a secondary character means that these competitors will in turn receive 
increased press coverage as they are placed in narratives with the celebrity actors. Thus this 
will increase the attention of stakeholders on the non-celebrity secondary characters. I deem 
that competitors will likely be see benefits of this increase of focus on them and I deem, that 
it will have both performance based and social ramifications.  
Increase in financial performance for non-celebrities   
 I know that the main characters of celebrity building narratives receive benefits in 
terms of opportunities and remuneration (Wade et al, 2006).  These studies have argued that 
because celebrities have increased attention on them and this can be taken advantage of terms 
of being offered opportunities that others will not (Rein et al., 1997) , and negotiate higher 
                                                 
14
 While competitors provide an obvious source of conflict, we acknowledge that other actors such as regulators, 
suppliers, unions etc., are likely to be also cast as secondary characters. 
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salaries (Wade et al., 2006). I deem it highly likely that with the increased attention brought 
to competitors through their presence, as secondary characters in celebrity building narratives 
too will seem accrue financial benefits. I see three reasons why this will be the case, which I 
will now explain.  
Firstly, mere exposure to larger audience has been shown to increase positive affect to 
an actor. Exposure to an actor leads to increased positive evaluations of the actors in three 
primary ways. First, it will make the actor more familiar to their audience. Studies have 
shown the repeated exposure to an object increased people’s familiarity with, and subsequent 
positive evaluations of it (Harrison, 1977; Zajonc, 1968). Second, research suggests that 
simple repetition of information regarding an actor increases its acceptance (Hawkins and 
Hoch, 1992). Third, increased volume of information is associated with increased positive 
evaluations of an activity because people with perceive the increased volume as a signal of 
trustworthiness (Heath & Tversky, 1991). According to Pollock and Rindova (2003), all other 
things being equal, a higher volume of information about an actor will increase positive 
evaluations of it. Thus the more exposure the more likely audience members will positively 
attribute to an actor. 
While mere exposure is likely to increase positive affect towards an actor in general, I 
see two further mechanisms by which audience members will generate positive affect 
towards competitors of celebrity actors specifically. First, if the competitor is framed by the 
media as being a similar to a celebrity actor (for example similar traits, strategies, activities), 
audience members who positively identify with the celebrity actor are also likely to positively 
identify with their competitor and thus display positive affect. This is likely to occur due to 
social categorization effects (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If an audience member positively 
attributes towards a focal celebrity actor, they are likely to do the same to another competitor 
of theirs who are described by the press in developing narratives as having similar attributes 
  
 
110 
 
to the celebrity. The logic is that if someone gains social identification from admiration of a 
celebrity (Van Krieken, 2012), they will likely positively attribute to someone who fulfils 
similar a role to the celebrity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).    
Second, if the competitor is framed as an antagonist or foil towards the celebrity 
actor, audience members who dis-identify with the celebrity actor due to identity incongruity 
(Zavyalova, Pfarrer and Reger, 2017) will be more likely to identify with a competitor who is 
being cast in the conflicting role to the “heroic” celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006). Zavyalova 
and colleagues theorized the strength of a message about a celebrity, espousing their values 
and identity will lead some audience members to negatively evaluate the actor while others 
identify positively. This eventually leads celebrities to become infamous amongst one group 
who negatively evaluate them whilst enjoying positive affect amongst the group who identify 
with them, Tajfel and Turner (1979) referred to this phenomenon as in-group and out-group. 
The out-group in this instance will be audience members who dis-identify with the celebrity 
actor. Thus as secondary characters develop whose values are deemed to oppose those of the 
primary character they are likely to garner positive attributions from members of this out-
group. Once again, this process will lead to positive affect from some audience members to 
these competitors due to this social categorization effect. 
Therefore, given these general and specific reasons why increased attention will 
increase the size of an attentive audience aware of competitors of celebrity actors, I deem it 
likely this increased attention will lead to increased income for these competitors. Basic 
economics dictates that if one has an increased pool of potential customers interested in your 
products or services then if the organization is functioning correctly, they will be able to 
increase their earnings (Porter, 1989). 
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.Hypothesis 1: a competitive interaction with a celebrity will be associated with 
an increase in attention for the competitor/rival, with a positive influence on 
earnings. 
Spillover effect on social positioning 
In addition to financial returns, celebrity spillover will likely have social outcomes 
also. Namely it is likely to affect competitors’ status ranking in their industry’s status 
hierarchy. The direct relationship between status and celebrity is not well understood. In a 
recent study, Hubbard and colleagues (2018) argued that although the basis of their socio-
cognitive foundations are different, the two constructs can co-exist and affect frames in 
different ways. Celebrity’s basis of evaluation and development is from a broad audience, 
while status implies a tighter network effect. This implies that the antecedents to their 
development is different. However, foundational views of celebrity from sociology have 
offered a strong link between celebrity and status. According to this view, celebrated or 
famous figures are more frequently used to replace declining figures with high status such as 
members of the clergy or royalty (Boorstin, 1962; Gabler 2003). One can see this in business 
also where the role of prominent family-owned and government-owned organizations are 
declining and the power of personality is increasing (Franks, Meyer & Rossi, 2005). 
According to Mills (1957: 74) “[r]ather than being celebrated because they occupy positions 
of prestige, they [celebrities] occupy positions of prestige because they are celebrated.” In 
this context, Mills used the term prestige but it was referring to highly visible places in the 
social structure which is what most sociological and management scholars would call status.   
Therefore a celebrity actor will not necessarily be high status; however, it is likely 
that due to the increased attention on them, their prominence will increase and it will affect 
their level of status in their industry. A common indicator of status that scholars have 
emphasized is the importance of an actor’s social prominence within a group (Lynn, Podolny, 
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& Tao, 2009; Podolny, 1993).  Status is seen as a fuzzy substitute measure of quality, where 
others try to assume an actor’s quality based on things that they can see such as their 
prominence in a network (Podolny, 1993). Having an increased media presence due to the 
interactions with a celebrity actor will put emphasize on the non-celebrity actor to the group 
they are situated in and thus likely to make them more prominent than others around them not 
receiving the kind of attention. Hence, this is likely to increase in their position in a status 
hierarchy. It is not just mere media attention that causes this effect but attention on what the 
actor is fundamentally known for. This is because the media attention will focus on their 
competitive interactions with the celebrity. For example, a lesser known lawyer who is 
competing against a celebrity lawyer such as Johnny Cochrane or Gloria Allred in a case will 
likely see their attributes and credentials recurrently broadcast in the news reporting. Thus, 
they will be more prominently known in the law network and should see a status shift 
upwards as a result.  
 Some researchers have measured status as high-profile relationships (Pollock et al., 
2010; Stuart et al., 1999). Status scholars consider a relationship high profile if it emphasizes 
the importance of an actor to their network (Pollock et al., 2010). Thus competing against a 
celebrity is likely to send a signal of importance and power given the likely position of 
prestige that the celebrity possesses (Mills, 1957).  As Rindova and colleagues (2006) have 
stated celebrity actors generate emotive responses from a broad audience. It is highly likely 
they will be prominent to their immediate network. Also, because status is rivalrous in nature 
(Podolny, 1993), what others are doing is important. In the case of competing against a 
celebrity, the nature of the prominent competitive relationship is likely to boost an 
organization’s perceived status ranking compared to those around them that don’t have such a 
prominent interaction. Using the law example again, others in the network will likely take 
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notice that a lesser known lawyer is competing against Johnny Cochrane and see this lawyer 
as more prominent in the status hierarchy. 
Hypothesis 2: a competitive interaction with a celebrity will be associated with an 
increase in status. 
Continued effect of celebrity spillover 
The basis of development of celebrity is a result of narrative development in news 
stories (Rindova et al., 2006; Lovelace et al., 2017). While the media has been shown to 
affect the development of other social evaluation assets (Deephouse, 2000), the narrative 
content of the news reporting is not directly related to the value of the construct as a social 
evaluation asset. I will now explain how the architecture of narratives will make celebrity 
spillovers longitudinal.  
For an event to be considered part of a narrative, it must have a preceding state of 
affairs, a current state of action, and a future state of affairs (Czarniawska, 1997). Thus, 
narratives are longitudinal by nature as they link events and related actors together over time. 
Therefore, in traditional storytelling, as a narrative continues over time, some characters will 
come and go as they will not be involved in every connected event but will all be linked in 
the story by the narrative that connects them (DiBattista, 2011).  
Relating these concepts of narrative to press coverage, even after an event has passed, 
actors involved in that event could be linked in future news coverage due to the longitudinal 
nature of narratives. For example, in the case of celebrity actor and its competitor, the press 
will likely dramatize the relationship in a way such as a giant against an underdog or two 
equally matched titans competing. Once the interaction finishes the press will likely discuss 
the outcomes and ramifications in relation to this exciting narrative. Therefore, the media will 
likely continue their high attention on the non-celebrity competitors for a time after the 
competitive interaction has ended until the narrative runs its course. But, due to their need to 
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tell exciting stories and their finite resources (McQuail, 1985) they will likely continue to 
follow the celebrity actor as new exciting narratives develop with other actors as secondary 
characters. For competitors of celebrity actors, I believe an intensity of coverage linking the 
two will occur whilst they are competing together, once the competition ends, news coverage 
linking them will continue but begin to dissipate and go back to a lower level eventually.  
 Audience awareness of the competitors due to their competition with the celebrity 
actor will not dissipate immediately either. Due to the widely distributed nature of the 
information available about the competitors ((Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the 
packaging of the information in a narrative format (Rindova et al., 2006), it is more likely to 
be easily recalled and thus sustain in the memory of the audience. Both individuals and 
organizations have limited attentional capacities (March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997) and 
thus their attention to certain actors will vary over time dependent on their prominence in the 
field or importance to them (Pollock, Rindova and Maggitti, 2008), therefore with the lack of 
news coverage on competitors after a period of competition ends, the attention of their 
audience will wane, especially as new topics of interest emerge. Thus due to the mechanisms 
for increased earnings I discussed previously (increased audience attention and affect) and 
status (increased attention on place in network), the effect of a positive spillover should 
continue for a period of time after a competitive interaction with a celebrity ends but should 
be decreasing in size as the attention of the audience wanes. 
Comparatively, other positive social approval transfers all have been theorised to 
happen through a period of non-competitive interaction with the focal actor. Therefore, once 
the period of interaction ends for these positive transfers of reputation and status, the transfer 
should also abruptly end. This therefore makes the durability of a celebrity spillover a unique 
attribute of that social approval asset. 
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Hypothesis 3: the celebrity spillover effect will continue for earnings and status 
ranking in periods after a competitive interaction with a celebrity actor, but will 
decrease over time.  
Celebrity spillover effect even if celebrity actor is dominant 
 In my introduction, I posited about the non-rivalrous nature to celebrity, in that it can 
be shared as an asset between competitors and that this is not found for high reputation or 
high status. Particularly, because of the underlying mechanism being attention via press 
coverage, I deem this effect likely to take place, even if the celebrity competitor has 
dominated their non-celebrity rival.  
Celebrity actors are likely to have increased access to resources (Rein et al., 1997) 
and attract customers (Amos, Holmes & Strutton, 2008). Also while celebrity and high 
performance are not by definition co-occurring, extant research dictates that that there must 
be some form of high performance at least initially (Rindova et al., 2006). This means that 
celebrity actors are likely to have favorable strategic positions relative to others in their 
industry. Despite this, I argue that in cases where there’s a perceived negative outcome from 
a competitive interaction with a celebrity actor, there will be a net positive even if the 
interaction is seen as dominant performance for the celebrity actor. Two key reasons for this 
will be a) the increase of consumers in the industry and b) the increased awareness of 
consumers of the competitor despite negative coverage. 
 Firstly, whilst celebrity actors bring attention to themselves, they will be framed 
within a particular context which in business will be the industry that they are in (Hayward et 
al., 2004; Allen & Parson, 2006). We know that celebrities will be able to charge a premium 
for their products and thus will likely to be charging higher prices than the industry average 
(Rein et al., 1997). Thus as a larger audience becomes aware of the celebrity it also brings 
attention on the industry and will potentially bring a larger customer base. Thus if customers 
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who are attracted by the celebrity to the industry but cannot afford them will turn to others in 
close proximity and thus even if the celebrity is dominant in a competitive interaction with a 
non-celebrity, that actor should also see a boost in income.  
 Secondly, research in marketing has shown that even bad press coverage about a 
product correlates with higher sales in instances where the product is not widely known 
(Berger, Sorenson & Rasmussen, 2010) and higher word of mouth (Chen & Berger, 2013). 
The argument is that, even if the coverage is negative, the publicity will result in a positive 
return in terms of sales because more consumers are now aware of the company’s products 
and it has been shown they are more likely to buy them (Berger, Sorenson & Rasmussen, 
2010). Thus, I theorize that non-celebrity competitors will still receive a boost from 
competing with the celebrity actor, even if the outcome is perceived as negative, due to the 
increased attention of a broad audience that did not know them before.  
However, I do acknowledge that there is likely to be a boundary to this affect as there 
may be competitors who will not be able to deal with the dominance by the celebrity actor 
and cease trading or choose to move to another segment. As such, whilst I would expect a 
spillover effect where the outcome is negative, I would expect this to be lesser in magnitude 
than the main effect, due to the presence of cases where the competitors stopped trading. 
Similarly, I see that the mechanisms of positioning in a network and high profile 
relationships will still affect a non-celebrity even if the celebrity competitor is framed as 
dominating the competitive interaction by the press. However, again there is likely to be 
more of a boundary to this than a main effect as this is likely to be only effective for 
competitors quite low down in the status ranking. I deem this to be the case because the 
visibility will likely help someone unknown, but wouldn’t likely give much benefit to 
someone who is already known in the network (Podolny, 2005). In fact it may be a negative 
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signal to their network (Podolny, 2005). Therefore, being dominated by a celebrity 
competitor is unlikely to cause a shift for someone higher up in the status order already. 
 Because the social basis of evaluation is different for the other positive social 
evaluation assets that have been shown to spillover (See Devers et al., 2009) I posit that this 
will only happen for interactions with celebrity competitors. Because status relies on 
affiliations (Podolny, 1993) and network centrality (Washington & Zajac, 2005), negative 
outcomes of competitive interactions with high status actors would likely be received 
negatively by external observers because of their rivalrous nature (Carroll, 2015; Deephouse, 
2000; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006) as they provide consumers with a signal of quality. 
However, because of the non-rivalrous nature of celebrity and the increased attention that 
will come with the media reporting of the interaction, a positive effect both financially and 
socially should be felt.  
Hypothesis 4: a positive spillover effect in terms of earnings and status ranking will still 
occur even if the outcome of the interaction is perceived as negative for the non-celebrity 
competitor. 
METHODS 
Sample 
I conducted my  study using data from the Ultimate Fighting Championship, the most 
prominent Mixed Martial Arts league in the world.  I tested my  hypotheses using individual 
competitor level data at the fight level from 2009 to 2016. Mixed Martial Arts is the fastest 
growing sports industry in the world (Adams, 2015). my  context and sample had several 
distinct advantages for testing my  hypotheses. Firstly, it is a context where the development 
of celebrity actors is common and the actors are distinct and visible because it’s a sporting 
industry which attracts a lot of attention and positive affect from consumers (Helms and 
Patterson, 2014) and the regulators of the sport actively encourage celebrity actors to develop 
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with press conferences, the production of promotional material for fights and billboards etc. 
Second, it allowed us to clearly identify competitive interactions between celebrity and non-
celebrity competitors and isolate what happened during and after the interactions because of 
the clear competitive interactions that take place in this context (i.e scheduled bouts) and 
information on subsequent bouts afterwards. Third, the level of information available allowed 
us to control for other confounding social evaluation assets—high reputation and high status.  
I constructed my  initial sample using biographical data from the UFC official website 
(http://www.ufc.com/fighters). This included performance as well as extensive biographical 
data. I restricted the sample to every fighter competing in the weight divisions that related to 
the celebrity actors I identified in the process described later in the dependent variable 
section. my  sample consisted of 2097 individual observations which involved 253 
competitors across five weight divisions who were signed to the UFC over this period.  
Dependent variables 
Earnings 
I measured earnings as the guaranteed earnings for each bout. The UFC is based in 
America and holds roughly 80 events a year, on average, with an expanded international 
presence since 2006. In most American states, the State Athletic Commission releases the 
individual competitor earnings after each event. A bout is agreed upon in principle first, 
which usually makes the industry-focused press, and then the two fighters must agree 
financial terms and when the bout will take place. For each bout, fighters sign a bout 
agreement with each other and the UFC as a promoter. The agreement will detail minimum 
guaranteed payment to each athlete, as such the amount paid differs for almost every fight. 
Seven American states and all international commissions do not release earnings data. After 
collecting all the available State Athletic Commission releases, and to provide a more 
comprehensive sample, I collected estimates provided by MMA journalists and archived on 
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an industry focused website (http://thesportsdaily.com/mma-manifesto/ufc-fighter-salary-
database-salary-main-ufc-career-fighter-earnings-html). These estimates are based on the 
total gate earnings announced by the UFC and previous and post earnings by the individual 
fighters. International estimates accounted for 23 per cent of the sample and domestic 
estimates accounted for 13 per cent of the sample. For ease of analysis, I created a log of 
earnings. 
Status ranking 
Based a commonly used conception of status as a positioning in a social ranking (E.g 
Bielby and Baron 1986; Sørensen 1996; Tilly 1998; White 1970; Washington & Zajac, 2005)  
I measured status as the positioning of a fighter’s bout on a fight card as it is a clear signal of 
an actors positioning in a social ranking. Appearing at the top of a card means a fighter is on 
the poster associated with the card and associated advertising. In MMA like its more 
traditional combat sport sibling—boxing—importance is placed on each place in the fight 
card and goes from most perceived importance to least perceived importance.  
Furthermore, a key element of status is its fuzzy relationship to quality (Castilla, 
2008; Podolny, 1993; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). Following these studies, placement on a 
fight card is not dictated directly by a competitor’s record and past performance, as many 
fighters will headline a card with poor performance for several years. It is likely that a 
weaving of their history, performance, relationship with the promoters, fans and media that 
are likely going to dictate the placement on a card. For example, Dan Henderson was a very 
prominent competitor in the UFC who competed twice in the Olympics in wrestling prior to 
his MMA career, fought for titles in several major fight leagues, including the UFC. 
Henderson lost 8 of his last 10 bouts prior and dropped out the top 15 rankings in the last 
three years prior to retiring in 2017. Despite this poor performance, he headlined or co-
headlined 9 of the associated cards to his bouts. I would thus deem him high status with a 
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questionable reputation. On the contrary, Kamaru Usman has won all his bouts in the UFC 
and all but one in his career (7 and 12-1 respectively) and is ranked number 9 in the world at 
welterweight (as of January 2018) but has not headlined or co-headlined a fight card. I thus 
would deem him high in reputation but without high status.  
To construct this variable, I collected publicly available data on the running order of 
fights on a card and attributed a rank to each fight on the card.  For example, on a card with 
12 fights, I coded the headliner as 1 and the opening bout of the night as 12. A competitor 
would  have high social prominence if they were on the top or near to the top of the bill with 
a descending level of prominence towards the least important. Bouts between highly 
prominent and less prominent competitors occurs rarely if ever, as the UFC prides itself as 
promotor in making the match-ups consumers want to see (Mackenzie & Ruebusch, 2018). 
Thus the bout’s ranking is likely to reflect the social positioning of both competitors and not 
just one if the pair involved. 
Independent variables 
Competitive interaction with a celebrity 
As this paper is focused on interactions with competitors with perceived celebrity 
value, I first identified a parsimonious measure of celebrity competitors in the UFC. Broad 
audience attention and positive evaluations are described as the two elements to celebrity 
creation (Rindova et al., 2006). I used an appearance on the cover the two most prominent 
industry magazines as a proxy for high attention and the winning of a fighter of the year 
award at the annual World MMA awards which is voted on for by the general public as a 
display of positive affect by a broad audience.  
In my  context someone who satisfies these two criteria are being identified as special 
by media and their attentive audience which are both deemed key to creating a celebrity 
(Rindova, 2006). According to Pollock and Rindova (2003) attention is a function of the 
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volume of exposure of audience members. Hubbard and colleagues used high exposure in an 
industry magazine as indicative of possessing this. Following this, I used an appearance on 
several industry focused magazines as indicative of broad attention. I utilised the online 
martial arts archive MA-Mags (http://www.ma-mags.com/) to look at the covers of the two 
most prominent MMA magazines: the UFC Magazine and Fighters Only. Publishers will 
generally only select someone for the cover that will be recognizable as it is a key aspect of 
their weekly marketing (McQuail, 2010) and being exposed to a broad audience again 
signifies broad attention. This gave me a sample of 9 competitors. Secondly, to identify high 
positive affect, which was the second, criteria Rindova and colleagues (2006) discussed,I 
eliminated any competitors who had not won a fighter of the year award at the global MMA 
awards, which is voted on by mixed martial arts fans. Applying these criterion, I identified 5 
celebrity competitors: Georges St Pierre, Anderson Silva, Jon Jones, Conor McGregor and 
Ronda Rousey who competed across 6 divisions with different periods of dominance.  
Given the fight level data I had, I created dummy variables for fights against these 
celebrities (celeb t=0). I then coded for the fight immediately after the celebrity (celeb t +1), 
and the following fight after that (celeb t+2). Given that the celebrities were not prominent in 
the industry immediately and required time to become widely known (e.g Rindova et al., 
2006), I began from the year first either appeared on a magazine cover or won their first 
award (whichever came first). I deemed this would allow for a more accurate demonstration 
of any potential celebrity spillover effects.  
Controls 
I introduced a range of control measures to rule out alternate explanations for increased status 
or increased earnings. 
Fighter history  
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I used several variables to control for multiple aspects of a fighter's history and 
biography that could affect the relationships of interest in my  study. Accounting and finance 
literature has shown an established relationship between past performance and future 
earnings (Gordon, 1959; Sloan, 1996), so I controlled for past performance with data about 
the individual fighter’s careers by controlling for the number of wins as well as the type of 
wins, expecting that those with more knockouts and submissions may be considered more 
exciting and paid more.  I controlled for experience by collecting the year the individual 
fighter joined the UFC, how many fights they had and how many fights they had in the UFC 
or any other global mixed martial arts league. I also controlled for biographical factors such 
as age and sex of the fighter.  
High status 
To clearly show the relationship between celebrity and earnings I controlled for high 
status and coded dummy variables for headliners (Name associated with the promotion of the 
fight) co-headliner (Name and picture also on the poster for the fight) and appearing on the 
main card of a fight card.  
High reputation 
I also coded for high reputation by creating a dummy variable for any fight that was a 
championship fight (for a belt) or for a title eliminator (next in line to fight the champion). To 
get to this position a competitor would need to be ranked highly in the official UFC rankings 
(http://m.ufc.com/rankings/featherweight) and have a recent record of quality. Both of these 
measures adhere to Lange et al.’s (2011) description of reputation as a record of past good 
performance as a guide for future quality. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for my variables. 
The means and standard deviations were calculated using untransformed measures for ease of 
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interpretation. The correlations shown in my  data are reasonably low; I tested for 
multicollinearity in my  regressions using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and the condition 
number. I used linear regressions to calculate the VIF for each model; the results show a 
mean VIF of 2.34 and with no individual VIF greater than the recommended threshold of 10 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The condition numbers were all below the 
recommended threshold of 30 (Cohen et al., 2003). Thus multicollinearity is unlikely to be an 
issue in my  analyses. 
Table 2 provides the main models of my  analyses.  Model 1 contains all the controls 
regressed on my  main dependent variable of logged earnings.  I tested hypothesis 1 by 
including bouts against celebrity competitors (celeb t-0) in model 2. I find strong support for 
my  hypothesis; with a bout against a celebrity competitor correlated with a 197% increase in 
earnings with a p value of 0.00. I tested hypothesis 2 in model 4 with placement on a fight 
card as the dependent variable. Similarly, I found strong support for this hypothesis with a p 
value of 0.00.  Again, this can be interpreted as a substantive change as a bout against a 
celebrity actor moved a competitor up two places on a fight card (with an average of 12 fights 
per card). 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics and Correlations 
  
Mean St. Div 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Earnings 40.8   2.23 1 
              2 Placement on card 5.33 0.08 -0.35 1 
             3 Sex 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0 1 
            4 Year joined UFC 2010 0.09 -0.32 0.11 0.02 1 
           5 Total fights 19.93 0.24 0.27 -0.26 -0.16 -0.12 1 
          6 International level fights 8.00 0.15 0.38 -0.39 -0.09 -0.01 0.63 1 
         7 HighrepCamp2 0.22 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.14 0.14 0.12 1 
        8 Wins 15.81 0.19 0.27 -0.28 -0.16 -0.11 0.92 0.55 0.15 1 
       9 cum_kfo 2.24 0.06 0.34 -0.39 -0.13 -0.13 0.42 0.72 0.1 0.4 1 
      10 Main Event 0.13 0.01 0.41 -0.53 -0.01 -0.17 0.19 0.29 0.07 0.22 0.33 1 
     11 Co-Main Event 0.12 0.01 0.11 -0.38 0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.14 -0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.14 1 
    12 Championship fight 0.07 0.01 0.31 -0.32 0.05 -0.22 0.08 0.17 0.1 0.12 0.24 0.47 0.04 1 
   13 Celeb t-0 0.02 0.00 0.41 -0.15 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.09 0.26 -0.03 0.3 1 
  14 Celeb t+1 0.01 0.00 0.34 -0.11 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.17 1 
 15 Celeb t+2 0.01 0.00 0.12 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.12 1 
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Table 2 
Main regression models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES 
      
              
Total fights 0.044** 0.025 0.031 0.001 0.009 0.001 
 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
International  level fights 0.039* 0.033 0.021 -0.069*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) 
Wins 0.024 -0.013 0.013 -0.020 -0.032 -0.019 
 
(0.025) (0.050) (0.010) (0.027) (0.031) (0.026) 
cum_kfo 0.013 0.013 0.080*** -0.091** -0.104*** -0.098** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.026) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) 
High rep camp 0.087*** 0.067*** -0.056 0.087 0.066 0.086 
 
(0.027) (0.024) (0.058) (0.136) (0.115) (0.138) 
Championship fight 0.049** 0.060*** 0.351*** -1.084*** -1.131*** -1.180*** 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.086) (0.205) (0.155) (0.208) 
Main Card 0.191*** 0.152** 0.059*** 
   
 
(0.071) (0.062) (0.019) 
   
Main Event 0.046 0.061 0.181** 
   
 
(0.044) (0.039) (0.072) 
   
Co-Main Event 0.376*** 0.282*** 0.061 
   
 
(0.089) (0.080) (0.039) 
   
Sex 
   
-0.322** -0.396** -0.340** 
    
(0.164) (0.160) (0.170) 
Debut year 
   
-0.004 0.001*** -0.002 
    
(0.037) (0.000) (0.036) 
Celeb t-0 
 
0.681*** 0.416** -1.836*** -1.844*** -2.111*** 
  
(0.203) (0.183) (0.394) (0.362) (0.450) 
Celeb t-1 
 
0.656*** 0.418*** -0.676** -0.627** -0.646** 
  
(0.183) (0.118) (0.283) (0.296) (0.327) 
Celeb t-2 
 
0.432*** 0.290 -0.625* -0.837** -0.392 
  
(0.131) (0.199) (0.327) (0.390) (0.312) 
       
Observations 1,399 1,396 1,396 1,397 2,097 1,397 
R-squared 0.620 0.684 0.653 
   
Number of id 214 214 214 214 253 214 
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fighter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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My third hypothesis theorizes that this increase in terms of earnings and status 
position will continue to persist for competitors after a period of competition with a celebrity 
actor but will decrease over time as attention on them wanes.  For earnings, as indicated by 
model 2, the period after a bout with a celebrity actor, as indicated by celeb t+1, correlated 
with a 192% increase in earnings and as I theorized, it decreased in bout celeb t+2 with 152% 
increase in earnings again with both p values 0.00. Similarly, for placement on the card as 
shown in model 4, the effect continued into celeb t+1 and celeb t+2 with a substantive drop in 
the value in the increase to 0.63 (p value 0.034) and then a slight increase to 0.84 (p value 
0.032). I deem the larger drop is likely due to the ordinal nature of the variable (Agresti, 
2010). Although it again shows the trend I predict. Therefore, I find ample evidence to 
support hypothesis 3.  
 I also found support for my fourth hypothesis. In models 3 and 6, I ran the same 
models but removed the competitors who had won their bouts against the celebrity actors. For 
earnings, there is a substantial difference in the increase of 1.51% compared to the increase in 
model 1 and interestingly the increase in placement is higher (2.1 versus 1.8). This suggests 
that the quality of competitor of those who lose is potentially lower as they increase the most 
in terms of status but do not see their earnings increase to the same degree. As I 
hypothesized, the effect for those who lose goes away quicker with significance fading away 
at celeb t+2 with the coefficients much lower than the models also containing those who won.  
Robustness checks and supplemental analyses 
I conducted several additional analyses to further explore my theory and results and to 
rule out alternative explanations of my findings. 
Alternative measurement of earnings. The logging of variables to make them more 
normalized in terms of their distribution has become common practice in applied statistics 
(Casella, 2004). However, scholars have noted that particularly for skewed distributions like 
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that of earnings in my study, this can be an issue as it can lead to the misinterpretation of 
results (Casella, 2004; Feng et al., 2012). Thus to ensure the robustness of my results I ran 
models 1 to 3 with unlogged earnings. All four hypotheses are supported in the same way 
with significance remaining within p> .05.  
Additionally, to ensure containing estimates did not compromise my dependent 
variable of earnings, I ran additional models both controlling for the estimates, which was 
insignificant and dropping them in a subsample. Both of these additional analyses did not 
affect the significance of the results. This indicates that my findings were not being driven by 
the estimates in my sample.   
Alternate coding for celebrity actors. To ensure the veracity of my claims, I 
constructed my celebrity variable differently. Firstly, I used a different method to identify 
celebrity actors. I saw Pay per View figures as another good way to identify celebrity actors 
for reasons I will now explain. As a promoter, the UFC garners money from four primary 
avenues; ticket sales, broadcasting deals, sponsorship and Pay per View events. I looked at 
the records for the Pay per View and saw that there was a skew in the distribution of the 
figures towards the top (the average of the top thirty pay per views is an audience of 
1,093,800 whilst the average overall was 477,849). 
In my context a recurrent appearance towards the top of Pay per View records 
indicates both broad attention and positive affect of audience members. Firstly, the numbers 
of people watching indicates a broad audience is aware of them and is comparative to peers 
who have low or medium amounts of attention. Thus, for the high attention I selected an 
appearance the top 30 Pay per View records. According to Pollock and Rindova (2003) 
attention is a function of the volume exposure of audience members. If these audience 
members are paying $60 to see the actor than that indicated attention. Secondly, to identify 
the positive affect of the audience I only selected fighters who appeared 3 or more times as 
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the headliner of a Pay per View event. This made it likely the competitors were there due to 
the sustained positive affect of their audience and not any one off confounding factor. 
Interestingly, this brought up the same list as I identified using my main operationalization. 
Additionally, I pushed the boundaries of the restrictions on the appearance at the top 
of Pay Per View records. I included anyone who was featured in the top thirty results and 
featured in the data. This resulted in 13 extra fighters being added. Expanding the sample 
dropped the significance of all of my models and provides further evidence that my selection 
of celebrity actors was suitable.  
Thirdly, in my main models I restricted the coding of celebrity fighters to bouts after 
they had appeared on the magazine cover or won the award. When I removed this restriction I 
lost significance for celeb t+1 and celeb t+2 for both dependent variables.  This indicates that 
celebrity value is only predicated on the level of attention being placed on the focal actor as 
theorized by Rindova and colleagues (2006). To further explore this point, I looked at the 
average media coverage of the focal celebrities in early years prior to winning an award and 
appearing on a cover, which was 631 articles per year, whereas, the average per year after 
that was 3,479 which indicates a significant difference in the levels of press attention during 
those years. 
Finally, one potential confounding effect I see is that many of the celebrities garner 
high reputations and I do not show in my models whether it is actually high reputation that 
spills over. To test for this, I created a variable for champions to see if becoming the focal 
high reputation actor in a division predicted a change in earnings when the belt was 
transferred from one actor to another. I found no significance for this variable.  
Extended sample for placement on fight card. To keep my results across models 
standardized, I only used observations in my models with placement on a fight card for which 
I had earnings data. I ran the full sample for status ranking and found support for all my 
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hypotheses with little change in the coefficients except for celeb t+2 where there the 
coefficient was slightly larger (.84) than the smaller sample. This shows robustness in the 
effect for status ranking.  
Endogeneity of independent variables. To explore the issue of endogeneity of the  
independent variables on my  dependent variables I ran tests on my  models exploring the 
impact threshold of a confounding variable (Frank, 2000). On earnings as the dependent 
variable, my three independent variables scored highly on the test, which means low 
likelihood of endogeneity. To invalidate the inference for Celeb t=0 and t+1 49% of the 
estimate would have to be due to bias to invalidate the inference. For celeb t+2 21% of the 
estimate would have to be due to bias. Between 296 and 695 cases would need to change to 0 
for the inference to be invalidated. Additionally, following the procedure set down in Frank 
(2000) an omitted variable for all three variables would have to be highly correlated to both 
the dependent and independent variables to affect my results (with a coefficient of .19, .38 
and .21 for between earnings and the three IVs respectively). Thus given my high R
2
s and the 
level of controls and fighter fixed effects, I deem it highly unlikely that there is an omitted 
variable affecting my  results for earnings.  
I followed a similar procedure for my model predicting change in the placement on a 
fight card. To invalidate the inference for celeb t=0, 57.9% of the estimate would have to be 
due to bias, for celeb t+1 the figure is 17.9% and for celeb t+2 the figure is 4.6%. It is highly 
unlikely that celeb=0 and celeb+1 would be affected by bias although celeb t+2 is at threat of 
being affected by bias due to a confounding variable. It is likely that the lower figures for 
celeb+2 for both dependent variables is due to the small number of positive observations for 
that variable which is due to the nature of the data. Given the strong results with the other 
variables, even removing celeb+2 from the models for placement on the card would not affect 
any of my findings in relation to my hypotheses.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Contributions to theory  
This paper makes three major theoretical contributions. my first theoretical 
contribution is to research that has examined the effects of celebrity (e.g Cho et al., 2016; 
Koh et al., 2011; Lovelace et al., 2017; Pfarrer et al., 2010). Specifically I theorized and 
found that competitive interactions with a celebrity actor can improve the earnings and status 
rankings of competitors. This finding supports my theorization that the benefits of celebrity 
as a social approval asset can be shared through competitive interactions. my  theory and my  
findings extends extant work that has only focused on the effect of celebrity on the outcomes 
of the focal celebrity actors or their associated firms (e.g. Hayward et al., 2004; Lovelace et 
al., 2017; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2017). 
My second contribution is in elucidating the relationship between positive social 
evaluations and competition. Specifically I provide empirical evidence that competitors 
receive benefits from engaging in competition with celebrities, even those who have appeared 
to have a negative outcome.  This shows that celebrity as a social evaluation asset can change 
the outcomes of competitive interactions in an industry. This extends work by Washington 
and Zajac (2005), who looked at social evaluation assets and competition in a more static 
way. Also by showing these effects I offer a link between the sociological orientated social 
evaluation literature (e.g. Podolny, 2008; Rindova et al, 2005) and the economically rooted 
industrial organization (e.g. Barney, 1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Porter, 1981).   
Finally, I contribute to social evaluation literature by showing a relationship between 
status and celebrity. I confirm a suggested link from early writing on celebrity (e.g. Boorstin, 
1962; Mills, 1957) by demonstrating that associations with celebrity actors can boost the 
status ranking of non-celebrity actors. In my context, a competitive association with a 
celebrity actor saw non-celebrity actors see a rise in the visibility in the industries status 
  
 
131 
 
hierarchy. This provides evidence of a relationship between the two constructs. I theorize that 
that the visibility element of celebrity aids non-celebrity actors increase their perceived 
prominence to their network (e.g. Podolny, 2008). 
Contributions to practice 
 My findings also have interesting implications for managers. While, my findings do 
not apply to all industries (for example in non-differentiated industries), they have major 
implications on the competitive behavior of firms in industries that are dominated by strong 
personalities or brands. Mixed Martial Arts is similar to service industries where prominent 
celebrity practitioners develop, for example Johnny Cochrane in law or Foster and Allen in 
architecture have a similar standing in their industry as Conor McGregor or Anderson Silva 
in MMA. In these types of industries taking up a case against a Cochrane or bidding against a 
Foster and associates for a major contract regardless of the outcome could be a good strategic 
move based on the empirical evidence I provide in this study.  
Additionally, this type of effect is also likely to be seen in highly differentiated 
consumer facing industries with strong branding such as consumer electronics or mobile 
apps.   Zavyalova and colleagues (2017) argued that social salient actions are important for 
celebrity organizations capturing the press’s attention. I deem in consumer industries where 
there is a lot of cultural and social salience and press attention on celebrity firms, this type of 
effect is likely to be seen. The relationship between Uber and Lyft in taxi hailing apps and 
Apple and Fitbit in Smartwatches can serves as examples of primary and secondary character 
relationships I theorized earlier.  
Therefore, for managers in these types of industries, when making strategic decisions 
in terms of who to compete against should factor in the potential ancillary benefits of 
competing against a celebrity actor in terms of the extra attention it will bring to them. Even 
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if the organization loses the bid or has a small market share against the celebrity, my findings 
show that just competing can bring benefits.  
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CONCLUSION 
In the introduction of this thesis I proposed the research question-- what are 
the antecedents, consequences and effects of celebrity in an entrepreneurial 
organisational and competitive context?  Paper one focused on the antecedents of 
celebrity development for entrepreneurs in the press. Paper two focused on the 
consequences of being highly positively attributed (a key element of the celebrity 
construct) using a socio-cognitive lens of hubris. Paper three explored the effects of a 
focal celebrity actor on those they compete against. In answering the above question 
my dissertation provides three key contributions of the study of celebrity as a social 
approval asset. 
 Firstly, I contribute to our knowledge on the development of celebrity as a 
social approval asset in the press and showing how entrepreneurs being suitable to 
telling broader socio-cultural and technological changes likely influences the amount 
of press attention an actor will receive and also influences how entrepreneurs become 
societal level celebrities through press coverage. Additionally I show how the 
narrative framing of the entrepreneurs in my study by the press in relation to the 
category they belong to potentially affect their development as celebrities.  
Secondly, I contribute to socio-cognitive strategy by theoretically describing 
how through highly positive external attributions, organizations can become hubristic 
and this can affect their strategic actions. By developing the concept of organisational 
hubris I add to the theoretical conversation that has focused almost exclusively on 
hubris of individual executives (e.g., Li and Tang; 2011; Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997; Sadler-Smith et al., 2016).  In doing so I elucidate outcomes of this on 
organizational action.   
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Thirdly, I contribute to literature on the outcomes of the possession of 
celebrity by showing that through the narrative construction of celebrities in the press 
and the non-rivalrous nature of celebrity as a social approval asset, competitors of 
focal celebrity actors can receive spill over affects in terms of performance and social 
standing. This adds to our understanding of celebrity as a social approval asset and 
how competition can be altered by 
 At a broad level, this thesis provides compelling evidence that the way broader 
society views and appreciates both individuals and organizations has important 
outcomes worthy of study by management scholars.  It is also my intention with this 
work to add a socio-cultural perspective the study of entrepreneurship and 
competition. We already have socio-cognitive views of business (c.f. Pollock & 
Rindova, 2003) and cultural views of entrepreneurship (c.f. Johnson, 2007). The 
argument I put forward in this thesis situates itself in between these views as I argue 
that the way society interprets culturally salient business activities or actors can have 
effects on the actors themselves and their industry or society more broadly.  
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